

Volume 2. Number 3. September 2001

Transcendent Philosophy

An International Journal for Comparative Philosophy and Mysticism

Editorial Board

Instructions for contributors

Muḥsin Arjċ

Love in 'Irfān

Gustav Richter

On RĒmċ's didactic poetry

Sayyid AbĒ l-°asan Rafċ'ċ Qazvċnċ (d. 1975)

On the Four Journeys (Risālat ta'iqċq fċ l-Asfċr al-Arba'a)

Jonathan Weidenbaum

Eckhart, Luther, and the Buddha in the Marketplace: Heidegger's Great Synthesis of the Mystical and the Existential

Hamid Hadji Haidar

Tolerance Versus Neutrality: a critical analysis of liberal neutrality

Book Reviews:

John D. Caputo

On Religion, Thinking in Action Series (Sajjad Rizvi)

Richard C. Martin, Mark R. Woodward

Defenders of Reason in Islam: Mu`tazilism from Medieval School to Modern Symbol (Mehdi Aminrazavi)

Sabine Schmidtke

Correspondance Ivanow-Corbin: lettres  chang es entre Henry Corbin et Vladimir Ivanow de 1947   1966, ed. (Sajjad Rizvi)

James McEvoy,

Robert Grosseteste(Patrick Quinn)

Barry Miller

A most unlikely God: a philosophical enquiry into the nature of God (Sajjad Rizvi)

Matthew T. Kapstein,

The Tibetan Assimilation of Buddhism: Conversion, Contestation, and Memory (Eric M. Buck)

Jonardon Ganeri

Philosophy in Classical India (Sajjad Rizvi)

Books published in Iran

Books received

Recent Articles

Transliteration Table

Love in 'Irfān

Muḥsin Arīkç, Islamic Centre of England, UK

Abstract

This short article examines the role and presentation of love in Islamic mysticism, illustrated by the verse of major Sufi poets. Love is the way of the mystic who seeks to efface himself in his beloved in the unio mystica. An important aspect of mysticism in Islam is the way of love, of the fidèles d'amour as the late Henry Corbin put it. He describes love as a central feature of the tripartite relationship between God, man and the cosmos.

'Irfān (Islamic mysticism) as a discipline is a commitment and mystical intuition, and not merely a theory. In his endeavour, the 'irif annihilates himself in his beloved. This annihilation, which is the manifestation of true commitment, is the reality of cognition in 'irfān. The fusing of total commitment with absolute annihilation is known as 'love'.¹ Accordingly, 'irfān becomes the 'science of love' or the 'art of loving', but a very special love for a very special beloved, the most beautiful and the most complete. As Shaykh Bahj'ç (d. 1621) says:

A science that gives you a new life
Is the science of love, so listen to me?

Within the spiritual journey, the way of 'irfān is nothing but serving the beloved.

°jfi" says:

The wrangling and the noise of the madrasa have occupied me,
Let me be with the beloved and the wine for a while.

Apart from the art of loving, no other art or knowledge can lead one to the beloved.

Again °jfi" has stated:

I am preoccupied with the art of loving and hope that
This noble art would not lead me stray, the way other arts did.

What is Love?

Love in this context cannot be defined in terms of abstract mental definition. It can only be explained by one's heart and experience. By attaining love, the heart can comprehend abstract mental concepts.

Whatsoever I say in exposition of love
When I come to love it, I am ashamed of that explanation.
Although verbal commentaries are more precise and eloquent
Yet love detached from any commentary is clearer.
Whilst the pen was making haste in writing,
It split upon itself as soon as it came to love.
Intellect lay down helplessly from describing love.
It was Love that gave the true account of love and loving.
The proof of the sun is the sun.
And if you require the proof, then do not turn away from it. 2

Because love as a concept is not of a theoretical nature like other issues, it is very difficult to define. We cannot use mental concepts or abstract ideas to construct a framework by which love can be fully described. In general, because definable concepts are similar in some respects and dissimilar in others to real occurrent issues, they can be described and defined. This contrast of commonality and distinction that exist within the nature of these realities can be used by the mind to create a boundary and present a perceivable definition that constitutes a mental picture of that reality. With such a mental picture, one can separate one concept from others. But 'love' like 'existence' has no similitude or equivalent. Hence the above method, or the use of contrast, cannot be utilised to construct a perceivable definition for 'love'.

Like 'existence', 'love' is unique. It has no opposite or contrary. Accordingly, no concept can be found that in some respect has some similarity and in others it is opposite to love. What we have stated earlier about the impossibility of defining love should not be misinterpreted into believing that love cannot be perceived. Love can be comprehended from the external signs that accompany it. These external signs and indicators; though cannot be taken as the true definition of love, they can, however, be used to familiarise the mind with this unique reality.

There are three major signs of love: attachment and devotion, perception and understanding, pleasure and delight.

Where there is no commitment, there is no love; where there is no understanding, there is no love; and where pleasure and ecstasy are absent, love is absent too. Whenever two things are consciously bound to each other and their attachment brings joy and happiness, then, there is love. The above suggestions can be used in defining love as conscious and wilful attachment of two things that leads to pleasure and joy. For a lover, love manifests itself in the form of intense and thrilling attachment to the beloved, and in the beloved, love reveals itself in the form of willing attraction and contentment. The attachment of a lover to the beloved stems from the affinity and needs of a lover for the beloved. An intelligent and wise lover, who is conscious of the fact that his total existence is linked to the beloved, would experience this affection and attachment with all his soul. Within him, he would sense a gratifying attraction towards his beloved. This delightful and pleasing ecstasy that is patent within the soul of the lover is nothing but love.

Love is a mutual attraction

Love is a deliberate and reciprocal relationship between two things, and it is the consequence of attraction and allure from one side and desire and struggle from the other. This unique characteristic cannot be a one-sided affair. This relationship is not only a reciprocal affinity; it is a complementary one as well. That is, as the intensity of desire and allure increases, the degree of attraction and affinity increases too.

Let us explain this mutual relationship. The creator of the world, who is, the most Perfect Beloved, showered all his creatures, with His bounties. This type of all embracing bounties from the Almighty Allah is expressed as divine compassion (raḥmat-i raḥīmīn) within the language of revelation, within 'irfān, however, they have been called great self-disclosures (tajallī-yi aḥīyāt).³ The reciprocal response given to these blessing by the creatures or beings establishes their position within the hierarchy of existence. The quality of an entity's response will qualify it for a particular statue within the path of perfection. Divine love also has a bearing on these reactions, each being, depending on its particular position within the hierarchy of existence, benefits accordingly from this mutual attraction and divine love, which, in turn, generates excitement and ecstasy within the nature of that being.

Man's place within the hierarchy of love

When it comes to divine love and its hierarchy, man possesses a very unique status. He is permitted to attain the position of witnessing (shuhūd) and ultimate presence (maqīm-i qurb) before Allah. Put differently, the door to eternal perfection is left open for man. This is why human love, particularly within the divine domain can develop itself.

The first stage within human love is the sense of need (niyāz) that motivates man to struggle. This realisation is the first flame of love and that once kindled, could take man up to immortality. The source for the realisation of needs is nothing but the general all encompassing Divine Mercy (faḥḥ-i ilāhī) that everything and everyone was showered with them. Man's advance within the hierarchy of divine love depends on his response to the realisation of needs. This realisation in turn makes it necessary for man to surrender himself to the beloved. Some are able to do that selflessly and, before the beloved, they see nothing of their own self. They have no desires and no self. Their only wish is to see Him and seek nothing but Him. His Love and His remembrance is the only thing they value. In the Holy Qur'ān, these groups of people are indicated in the verse 'and those foremost in faith will be foremost in the Hereafter'.⁴

Devotees are not a homogenous group. Even within those who have reached the highest degree in spiritual understanding, there is a hierarchy. Where the most elevated are those who abandoned themselves first and most to their Beloved. Those who by saying yes first affirmed their total Love for Him. The most complete and the foremost devotee of the path of divine love is none other than the Holy Prophet Muhammad (ﷺ). He is the leader and for his devotion, he occupies the first place in the Kingdom of Heaven. The Holy Qur'ān reminds humanity of the unique position held by the Holy Prophet in the path of devotion by saying:

Say: (O Muḥammad) truly my prayers and my service of sacrifice, my life and my death are all for Allah the Cherisher of the worlds. No partner has He: This I am commanded and I am the first of those who bow to His Will. 5

ʿĪfī expressed this theme eloquently by saying:

A star twinkled and became the moon of our meeting.
It became a close companion to our unruly heart
My sweetheart who was never schooled and never learned to write
With a wink, became the master of a hundred scholars.
Apart from that intoxicating narcissus, may God protect it from all evil eyes?
No one sat comfortably under this blue dome
My life be a sacrifice for his mouth, as within this garden
No other bud better decorated and adorned the lawn of existence
Although the sellers of charm have come to display their beauties
But no one can reach the charm and attraction of our sweetheart.

Here, °jfi" is describing the Holy Prophet Mu'ammad (ؐ). He uses poetic expressions like 'our beloved who was never schooled', 'intoxicating narcissus who has the most elevated position in this universe' or 'within the garden of Divine Manifestation no other bud had been created better' to describe the personality of the Holy Prophet and express his admiration for the Prophet. In these couplets, the mystic poet °jfi" of Shiraz, describes the most honourable Messenger of Islam, Prophet Mu'ammad (ؐ). The beloved one who was not taught in a school (maktab), and did not write a line, but by a single amorous glance, became the teacher of hundreds; the intoxicating narcissus who attained perfection beyond the reach of all; the blossom whose beauty the gardener and decorator of the world, created as the manifestation of his own divine beauty. He is but the friend of God, the chosen Mu'ammad, peace be upon him and his household. When °jfi" says 'No secret-holder can rank with our thanksgiving friend', he plainly refers to the Qur'anic verse given in the previous page in which by thanksgiving it is meant supplication and prayer of the Messenger of God and by straightforwardness it is meant monotheism and the fact that he was the first Muslim, the one who surrenders to the will of God.

After the most honourable Messenger, come his household and after them the prophets and the truthful, and then other saints and pious people. Inanimate creatures, too, love the Supreme Being; their being controlled and conquered by man, is their annihilation to seek his pleasure.

The Essential Beloved and the accidental beloved.

Almighty God is the Essential Beloved and is the most beautiful and perfect. Other beings are all manifestations of his Perfection, Glory and Beauty. The Chosen Mu'ammad (ؐ) represents God's most perfect Beauty and Glory. He is at the top of the chain of divine perfection and glory of God and after him come his household, then other honest and faithful human beings. In this way, the chain of beings starts with the most perfect and continues to the most imperfect beings.

In the connected chain of being, the essential love of the Supreme Being transcends the love of every other perfect being, comes to the love of the Messenger of God and his household - as they are the most perfect manifestations of God's Divine Perfection and Glory - and passes them and reaches the Almighty God. No love is a true love of God except that it passes through the love of Mu'ammad and his household. Any love that does not pass through this stage is not a love but a mere gesture or pretension. In mystical terminology, a pretender is one who pretends to love but is barren of love.

In the connected chain of love, Mu'ammad and his household who are the most perfect of God's servants are accidental beloveds because God's divine perfection and beauty have, in their most complete form, been endowed to them.

The well-known messenger from the place of my Love,
Got me the amulet with her notes;
Well it reveals Love's glory and beauty,
Well it reiterates Love's dignified anecdotes.

The Beloved, the starting point of love.

The starting point of love is the beloved; also the end of love is the beloved, though in fact, there is no end to love. Love that terminates is not love. In true love, the end of every stage is the beginning of a new stage. There is no end to the school of love. The students of the school of love attain a new level having passed the previous levels. They come to a new stage, having passed the previous stages. The starting point in love is the beloved herself. The beloved with her coquetry, manifestation, and gesture, adds fuel to the fire burning inside the lover and fans this fire with her amorous glance.

Almighty God, when creating human beings, flamed the fire of love in his being and this was the starting point of love. The love of God for his own Essential Perfection and Beauty was the cause of the creation of this world, which mirrors God's Beauty, Perfection and Glory.⁶ Man was the highest manifestation of God's Glory and Perfection. Man, the inexperienced lover, endowed with sparks of love sought to find God fervently, but the distance between him and God was more than he had thought. Adam's fault that led to his expulsion from heaven, taught him to have a solid and strong will and be more persevering in the way to reach God. To attain absolute perfection and to reach the final destination, man needs to have a present fervour, which is always fresh. Therefore, God has put man to test in every stage of the way so that he recognises his deficiencies and realises the long distance he needs to go. In this way, at every stage a new fire is inspired in man's being so that he keeps going on the way to absolute perfection. °jfi" says:

Arise, oh Cupbearer! And bring
To lips that are thirsting the bowl they praise,
For it seemed that love was an easy thing,
But my feet have fallen on difficult ways.

The Holy Qur'in says:

Do men think that they will be left alone on saying, 'we believe', and that they will not be tested? 7

The arc of the descent and ascent of Love

The starting point of love is the beloved. In mystical love, Almighty God with His Absolute Perfection and Beauty is the starting point of love. From this point, which is the beginning of love, love's light has been cast over everything everywhere. The truth of the world consists of the shining of the light of divine love over and onto the tablet of the inner nature of the creatures. In other words, with the shining of the divine light, whatever had the capability and potentiality of existence came to be and its share of being is the same as its share of love allocated to it.

It is only love that connects the creatures of the world together and there is nothing but love in the world. The world was created with love and it is with love that all the creatures in the world were unanimously connected and joined together. It is with love that all the imperfect creatures of the world are in an indefatigable struggle to attain perfection and are on the move to seek their favourite.

The beloved is the beginning point of love. Love began from her. In other words, the first lover of perfection is the absolute perfection. He was in love with perfection and beings came to be because of this love. Being is the result of the love of the Creator for His own perfection. The Universe and its beings are the mirror reflecting the most perfect perfection and the most beautiful beauty. No mirror can reflect and uncover the perfection and beauty of the Creator as the Universe. °jfi says:

Your ray of beauty came forth from thy Manifestation in the earliest days,
Love appeared and set the world on fire!

Elsewhere he says:

O Saki, set my glass afire
With the light of wine! Oh minstrel, sing:
The world fulfils my heart's desire!
Reflected within the goblet's ring
I see the glow of my Love's red cheek,
And scant of wit, ye who fail to seek
The pleasures that wine alone can bring!
He cannot perish whose heart does hold
The life love breathes—though my days are told,
In the Book of the World lives my constancy.

Saki, or cupbearer, and minstrel are references to the awliyi' (or friends) of God who pour the sweet nectar of God's love into the mouths of people and with their intoxicating and divine message and sayings kindle the flame of fervour and divine love in the hearts. The bowl into which the wine of divine love is poured is the natural world and the image of the beloved is reflected in it.

Before this green dome and glassy arc came to be,
My eyes were sheltered in the eyebrow arc of thee.
From the dawn of earliest days to the supper of the unlimited age,
Friendship and attachment were based on mutual pledge.
Love's shadow always sheltered the lover,
She was keen on us, we in need of her.

In this piece of gnostic lyric poetry, divine love is an eternal truth that existed before the creation of this material world. It was the attraction of the divine love that brought us to this world. The secret of love inside us is a shadow of the beloved causing a mutual amorous relation. On the one side of this mutual relation is the need and on the other, fervour's attraction; He longs for us and we need Him.

Therefore, as was referred to earlier, the path of love is bilateral; it starts from the beloved and continues with the rhapsodic need of the lover. The longing of the beloved for the lover comprises love's descending arc and the need of lover for the beloved, its ascending one.

Lover's ascending arc delineates the need of the imperfect for the perfect and love's descending arc delineates the fervour of the perfect to show and manifest itself at all various degrees of perfections from the highest to the lowest. In the language of wa | ç or revelation, by love's descending arc, which is the absolute, perfect love for the lower degrees of perfection, is meant sal|m or peace and ra | mat or

mercy; by love's ascending arc, which is the love of all creatures specially man for the Absolute Being, it is meant zikr or remembrance, 'ibjdat or supplication and tj 'at or obedience to God.

In the following Qur'anic verse, love's ascending and descending arc has been beautifully outlined:

O ye who believe! Remember Allah with much remembrance. And glorify Him early and late. He it is Who blesseth you, and His angels (bless you), that He may bring you forth from darkness unto light; and He is ever Merciful to the believers. Their salutation on the day when they shall meet Him will be: Peace. And He hath prepared for them a goodly recompense. 8

Supplication, remembrance and obedience to God show the love affair of those enthusiastic lovers who emotionally burn to meet with the Friend; the mercy and divine salim or peace are the benevolent pull and attraction of the beloved who sweetens the mouth of the impatient lover and kindles the flame of his love.

In the ascending and descending arc of love which encompasses the Universe, every creature has a special status, every creature, appropriate to its share of perfection, is somewhere on this connected chain and has a certain degree. Every creature that enjoys a higher perfection will enjoy love's attraction more and has a higher position in the chain of love. The higher a creature's perfection, the higher its fervour and love towards a perfection above itself. The highest point is to occupy the highest position in the phenomenon world. At that point which is occupied by the most perfect of Almighty God's creatures, there exists nothing but the annihilation of the lover into the beloved. The pure essence of the Chosen Muḥammad - peace be upon him - is the manifestation of this perfect creature, who is annihilated in divine love. The result of the absolute annihilation of the pure essence of Muḥammad in the essence of the Absolute beloved - who is the beginning of the creation and is the Creator of the world - is the manifestation of all divine glory and beauty in the Muḥammadan essence, which has a humane and corporal body. The complete annihilation of the Muḥammadan essence into the existence of the Almighty, has been reflected in many different ways in the verses of the holy Qur'an. For example, the holy Qur'an describes the Almighty God as:

Lo! My Lord is on a straight path. 9

This means that God Almighty is the criterion of the truth and right. Also, to describe the honourable prophet, the Chosen Muḥammad (ﷺ), the holy Qur'an says:

I swear by the Quran full of wisdom,
Most surely you are one of the messengers. 10

The straight Muḥammadan path, which represents the manifestation of God's pleasure and his holy appearance, shows itself, at lower degrees, in the existence of other prophets and saints. The holy Qur'an says:

Keep us on the right path.
The path of those upon whom Thou hast bestowed favours. 11

By God's blessing which has been endowed on the awliya' (or the saints), is meant his full blessing which is the blessing of full love. The result of full love is the annihilation of the self in obeying Almighty God

and full humility in seeking His Pleasure. Those people blessed with God's blessings are divided into four groups with every group superior to the other:

And whoever obeys Allah and the Messenger, these are with those upon whom Allah has bestowed favours from among the prophets and the truthful and the martyrs and the good, and a goodly company are they! 12

This interconnection between the degrees of love of attachment encompasses all the creatures. Every creature in this world has a share of love. From one side, it loves its superior and from the other, is the beloved of the being beneath itself. In this way, the organisation of the world of being, has been set up by means of love and been founded on the basis of love.

Love and Valiyat (guardianship)

As it was said before, in the connected chain of the creatures in the universe, every creature loves the superior being above itself. This love is essentially the love of God and accidentally the love of the superior above. Because of the love of every creature for the being above itself, the attention and mercy of the superior gets directed towards the one underneath. This mutual relation of love and mercy is what we call 'valiyat' or guardianship. Guardianship is the same as love but in the outside world and love is guardianship but in the inner world. Guardianship is the manifestation and appearance of the inner love.

Almighty God is the essential beloved and guardianship belongs to him; that is to say that he only has the right to summon, command or prohibit people. The right to command or prohibit - which forms the real essence of guardianship - stems from Almighty God's holy essence, which is the most perfect, the most beautiful and the real beloved. As God Almighty is the most perfect and is the source of all perfection, he only has the right to command, prohibit, guide and order. He only chooses the most perfect human being as his successor and gives him the right to command, prohibit and order. In this way, the connected chain of divine love is a chain that connects all objects through the guardianship of the perfect guardian to Almighty God and thus all creatures that are full manifestations of divine glory and perfection, are also the full manifestations of divine guardianship. Therefore, through the passage of guardianship, love reaches God Almighty; and every love that does not pass through this passage is not connected to God: in other words, it is not, in truth, the love of God.

True Love and Figurative Love ('ishq ḥaqīqī wa majzī)

From what was discussed here, it was understood that love is an enjoyable and conscious attachment that starts from the beloved and is realised in a guardianship relation when the lover surrenders to the will and request of the beloved. In the sensory world, love appears as an ardent and exciting attachment. Therefore, love starts from the beloved who is perfect; love leaves the lover, whose whole being is in need of the beloved, in the everlasting attraction and struggle (to get to the beloved). Therefore, true love never terminates; whatever terminates is not true love. The thirst of the true lover is never quenched; and he whose thirst for the beloved is quenched is not a lover.

In figurative love which comprises the feeling of attachment to something one is in need of, whenever the lover reaches the thing to which he felt an attachment, his emotions towards that thing subside and the fire of his need towards that thing becomes cold. If any feelings and emotions are left to him, they

are for things over and above the first-beloved. The cooling and subsiding of feelings show the figurativeness of the love.

From the point of view of the gnostics and mystics, figurative love is not unrelated to the true love. Rather, figurative love has been derived from the very true love, which is the love of Absolute Perfection. However, because of the interference of the element of imagination - which is activated by various factors such as lust and passion in the human psyche - man mixes up a thing that is not his favourite and true beloved for the true beloved. That is why, when he attains it, he does not find it as his agreeable and favourite goal. He, therefore, turns away from it and starts a new struggle to attain his true beloved. If he is still controlled by his imaginative power, which stems from lust, wrath and other animal desires, he will continue with his original mistake. He will not get anything but the loss of his lifetime. This is exactly the very 'loss', to which the Holy Qur'jn refers:

I swear by the time, most surely man is in loss, except those who believe and do good, and enjoin on each other truth, and enjoin on each other patience. 13

Notes:

Love mysticism is a critical aspect of Sufism. For a general appraisal, see Annemarie Schimmel, *Mystical Dimensions of Islam*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press 1975, pp. 130-48. On its role in R m 's poetry, see William Chittick, *The Sufi Path of Love*, Albany: State University of New York Press 1983. On Corbin's analysis of the fideli, see *En Islam Iranien III: les fid les d'amour*, Paris: Gallimard 1972, pp. 9-146.

R m , *Mathnaw -yi Ma'naw *, ed. R.A. Nicholson, London: Gibb Memorial Trust 1925-40, vol. I, verses 112-16.

On these themes, see William Chittick, *The self-disclosure of God: Principles of Ibn 'Arab 's cosmology*, Albany: State University of New York Press 1998, pp. 52-57, 100-17, 329-31 inter alia.

Al-Qur'jn al-Wiqi'a 56: 10.

Al-Qur'jn al-An'jm 6: 162-63.

Referring to the famous  ad th of the hidden treasure, see Chittick, *Self-disclosure*, pp. 21-22, 70, 211, 329.

Al-Qur'jn al-'Ankab t 29: 2.

Al-Qur'jn al-A'zjb 33: 40-41.

Al-Qur'jn H d 11: 56.

Al-Qur'jn Yjs n 36: 2-4.

Al-Qur'jn al-Fiti'a 1: 6-7.

Al-Qur'jn al-Nisj' 4: 69.

Al-Qur'ân al-'Aẓîm 103: 1-3.

On Rûmî's didactic poetry

Gustav Richter (1906-39) 1

Abstract

This article, a translation of a venerable German lecture on the Mathnawî, analyses some aspects of story-telling and didactic style in the poetry of the famed Persian Sufi poet, Jalîl al-Dîn Balkhî, better known as Rûmî in the West and Mawlânâ in the East. The major claim in the article is that the didactic style of the Mathnawî imitates and follows the paradigm of Qur'ânîc story-telling. The structure and style of the poem is thus deliberate, intentional and organised and not haphazard.

A stylistic analysis of the didactic poetry of Jalîl al-Dîn Rûmî (d. 1273) 2 is particularly difficult. Following the initial historic excursion, we have gathered the impression that the messages of a piece of art of this genre do not serve to illustrate the background for a stylistic analysis with respect to their logical representationalism, being generally very bound to their aesthetic picture. This is why the very mode of expression is important. It makes use of a form that is also possible outside of the genre of poetry. Thus, the composition itself speaks more clearly to us, even in its most outward appearance. The didactic poetry, called Mathnawî (meaning distich), includes more than 20,000 couplets. It is divided up into six books, which do not necessarily have an inner coherence. 3 This is odd, if we imagine it to be an epic. But it is not an epic. And neither is it lyric poetry. We have chosen the German term *Lehrgedicht* (didactic poetry), which is indeed the most useful if we try to apply occidental terms of comparison. We have in mind a particular form of poetry in which, or with which, one is being taught. With the indication towards the didactic claim we have not yet pronounced the last crucial point that would prevent us from misunderstandings. The form of expression, in order to be valid and in order to suppress the content as mentioned above, has to impose on the metric-didactic flow certain structuring features. A look into this organisation serves as the best approach to the rich arrangement of stylistic developments.

The different books of the didactic poem are divided into chapters of differing length and have headings. Specific groups of chapters are united by events. This means that the poet relates happenings, legends, and anecdotes without external or internal connection, only related by their religious background. We have to explore their nature further. I have chosen the following example:

A part of the first book recounts the story of a harp player who lived at the time of the second caliph, 'Umar (Mathnawî, vol. I, verses 1913-2243). In his old age, he loses his voice, becomes ill and poor. In the torments of his soul, he heads to the graveyard, falls down to pray, but falls asleep soon due to exhaustion. Allah reveals himself at the same time to 'Umar in a dream and demands that he be merciful and provide for the one sleeping at the graves. 'Umar follows the voice and wakes him up. Embarrassed and shattered by God's mercy, the old man sheds tears over his past and the sins he committed. But 'Umar commands him to stop his selfish tears and devote himself to God.

This framework story is clear. But it is only the framework story. How strange that only five of the fourteen chapters framed by the story deal with it. What purpose do the others serve?

With respect to their content, they comprise of meditations and subplots that lead the reader so far from the framework story that the superimposed connection can almost only be reintroduced in an artificial manner. However, this method of composition has a deep meaning and I will demonstrate shortly, what important value of style is connected with it.

The events of the plot, the story of the harp player, remain the main picture for our analysis despite its small size. The historic research should investigate here, whether the simultaneity of plots is seen to be characteristic for the style of didactic poetry, or whether this is the composer's creation. I deem the latter more possible. Sanj'ç (d. 1131) 4 prefers terms as topics, not as plots. But this is just a remark on the side. The main characteristic is mirrored in the relation of the plot to the remaining parts: the one of the primary to the secondary style; primary style being the uninterrupted continuation of the plot, secondary style are the interrupted, poetic meditations as intensification of new events. Here, a new perspective is opened up: the primary style is general and unique, in as much as the happenings are determined – the story of this harp-player - they are unique and cannot be repeated. The event is general and determines the genre of literature. The secondary style on the other hand is general in that it goes with the meditations not bound by time, beyond the didactic poem. But is at the same time increasingly unique in that it is related to the main plot and the emerging subplots.

These simultaneous formations of style can only be elucidated in their complementarity, when we are looking at the main picture in its artistic meaning. Without a doubt, the story of the harp player is not intended to be beautiful in itself, since that would impede the meditations of the secondary style. Instead, it demands as a necessary addition a higher analogy of the meaning that will remain in the zenith of all thoughts and didactic content, no matter how they are interpreted artistically. This highest principle is the religious intention itself and practically the highest hermeneutic possibility of the subject in question with respect to the religious experience. This singer is introduced as the incarnation of the art of singing, so powerful that according to this principle a symbol of God is experienced: his highest abundance of life, the reviving breeze of his spirit. I will address these issues on an individual basis. At first, I will have a look at the end of the story. If the harp player as the personification of human weakness falls down on the gravesite, how can a continuation of the story be justified? Are we here not dealing with a change of values that cannot be explained with the events and the logic situation?

This example does not stand alone, and I will improve our insight with another. The first story of the book deals with a king who encounters a beautiful girl on the hunt. He loves her and takes her to his palace. The girl feels dejected and falls ill, and no doctor can help her. The king prays to Allah for help. God commands him to lead the old man who will come to his palace the next morning to the girl. He will know the reason for her suffering. The king obeys, honours the old man and takes her to the girl. The old man, alone with the girl, realises immediately that she is consumed by her sorrows. She admits that she loves a goldsmith in Samarqand. The old man asks the king to have the goldsmith come from Samarqand and to unite the lovers. The king fulfils the wish. But the story has a bad ending. The old man poisons the goldsmith so that his health and beauty are diminished. The girl's love diminishes as well and the goldsmith dies. From then, the girl serves the king in love.

Here, too, we have a surprising change of values in the plot. With respect to the religious dimension, the characters seem constantly to be changing their roles. This healing old man, full of God's mercy, not unequal to a prophet in his bearing, turns as one who prepares the poison against his mission and comes to symbolise a principle of harshness and lack of value that nullifies the previous impression. Equally the girl, a symbol of honest and soulful love, changes her characteristic value into a superficial individual, weak of character, who does not deserve our esteem. We will now not continue our analysis

and I will only quickly point to the wide-ranging compositions of the secondary style that in reflection and intermediary pictures appears as in the former example and explains the events of the main plot to a great degree.

One should not conclude that this change of values is omnipresent. But its application demonstrates that the artistic intention of the poet is not determined by the events according to their logic-symbolic sequence. But that it is rather determined by the possibilities of re-interpretation, which the pieces of the main plot experience through the secondary style, and this is here not only a supposition.

No event is bare of this extension. It is divided up into periods, which hinder the flow of the main plot and force the onlooker to return. We stop and ponder. We experience the thoughts of the events again, even several times. It becomes a picture whose light changes with the hours of the day. The author shifts characters and things like pieces of scenery and one does not always know where they are going to be in the next picture.

The events are thus divided up into groups of pictures. The approach emerges from the strength of comparison inherent in the topics of the primary style. When the poet continues with meditation of the secondary style, they are then not separate from the first. Rather, they are in an organic and important connection with the immediate meaning of the previous part of the main plot. This immediate meaning lies here in its highest interpretation that the topic allows in its religious dimension. So that we, for example, think immediately of God when we are thinking about the harp player. With the tenacity of such an expression and its spontaneous metaphorical value, a circle of pictures of an autonomous chapter is created together with the reflecting similarities in the other form of style.

I will demonstrate this with the story of the harp player:

Hast thou heard that in the time of 'Umar, there was a harp player, a fine and glorious minstrel?

The nightingale would be made beside herself by his voice; by his beautiful voice one rapture would be turned into a hundred.

His breath was an ornament to assembly and congregation, and at his song the dead would arise.

He was like Isrifçl (Seraphiel) whose voice will cunningly bring the souls of the dead into their bodies.

Or he was like an accompanist to Isrifçl, for his music would make the elephant grow wings.

One day Isrifçl will make a shrill sound and will give life to him that has been rotten for a hundred years.

The prophets also have (spiritual) notes within, whence there comes life beyond price to them that seek (God).

The sensual ear does not hear these notes, for the sensual ear is defiled by iniquities.

The note of the peri is not heard by man, for he is unable to apprehend the mysteries of the peris,

Although the note of the peri too belongs to this world. The note of the heart is higher than both breaths (notes).

For peri and man alike are prisoners: both are (captive) in the prison of this ignorance.

Recite, O community of jinn and men in sĒrat al-Ra'īmīn; recognise the meaning of 'if ye be able to pass forth'.

The inward notes of the saints say, at first, "O ye particles of Ij (non-being)

Take heed, lift up your heads from the Ij of negation, put forth your heads from this fury and vain imagining.

O ye who all are rotten (in the world of) generation and corruption, your everlasting soul neither grand nor came to birth".

If I tell (even) a little of those (saintly) notes, the souls will lift their heads from the tombs.

Put thine ear close, for that (melody) is not far off, but 'tis not permitted to convey it to thee.

Hark! For the saints are the Isrīfċl of the (present) time: from them to the dead comes life and freshness. 5

The reference to Isrīfċl clearly initiates a reflective period. The parable changes the subject (harp player) to a new one and evaluates the main picture with a new picture. The poet achieves thereby an effective increase of the symbolic strength in the main picture: Harp player = highest invigorating principle; the hyperbole of the nightingale – one of the favourite figure of style in Persian poetry – seems almost to pale in comparison with the picture of Isrīfċl. One doubt remains. Does not the juxtaposition of Isrīfċl diminish the effect of the main picture (harp player = God)? Not at all. Yet, initially the poet does pose a limit. All of a sudden the harp player is only similar to Isrīfċl, one of God's angels, but not to Allah himself. But the poetic effect runs counter to it: if Isrīfċl must be thought of a beautiful and mighty, how would God himself be? And again the comparison is being diminished; even an emissary of Isrīfċl can be compared to the harp player.

The value of this whole composition is connected with the immediate interpretation of the spontaneous parable of the main picture. God himself is not named! The veil of silence covers thinly this secret and far away world, yet its folds reveal the invisible forms to the worshippers and believers. The religious intention, strongly demanded and speaking to us even in the outermost criteria of appearance, imposed upon us the association with the highest interpretation the subject in question will admit. And this state of worshipping is productive: could we recognise structures in the characters and pictures and come to a meaningful conclusion, if we denied to think about the super-term and the experience of the binding unity of the abundance in comparisons?

One should also not be repelled by the fact that at this stage we do not use the classical rhetoric terms that are still in fashion. Obviously, also these are not always applicable and at the moment, there is a controversy going on about their applicability in the occidental science of literature. One has to be even more cautious when applying them to a genre of literature whose artificial edifice does not comprise of necessary analogies with classical literature. Yet the Arabs and Persians have developed a rhetoric that is relatively congruent with the classical. But in both cases, we have only a method for the analysis of the technique of the style and its figures, not for the style itself and the overarching structure. One could be

tempted to use our notion of the metaphor for our spontaneous parable. But for reasons of methodological clarity it is preferable to use for the analysis of Persian texts, terms, that are not imbued yet with a conceptual meaning.

We return to the above part of the story of the harp player. With the picture of *IsrjfcI*, naturally the secondary style begins. It is not a comparison in passing. The poet elaborates and embellishes it. In connection with the main picture of the harp player, the poet creates variations into several groups of pictures. And with what an uncommon creation of meaning he does this! Linked to the picture of *IsrjfcI* is a reflection on the term 'naghm'. Naghm means the secret, sweet voice. It cannot be heard with the outer, the ear of the senses (*g£sh-i |iss*), but with the heart (*dil*). He does not give a connection to the main picture. But who would not see immediately in the structure the unexpressed relation with the harp player and his symbolic meaning: the voice of God that man can only hear with his soul! The continuation of the reflection is much more convoluted and permeated with new similes. Central to this reflection is the Qur'anic verse (*S£rat al-Ra |mjn 55: 33*) that reads: "O you jinn and humans, if you can pass through the outer limits of the heavens and the earth, go ahead and pass. (But) You cannot pass without authorization". The material incentive for this quotation can be explained with the material connection to the previous part of the text, in which the heart and its secret relation with the voice is juxtaposed to the state of physical limitations. But with respect to the style, the verse is much more: The Qur'in is the word of God. Here the secret voice speaks uncovered and explicitly, of which the reflections and pictures have been telling. The technique of using Qur'anic verses or legends of the Prophet must not be underestimated. With their sensible usage, their deepest interrelations are being illuminated without an addition of content or any speculative allegories that would corrupt the simplicity of the revealed Islam.

But this is only the backdrop to this episode. Its aesthetic vitality goes beyond that. The charm lies in the development of the yearning of the senses that the subject awakens. This is being carried out in similarities that initially are connected to the material-mental incentive, in order to then formulate the meanings of the terms in such a way as to change their meaning. The aim is to experience the effect of the singing, or the voice. The singer *IsrjfcI* is facing the Prophets who participate as onlooker. The distance between these two seems to mirror the distance between ourselves and the characters, we are far and we are looking far in space. This space is filled with characters: will they mediate? How can our mind be presented with the necessary approach to unite the imagined without violating their aesthetic distance, being confronted with so many appearances? Human being, *peri*, Prophet, *IsrjfcI*, this in order of value, with every single one of it is imbued with life in our imagination, not without their own function, though. But this 'secret voice of the heart' is higher than man and *peri*. This is the change of meaning. How does man make himself superior to *peri*? For our heart is fellow man, as are the prophets. How rapidly the notions of real man and prophet are merging into one, having been so unimaginably far just a short time ago. Not the heart it imprisoned, but the forms surrounding it are imprisoned in their attachment to this world. This is the ear of the soul, the refined echo of the divine voice. There is the vocation to the prophets. Prepared in this manner, we hear the word of God itself. Then, of how little importance is *IsrjfcI*, the singer! Silently the concepts are merging into each other. The circle of imagination conveys in this case of abundance of pictures an indivisible experience of the sense that does not stick to one subject or character, but to all at the same time. As the initial tension, created by the rich contrasts, starts to decrease, into undifferentiating reflection, so does imagination impose on the other hand the reflecting useful application, the quintessence of wisdom that faces the vision of the soul as if on a different level. "Come closer with your ear, because the voice is not far". In this way the change in style is being introduced, after it has been prepared by the sentence of the 'holy'

(the voice), as a secret simile to the voice of God. The first picture of the picture group ends with this turn, evaluating the beginning of the events around the harp player.

We shall not follow this picture group until the end of the chapter. Already, with the short sketch of the main points, which are most relevant for the style analysis, an important demand for methodology emerges considering the interpretation in terminology and system. We have seen that it cannot be permitted to choose terms or conceptions, that are known from the theological or philosophical literature of Islam, in order to picture a speculative system of R m 's mysticism. The terms are too undefined and are not usually posed for the sake of their terminological function. I even believe, that they intentionally have to do without their fixed, logical consensus. They get their value from the composition itself instead, but not in such a way as that they could be read then in a new terminology. At the most, one could make a terminological statement on a complete episode of meaning. In order to obtain a philosophical system, the compositions of the whole poem would have to be interpreted stylistically. Even then the terminological result would probably remain pale and worthless. I will take as a short example R m 's statements on love. He says that love is useful, the doctor for all troubles (Mathnaw , vol. I, verse 23), then love is compared with a rose or a nightingale (Mathnaw , vol. I, verse 27), then it is the source of illness (Mathnaw , vol. I, verse 110). Love can also become shame (Mathnaw , vol. I, verse 205), and is then comparable to a peacock (Mathnaw , vol. I, verse 208) or a fox (Mathnaw , vol. I, verse 210) and so on. Just try to come to a specific terminology of love for R m , with these statements. 6

Since we are trying to explore the veins of this body of style, we shall include for now the following chapter, that is in tune with our intentions:

The Prophet said, "In these days the breathings of God prevail:

Keep ear and mind (attentive) to these (spiritual) influences, catch up such-like breathings."

The (Divine) breathing came, beheld you, and departed: it gave life to whom it would, and departed.

Another breathing has arrived. Be thou heedful, that thou mayst not miss this one too, O comrade.

The soul of fire gained there from an extinguisher of (its) fire, the dead soul felt within itself a movement (of life).

This is the freshness and movement of the  bj-tree, this is not like the movements of animals.

If it falls on earth and heaven, their galls will turn to water at once (they will be consumed with terror).

Truly, from fear of this infinite breath (they were filled with dismay): recite (the words of the Qur' n) but they refused to bear it (the trust offered to them).

Else, how should (the words) they shrank from it have been (in the Qur' n), unless from fear of it the heart of the mountain had become blood?

Yesternight this (breath) presented itself (to me) in a different guise (but) some morsels (of food) came in and barred the way.

For a morsel's sake a Luqmīn has become (held in custody as) a pledge: 'tis the time for Luqmīn: begone, O morsel!

These pricks (of the flesh) for the sake of a morsel! Pluck ye forth the thorn from the sole of Luqmīn.

In his sole there is (really) no thorn or even the shadow of it, but because of concupiscence ye have not that discernment.

Know that the thorn is that which thou, because thou art very greedy and very blind, hast deemed to be a date.

Inasmuch as Luqmīn's spirit is the rose-garden of God, why is the foot of his spirit wounded by a thorn?

This thorn-eating existence is (like) a camel, and upon this camel one born of Muḥṣafī (Muḥammad) is mounted.

O camel, on thy back is a bale of roses, from the perfume of which a hundred rose-garden grew within thee.

Thy inclination is towards thorn-bushes and sand: I wonder what roses thou wilt gather from worthless thorns.

O thou who in this search hast roamed from one quarter to another, how long wilt thou say, "Where, where is this rose-garden?"

Until thou extract this thorn in thy foot, thine eye is dark (blind): how wilt thou go about?

Man, who is not contained in the world, becomes hidden in the point of a thorn!

Muḥṣafī (Muḥammad) came (into the world) to make harmony: (he would say) "Speak to me, O °umayra, speak!"

O °umayra, put the horseshoe in the fire, that by means of thy horse-shoe this mountain may become (glowing with love, like) rubies.

This °umay' is a feminine word, and the Arabs call the (word for) 'spirit' feminine;

But there is no fear (harm) to the Spirit from being feminine: the Spirit has no association (nothing in common) with man and woman.

It is higher than feminine and masculine: this is not that spirit which is composed of dryness and moisture.

This is not that spirit which is increased by (eating) bread, or which is sometimes like this and sometimes like that.

It is a doer of (what is) sweet, and (it is) sweet, and the essence of sweetness. Without (inward) sweetness there is no sweetness, O taker of bribes!

When thou art (made) sweet by sugar, it may be that at some time that sugar will vanish from thee;

(But) when thou becomest sugar from abundance of faithful-ness, then how should sugar be parted from sugar?

When the lover (of God) is fed from (within) himself with pure wine, there reason will remain lost and companionless.

Partial (discursive) reason is a denier of Love, though it may give out that it is a confidant.

It is clever and knowing, but it is not naught (devoid of self-existence): until the angel has become naught, he is an Ahriman (Devil).

It (partial reason) is our friend in word and deed, (but) when you come to the case of inward feeling (ecstasy), it is naught (of no account).

It is naught because it did not (pass away) from existence and become non-existent: since it did not become naught willingly, (it must become naught nevertheless, for) there is many a one (who became naught, i.e. died) unwillingly.

The Spirit is perfection and its call is perfection: Muḩṩafj (Muḩammad) used to say, "Refresh us, O Bilj!

O Bilj, lift up thy mellifluous voice (drawn) from that breath which I breathed into thy heart,

From that breath by which Adam was dumbfounded and the wits of the people of Heaven were made witless".

Muḩṩafj became beside himself at that beautiful voice: his prayer escaped him (was left unperformed) on the night of the ta'rsk.

He did not raise his head from that blessed sleep until the (time of the) dawn-prayer had advanced to (the time of) forenoon.

On the night of the wedding, his holy spirit pined (the privilege of) kissing hands in the presence of the Bride.

Love and the Spirit are, both of them, hidden and veiled: if I have called Him (God) the Bride, do not find fault.

I would have been silent from (fear of) the Beloved's displeasure, if He had granted me a respite for one moment

But He keeps saying, "Say on! Come, 'tis no fault, 'tis but the requirement of the (Divine) destiny in the World Unseen."

The fault is (in him) who sees nothing but fault: how should the Pure Spirit of the Invisible see fault?

Fault arises (only) in relation to the ignorant creature, not in relation to the Lord of favour (clemency).

Infidelity, too, is wisdom in relation to the Creator, (but) when you impute it to us, infidelity is a noxious thing.

And if there be one fault together with a hundred advantages (excellences), it resembles the wood (woody stalk) in the sugar cane.

Both (sugar and stalk) alike are put into the scales, because they both are sweet like body and soul.

Not idly, therefore, the great (mystics) said this: "The body of the holy ones (the saints) is essentially pure as (their) spirit."

Their speech and soul and form, all (this) is absolute spirit without (external) trace.

The spirit that regards them with enmity is a mere body; like the plus in (the game called) nard, it is a mere name.

That one (the body of the enemy of the saints) went into the earth (grave) and became earth entirely; this (holy body) went into the salt and became entirely pure

The (spiritual) salt through which Muḥammad is more refined (than all others): he is more eloquent than that salt-seasoned (elegantly expressed) ḥadīth.

His salt is surviving in his heritage: those heirs of his are with thee. Seek them! He (the spiritual heir of Muḥammad) is seated in front of thee, (but) where indeed is thy 'front'? He is before thee, (but) where is the soul that thinks 'before'?

If thou fancy thou hast a "before" and "behind", thou art tied to body and deprived of spirit.

"Below" and "above", "before" and "behind" are attributes of the body: the essence of the bright spirit is without direction (not limited by relations of place).

Open thy (inward) vision with the pure light of the King. Beware of fancying, like one who is short-sighted,

That thou art only this very (body living) in grief and joy. O (thou who art really) non-existence, where (are) 'before' and 'behind' (appertaining) to non-existence?

'Tis a day of rain: journey on until night, not (sped) by this (earthly) rain but by the rain of the Lord. 7

Also in the course of this chapter, the poet has placed his theme. It is an explanation of the ḥadīth: 'Indeed, your God lets out his breathing during your days. Be prepared to receive it'. It is not a verse of the Qur'ān, but since it is sunna, it is of the same obliging importance. The religious approach does not change fundamentally. It still lures rich motion from the soul and embellishes the moment with truly majestic pictures. These groups of pictures continue the content of the time sequence. They are not comprehensible without the background of the harp player, yet tie on only to a small part of the already introduced event. The happening continues with the same approach. But it remains fruitful. The poet

achieved this by connection it with the secondary style that we have been looking at above. From this structure he creates new forms. An abundance of perceptions that almost cannot be disentangled is being brought into the new chapter. But he does not connect them with the first interpretation tiresomely or without a transition, but brings them into a new chapter of a strict and equal kind of composition.

We did not finish reading the first group of the previous chapter. The embracing two styles have already been evident at the beginning. They merged into a circle of imaginations whose subjects allowed never ending variations of relations. This richness is being consolidated in the pictorial or terminological symbols. According to the highest religious intention they always incorporate a characteristic pointing to the highest things inherent in the Islamic faith. We hear of the Prophet and the word of the Qur'ân. Yes, we saw in it the centre, which all the other reflections had to lead to. In this new chapter now, the reflections goes out directly from the centre, as if it wanted to flow like a wave over the level of vision backwards to its inception. The previous parts end with a picture that carries this centre in it:

When a lamp has derived (its) light from a candle, every one that sees it (the lamp) certainly sees the candle.

If transmission (of the light) occurs in this way till a hundred lamps (are lighted), the seeing of the last (lamp) becomes a meeting with the original (light). 8

A subtle picture of the revelation and its continuation, in which at the same time the light of these hundred candles mirrors, without exhibition, the relational abundance of the picture with the previous manifold similarities.

One has to explain the theme of the new chapter from this point of view. The picture of the candle is just an adequate transition. The phrase of the breathing of God does awaken the memories of the stylistic forms around the term *naghm* (of the sweet secret voice). Do we not fundamentally remain at the same level of our devotion with the first sounds of this part? The utter centre is the highest richness of the senses of the notion of the harp player! This is why the further expression of the poet does not move upwards but is a more distanced looking around that allows due to the deeply felt experiences for surprising changes. This standstill is also produced by being set into the picture. The imaginative level depending on the main picture of the harp player becomes autonomous in a way due to the entelechy of the *'adçth* permeating all the other stylistic complexes. There is no further tie with the main picture itself. Through the only indirect similarity, that is almost inexhaustibly rich in itself by creating a new circle, the poet achieves finally the real detaching effect of the secondary style. This principle is crucial, from it springs the broad horizon of the poem, the unlimited possibility to create and finally the creation itself. It is not odd, that with such an artistry of style and form, the illogical method becomes enriched. The aesthetic production makes use, even in the smallest parts of this chapter, of these idiosyncratic means that are in no way on the same value level. A stroll in the gallery of these pictures might give further instruction.

The poet contrasts the God's spiritual breathing of deliverance with another, deadly breath that makes the soul deviate and even extinguishes fire. Breathing it is, in both cases, a contrast with the same comparative view. The poets conjure up the notion of a thing and its effect with a means that seemed to be preserved for the first, unique counterpart (and what else could be meant here then the sin, the devil and his debauched way?). The breath that had just been God's spirit is now evil. Thereby, we sublimate the inner form of the word and enjoy its great dignity. But we see ourselves falling on our knees before

this tabernacle, shattered by the might of death. And also here we find back to the beginning. God's voice is now speaking to us with the voice of the Qur'an (S'urat al-A'zib 33: 72): "We have offered the responsibility (freedom of choice) to the heavens and the earth, and the mountains, but they refused to bear it, and were afraid of it. But the human being accepted it; he was transgressing, ignorant". The holy consolidation lies in the imagination of a powerful comparison. Also, the mountains could not resist the inclination of the created to sin, they were weak, when their hearts were bleeding. Thus spoke God, the most compassionate. And he forces this comparison upon us that does away with the tension and liberates us. God creates this redeeming comparison. And thereby he intervenes again in our poetic consciousness: he creates with the lever of the poet, he prepares for the listener the way to receive and conclude with the highest interpretation: Does not the divine mercy protect us from the corrupting breath of the sinful death, and do we not remain turned towards the other breath? This verse of the Qur'an does contain a necessary tectonic categorisation of the sub-picture that at the same time determines the value of the inception of the first picture.

The poet continues easily with a next picture: "yesterday this breath reached me, but bread crumbs blocked its way". Again a contrasting pair, that corresponds with the previous. A biteful of human desire prevents the entrance of the divine voice into the human heart. "Because of one bite, become a Luqmīn!" This is a word play, bite means luqma, and Luqmīn is a wise man of old. But the word play means more than we can expect. It does not simply pass by but becomes important for the continuation of the text. We associate with the sound of the word a completely new group of things that now has to express their inner symmetry. This unusual tension of terms with respect to the subjects covered and the broadness of reflection transmits easily to the Persian the necessary context, that cannot be portrayed by the outer intention of a wordplay. The wordplay is not mere embellishment, or poignant background music. It is a carrier, of adequate nature, of the change in perception. We are bound to be led to a new meaning by the correspondence of sound. The Persian does not fall victim to the subject and its logic content. The logic demand of this relation, that remains linked to the causal consciousness of the listener, has to fulfil a unique task in this mystic act of speech: to implement the change of content in the conceptions of things to the utmost extent. The language creates the thing and endows it with meaning. Poetic reason demands from us in any case that we connect and analyse- therefore even the boldest word constructions are given a correspondence of meaning. The sub-meaning can become the main meaning, dominating and underlining perceptions are changing order amongst each other. With Luqmīn the poet then connects the legend of the thorns, we could be reminded of Achilles, his heel and the arrow. But now the thorn is centre and symbol itself. An uncovering of its meaning requires a contrasting correspondence, however. Thorns and roses belong together and at the same time they are strangers just like the desiring sinner and Luqmīn. Luqmīn's soul is God's rose-garden, but the one who looks for thorns, is a camel. In a completely different picture now, we look at the 'bite' and the desired object. The similarity of the sounds luqma and luqmīn is juxtaposed with the most contrasting meaning. The metaphor is interchanged with the reflection on the spontaneous effect of this picture in a very lively way. Why does man search in the sand and in the thorns, where he will never find roses? Obviously the identification of the sensual man with the instincts of the thorn-eating animal is taken up again. This Luqmīn of the roses is above the thorns, he is riding a new camel of pleasure. That is why he can see a new result: the one who searches for thorns is blind; for in reality he is not looking for thorns, but for the roses he is not able to discern. And in this way he is human again, tragic and full of unresolved tensions. But here again, the Prophet knows the redeeming word, the world of the Qur'an re-emerges in front of us and reveals the richness of the mystic experience. In this way we have returned to the starting point of the picture. The direction to the revelation can eventually turn all process towards an aesthetic ending: do we not foresee the miraculous power of live of the religious subject that appears pure and forever young in its continuous change? Cold terms would not have been

able to breath life into the things, but this is done through the poetic infinity with its relentless variability concerning the way it transforms the motives into pictures. Generally, the reappearance of the motif of Muḥammad imbues our chapter with a tectonic structure. So lies in the flow backwards the saving of energy for a new process.

Thereby, we are entering a new circle of ideas that is a cupola for the motif of Muḥammad. The reflective exegesis of the word ‘ḥumayra’ in the ḥadīth, constitutes, similarly to the word play in the previous part, an almost accidental incentive. Informing us about the feminine character of the word, the poet pulls away from us the symbolic and pictorial richness of the ḥumayra quotation, whilst directing our eye towards a form that without diverting attention from the subject brings about a new poetic feeling. This antithesis is very characteristic. Through the term of the biological contrast, the poet finds back to the interpretation of the meaning, however in a different direction than before. ḥumayra stands for the spirit imbued with God’s soul. This increase in value is compared with a parallel: what is good, is as if full of sugar, but not from the outside, rather, it is so independently and carrying the source of sweetness inside. Immediately next to it we find a second parallel, not in direct connection with the first but corresponding in meaning: the picture of love and the lover who has to face reason as its rival. How doctrinal and diligently the reflections are structured! But they are not a continuum of meaning. They hinder stylistically the flow of the change in perception, and force our mind into the structure of the episodes. They are then the aesthetic equivalent to the exchange of question, wish and exclamation, leading to tension in our capacity to understand. Prepared in this way we enter again into the halls of revelation. Again, Muḥammad sanctions with a remark to Bilal the reflections of the sub-pictures with the main thought of the whole chapter. His exclamation and prayer are example and apperception of the mystical meaning. Strictly the imagination of the listener is bound to this phenomenon; here it is placed into the centre of the overflowing poetic life; for these characters are beautiful and perfect since they are eternally connected with the pictorial motives. We learn again about the secret effect of the loving soul, endowed with the perfect voice. Adam listened to it and was consequently overwhelmed, and Muḥafī rejoiced. The poet remains carefully with this picture, being in the harbour of his poetic intentions. The main meaning of the chapter turns again and seals the ring of the reflections starting with the ḥumayra quotation.

From this peak we are led down again, in order to return to the same place on a different route. The vision of the praying poet is compared to the bridal unification. The poet does not even shy away from this enthusiastic comparison: with a characteristic gesture, he leads the listener to an aspired level of antithetical movement of his mind. The poet apologises: ‘If I mentioned the bridegroom, do not take this as a sin!’ He similarly is moved like Adam. But what is allowed in the holy event of prophecy, the uncalled sinner will not be able to grasp. The poet increases the importance of the main picture exponentially through the widening of the gap between the two. And he gains a new opportunity to broaden the meaning also. Mercy and sin are facing each other, in a dialectical process the effects of the motives are shifting and the contradictions become reconciled through the new evaluations of the motives. The method of expression corresponds with the one of the previous circle. In a sensible way, the pictures re emerge. Like sugar cane and sugar, sin and virtue belong together just like body and soul. Therefore the body of the Prophets is beautiful for their soul’s sake. They possess the salt to purify the whole human being. With this variation, we find ourselves again on the initial level and utilise before the picture of Muḥammad all our feelings of religious yearning and mystic view. Looking at the end of the chapter at all the interrelations, the picture of the revelation has come to exchange throughout all the sub-groups, this evade all terminological interpretations. It gives birth to all aesthetic tension and resolves them again. The incommensurable position of the listener becomes void of space and time. ‘The pure soul is void of categories’. Also, the final composition of the figures of the revelation becomes

blurred and immersed in the richness of divine entrance. A direct analysis of this content is juxtaposed poetically with the indirect result of the forms of question and exhortation.

It is self-evident that we cannot investigate all the poetic modi of the chapter in their every usage of word and sentence structure. Each usage of a linguistic expression requires a meticulous investigation our topic would only benefit from if compared to the material of the surrounding chapters. The evolution of the meaning we can analyse from the pieces of art themselves, because it will always give testimony of the poet's fundamental stylistic intention. The technical means have only a poetic task to fulfil with respect to the quantity of the respective poetic performance, but do not determine their quality. However, their effect cannot be demonstrated without a great variety of examples. Apart from the fact that they are only instructive for the Persian speaker, their general description would not add a fundamentally new dimension to our investigation. We have tried to prove with an example the whole structure of the didactic poem. Let us add the most general linguistic bond as main type of the applied technique of style to our investigation, the meter. Thus the modesty of the lower levels becomes evident, as opposed to the creative will, that reveal itself on a higher level to the 'inner' form. Rfmc applies here the Mathnawc or distich, two verses (rather half-verses) that rhyme. The meter is the same in both parts of the poem. It is the ramal, a metre consisting of three feet. 9 The first two have one length and one short syllable, then two lengths and in third foot the last length is omitted. (-v--/-v--/-v-). In the continuous beginning of the first length, lies a characteristic delaying factor, limiting the movement, beginning with the short. In the reduction of the feet into three (in poems they can be four) this imitation is illustrated marvellously. Before the rhythmical tempo can develop, it is already hindered from doing so:

— v — — — v — — — v —
Bishan£ az nay | chun ;ikiyat | mi kunad ||

— v — — — v — — — v —
Az judi'c- | hi shikiyat | mi kunad ||

Thus run the famous introductory verses of the didactic poem. A quietly proceeding, sober metre, whose monotony does not influence the composition with its own movements. Only the continuous rhyme at the end of the verse, which the Persian tends to emphasise when reciting, needs some attention as an extraordinary form of metre. How much more speedy and lively is the real epic metre with Firdaws! Indeed, the ramal is very adequate for the mystic style. It is a stable background for the forward moving time sequences as well as the reflections. And without consideration of the basic principle of the primary and secondary conduction of style, each verse, each part of the piece, each aesthetic method, escapes our evaluation. The secret of the mystic dimension of this kind of poetry lies in its structure. The logical process of time of the meta-events is turned, after the first encounter, into its opposite. The poetic progressiveness is now conducted with the allocation of meaning, which is beneficial for the qualitative character of the things that are appearing and gets rid of the quantifiable consciousness of time. The development of meaning is here everything. Every new meaning finds its first impression in the communication of the language. But this passable communication is lost with the new constructions of language in order to change the meaning. The meaning of words becomes unfathomable and the words lack conception. But within the complex of meaning not all the parts are stripped off their conception in the same way. This leads to a characteristic tension, to a continuous aesthetic stimulation and highest pleasure of modulation of the poetic feeling. Language become imbued with meaning, meaning creates language in turn with such passion, that it almost denies itself. It appears as if the Persian could strip off the language of its created form and can reveal its spirit almost

unconcealed. Thereby all value-relations and categories escape him. Strange accidents become important and get an eternal meaning. Where the logic structure becomes resolved, this is now and again replaced with a paradox. When he violently forces meaning into wordplays, when he understands associations, similarities of signs and other sometimes flippantly accompanying terms as carriers of meaning, this insults our occidental poetic reason quite often. What makes the Persian rejoice seems to us tasteless and hopelessly unpoetic. But the parts of the composition are also evident to us. The changing effect of the sub-pictures in the secondary style must again and again be related back to the main picture of the primary style. For the highest sequence of events must become something else than a mere sequence and process of events. It becomes a picture and pauses, colours and characters can change infinitely, but the space is now fixed and immobile, time comes to a standstill. The dramatic act takes place on a different level of values. What has been achieved? It can only be described with a paradox: an infinity that is perfect at all times. That the secondary style reaches further than the primary is only consequent. In the richness of its evaluation, the rationale for this genre of literature becomes evident.

With the ahistorical poetic view, R m  also turns the religious intention into a-historicity. The result of a literary investigation in terms of religious history should be pointing into this direction. The central, style-creating usage of  ad th and Qur' n renders the religious intention necessarily ahistorical. The revelation and its carriers are omnipresent. They are floating around us, rarely distinguished from each other, like pictures of the divine spirit and the one of the creation. With this attitude, Islam is experienced. The didactic aim of the poetry is to achieve this.

Finally, I have to add a comment concerning the translation. I did not deal with the episode of the harp player unintentionally. Just a short time ago, this part of R m 's didactic poetry has been rendered into German by Walter von der Porten (b. 1880).¹⁰ Also a person who is not an Orientalist can access this material now. One has to remark though that a poetic equivalent for the Persian cannot be found in any occidental language.¹¹ The aesthetic composition of our poetry is so fundamentally different, the stylistic change of meaning with the infinite possibilities of usage in a Persian way so impossible, that one should ask, whether this poetry should be translated literally, into prose or at the expense of philological exactitude into free poetry? In the first case the direct effect on the uneducated will be inadequate; for the poetic effect is missing. For reasons of methodology we had to render it into prose here. But the translation in verses has to be preferred, if its poetic expression, its passion is strong enough to feel like an original text. Through analysis and scientific guidance, the narrowness of the emotional reception could be broadened and endowed with the distance that is necessary to make this literature a contribution to occidental experience. The translation of von der Porten is a free imitation in stanza. In this way, it is extraordinarily beautiful. A person, who has access to research, can in this way come closest to the original.

Notes:

This is a translation of Gustav Richter, *Persiens Mystiker Dschel l-eddin Rumi: Eine Stilleutung in drei Vortr gen*, Breslau: Franke Verlag und Druckerei, Otto Borgmeyer 1933, chapter 2:  ber Rumis Lehrgedicht, pp. 27-49. His German translations have been replaced by English equivalents. The work began life as a lecture. All the footnotes are the work of the editor as the original has no references. The English translation was carried out by The Institute of Islamic Studies-London.

For an excellent overview of R m , see Franklin Lewis, *Rumi, Past and Present*, Oxford: Oneworld 2000. On stylistics in his poetry, see Fateme Keshavarz, *Reading mystical lyric: The case of Jalal al-Din Rumi*,

Studies in Comparative Literature, Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press 1998. On the structure of the poetry, see J.C. Burgel, "Ecstasy and order: the structural principles in the ghazal poetry of Jalal al-Din Rumi," in The heritage of Persian Sufism vol. II, ed. L. Lewisohn, rpt., Oxford: Oneworld 1999, pp. 61-74.

Lewis, Rumi, p. 561 says that this is because of the Qur'anic style of the text. He quotes Furḫzīnfar, Sharḫ-i mathnawḫ, Tehran: Tehran University Press 1967-69, vol. I, p. ii:

The Mathnawḫ is not divided into chapters and sections like other books; it has a style similar to the noble Qur'ān, in which spiritual insights, articles of belief, the laws and principles of the faith, and exhortations are set forth and mixed together according to divine wisdom. Like the book of creation, it has no particular order.

On this important lyricist, see J.T.P. de Bruijn, Of piety and poetry: The interaction of religion and literature in the life and works of ʿakḫm Sanj'ḫ of Ghazna, Leiden: Brill 1984; Anne-Marie Schimmel, Mystical dimensions of Islam, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press 1975, pp. 301-9.

Mathnawḫ-yi ma'nawḫ, ed./tr. R.A. Nicholson, London: Gibb Memorial Trust 1925-40, vol. I, verses 1913-30, modified.

On this theme, William Chittick, The Sufi path of love, Albany: State University of New York Press 1983.

Mathnawḫ-yi ma'nawḫ, ed./tr. R.A. Nicholson, Vol. I, verses 1951-2011, modified.

Mathnawḫ-yi ma'nawḫ, ed./tr. R.A. Nicholson, Vol. I, verses 1947-48, modified.

On this metre in Arabic poetry from which it derives, see W. Wright, A grammar of the Arabic language, rpt., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1995, vol. II, pp. 366-67.

Von der Porten's free translation of the Mathnawḫ, the text he called the 'Book of the Reed-pipe' in reference to the first verse, is Aus dem Rohrfloetenbuch des Scheich Dschelal ed-Din Rumi, Hallerau: J. Hegner 1930.

Of course, this is no longer the case.

On the Four Journeys (Risālat ta'iqḫq fḫ l-Asfīr al-Arba'a)

Sayyid Abḫ l-ʿasan Rafḫḫḫ Qazvḫnḫ (d. 1975)

Trans./annot. Sayyid Sajjad Rizvi, Pembroke College, UK

Abstract

This brief article presents the explanatory gloss of a famous twentieth century teacher of Islamic philosophy, Sayyid Abḫ l-ʿasan Rafḫḫḫ (d. 1975) on the four journeys of the mystic that the philosopher Mullī ʿadrī Shḫrīzḫḫ (d. 1641) introduces at the beginning of his summa of that name. He explains the relationship and correspondence of these stages of the mystic's journey to the subject matter and arrangement of the work al-Asfīr al-Arba'a, taking as his cue the statement of the four journeys at the

culmination of the introduction to the text. Although many thinkers have written glosses on the meaning of the four journeys, Sayyid AbĒ I-°asan's comments are some of the more illuminating and subtle expositions of Sadrian philosophy and its intimate grasp of the key relationship between mysticism and philosophy as complementary modes of noetic inquiry.

At the onset of the discussion on ontology and onto-theology in his magnum opus, al-Asfĳr al-arba'a, Mullĳ ĩadri says:

Know that the wayfarers (sullĳk) among the mystics (al-'urafĳ') and saints (al-awliĳĳ') undergo four journeys.

The first journey is from the creation to the Truth (min al-khalq ilā I-°aqq).

The second journey is through the Truth in the Truth (bi I-°aqq fĳ I-°aqq).

The third journey is the opposite of the first because it is from the Truth to creation (min al-°aqq ilā I-khalq).

The fourth journey is the opposite of the second in a sense because it is by the Truth in creation (bi I-°aqq fĳ I-khalq).

I have arranged the order of this book of mine, according to their movement through the (higher) lights and the effects, into four journeys. I have called it the Transcendent Philosophy (al-°ikma al-muta'ĳliya) of the four journeys of the intellect; and I shall pour forth (my words) on my subject with the help of the existent eternally worshipped Truth (al-°aqq al-ma'bd al-¥amad al-mawjĒd). 1

This is the propaedeutic and premiss for the naming of the text, a philosophical summa imbued with mysticism and intuitive philosophy, and for providing a mystical paradigm and metaphor for explaining the pursuit of philosophy in terms of the mystic's journey to God.

Most commentators on this work have begun with the discussion of the meaning of this passage as a way of understanding how the text works and discerning its aims and method. The edition of the work includes the three renown philosophers of the Qajar period, namely, °aqĳ Muĳammad Riĳĳ Qumsheĳ (d. 1889), Mĳrĳĳ Muĳammad °asan NĒrĳ and the most famous of them all Mullĳ Hĳdĳ Sabzavĳrĳ (d. 1873). 2 The glosses of Qumsheĳ and Sabzavĳrĳ are eloquent expositions of philosophical inquiry in Sufi language and locate the Sadrian enterprise within the theoretical Sufi framework of the mystic's path. NĒrĳ's glosses, appropriately for a renown logician, are more in keeping with a discursive method of exposition.3

My translation is based on the Arabic text published in a collection of treatises of Sayyid AbĒ I-°asan Rafĳĳĳ called Ghaw¥ĳĳ dar baĳr-i ma'rifat or Plunging in the sea of gnosis. 4 The eminent contemporary philosopher-mystic of Qum, °yatullĳh °asan °asanzĳda °mulĳ transcribed the text. Square brackets indicate the place in the Arabic text. The translation will be in italics, interspersed with my commentary.

Text

[233] In the name of God, the Most Merciful, the Compassionate.

He [Mullĳ ĩadri] said: Know that wayfarers undergo four journeys.

Know that the wayfarer to God, exalted be His glory and greatness, leaves this realm of multiplicity ('ĳlam al-kathra), not in a locative sense, after tracing the waystations (manĳzil) of the soul (al-nafs) and purifies it (the soul) of its passions, and is sincerely dedicated to God in all his acts, whether words or actions or thoughts or desires. He arrives in the realm of unicity ('ĳlam al-aĳadiyya) and sees all others plunged in the rays of the light of the Truth and His theophanies (al-°aqq wa tajalliyyĳtihi).

The author clearly juxtaposes the multiplicity and spatio-temporal aspects of this phenomenal world of ours with the noetic world of reality that is beyond that is devoid of space and time. The journey of the mystic therefore takes places in that noetic sphere and in that sense is 'non-locative'. It is the 'journey of the heart'. 5 It is the way of union that the mystic seeks. 6 This noetic journey has clear Platonic and Neoplatonic precedents and the premiss that this world of multiplicity is lesser and less perfect than the archetypal noetic world of unity is also a common Platonic assumption. The ability for the soul to 'doff' the body and ascend to the realm of the nous and experience beatific vision is similarly assumed. Plotinus articulates this doffing metaphor in Enneads IV.8.1, a text that found its way into the Arabic epitome and paraphrase of Enneads IV-VI better known as the 'Theologia Aristotelis' (Üthelġjçyi). 7

Earlier Sufi writings allude to the four journeys. Ibn 'Arabġ (d. 1240) in his al-Futġġt al-Makkiyya refers to them in chapter sixty-nine on the secrets of prayer as the 'spiritual ascent of man'. 8 Although they do not map onto the Sadrian journeys perfectly, they have the same motifs. 9 Two of his commentators, however, retain concepts of these journeys that bear a closer resemblance and influence on Mullġ ġadri. 'Abd al-Razziġ Kġshġnġ (d. 1330) in his influential lexicon of Sufi terms, al-ġġilġġt al-ġfiyya, discusses these four journeys. 10 Sabzavġrġ is his gloss makes the direct connection and quotes the whole section:

[A] journey is the attention of the heart towards the Truth, the Most High. There are four journeys. The first is the journey to God from the waystations of the soul (manġzil al-nafs), arriving at the Clear Horizon (al-ufuġ al-mubġn). 11 This is the culmination of the station of the heart (maqġm al-qalb) and the beginning of the self-disclosures of the [divine] Names (al-tajalliyġt al-asmġ'iyya).

The second is the journey in God with regard to His attributes and realising His Names, [ascending] to the Highest Horizon (al-ufuġ al-a'ġlġ) and the culmination of the presence of singularity (al-ġġra al-wġġidiyya).

The third is the ascent to Union (al-jam') and the presence of unicity (al-ġġra al-a'ġadiyya). This is the station of the 'two bows' length', and if he is raised further, then it is the station of 'or less' 12 and that is the culmination of sanctity (al-wilġya).

The fourth is the journey from God through God to achieve perfection and it is the station of subsistence after annihilation and the separation after the union (al-farġ ba'd al-jam'). 13

Sayyid 'ayder 'mulġ (d. after 1385), a major conduit for the school of Ibn 'Arabġ in Shi'i intellectual circles, also talks of these four journeys in his magnum opus, Jġmi' al-asrġr. 14 Commentators on the Asfġr have made the connection with this Sufi tradition. Indeed the connection between philosophy and mysticism in the metaphor of 'journey' might even pre-date Mullġ ġadri in the work of the sixteenth century thinker, Shams al-Dġn Khafarġ. 15

One final point concerns the term 'waystation' (manzil). This is a technical Sufi term and more generally as Qumshġhġ asserts a term for a stop along a path, a fleeting moment to pass beyond. 16

There is the beginning of the station (maqġm) of the heart and the culmination of the first journey, which is the journey from creation to the Truth. The being of the wayfarer becomes 'real' (ġġqqġnġ) and contingency (al-ġiha al-imġġniyya) fades from him. Thus when the heart of the believer is 'in the hands of the Merciful and He inclines it as He wills', he (the mystic) contemplates His highest attributes and His greatest Names, both the Names of Grace and of Wrath (al-luġfiyya wa l-qahariyya). From the very seat of his being, the judgements of the divine names in their multiplicity are manifest in him. This is known as the station of singularity (maqġm al-wġġidiyya). He is in the station of contraction and expansion

(maqim al-qabḥ wa l-basṣ) that manifest the judgements of Grace and Wrath, and he undergoes fear and hope (al-khawf wa l-raji') in it (that state). This is the (second) journey by the Truth in the Truth.

The author juxtaposes the level of unicity (al-a'ḍiyya) and singularity (al-wi'idiyya), terms used within the contexts of the theory of divine presences (al-ḥaḥarāt) in the thought of Ibn 'Arabī. 17 Sabzavīrī explains the distinction:

The level of unicity describes the divine essence negated of the divine names and attributes. But the level of singularity describes the divine essence deployed with the divine names and attributes manifest in the permanent archetypes (al-a'yin al-thibita) of things. 18

Two other themes are prominent. First, the Sufi language of stations is used to describe points along the path to God. The names of these stations are standard as used in Sufi manuals such as al-Risāla of al-Qushayrī (d. 1074). 19 They also intersect with the cosmology of subtle substances (laṣi'if) or levels of the self from the awareness of the human self ascending up to the True Self who is the One. Sabzavīrī makes this connection explicit in his discussion of the seven subtle substances as stations along the spiritual path. He further connects them to an interpretation of the level of disclosure in the famous light verse of the Qur'ān 24: 25. 20 Second, yin and yang aspects of God, jalīl (mysterium tremendum) and jamīl (mysterium fascinans), are compared. His grace and wrath are juxtaposed. This theology of balance suggests that all contrariety and balance in the cosmos emanates from the 'tao' of God's attributes. 21

[234] He is in the Truth because the lordly realm (al-'ilām al-rubḥānī) is vast and the perfect attributes are many in concept and each one of them rules over the existence of the servant. He is through the Truth because when the servant is free of the rule of contingency and is under the control of the rays of the light of the Truth, then he exists through the Truth and not through himself. Rather he has no 'ego' (anḥiyya) in this level (of being). He arrives in the second journey to the culmination of the station of his path and its developments from one state to another (min ḥalīl ilā ḥalīl), he contemplates all the divine attributes rolled up in the Unseen Unity that is specific to His Necessary Essence (ghayb al-waḥid al-mukhtaṣṣ bi-dhātihī l-wajībiyya). He ascends to essential annihilation (al-fanī' al-dhātī) but he does not see pure Truth (al-ḥaqq al-maḥḥud) and absolute unicity (al-a'ḍiyya al-muṣṭalaqa). Grace and wrath become one for him and reward and punishment are the same for him since both of them are expressions of a special name as reward is as aspect of His Mercy and punishment as aspect of His wrath. The attributes perish in His Unseen Essence in this station. All that the wayfarer contemplates is the Unseen Divine Ipseity (al-huwiyya al-ghaybiyya al-ilḥiyya).

A key feature of mystical language is the use of coincidentia oppositorum, the juxtaposition of paradoxical language, which can clearly be noticed here. Corbin drew attention to its use in Sufism and later Islamic philosophy in Iran. 22

This is pure self-effacement (al-maḥw al-maḥḥud) and sheer obliteration (al-ṣamas al-ḥirf) and the culmination of the station of the heart and the beginning of the manifestation of (the station) of the spirit (al-rūḥ) in the words of the mystics. Thus he perceives divine providence (al-'inīya al-'ilḥiyya) and reverts to self-consciousness (al-ḥaḥw) after the self-effacement. 23 He contemplates the creation and the contingent realm but with another eye and a different vision and a contemplation that is unlike the contemplation of the veiled ones. Rather, he contemplates contingent quiddities (al-miḥiyyāt al-imkīniyya) as manifestations of His names and as theophanies of His attributes and reflections of His essence. This is the (third) journey from the Truth to creation. This is the station of sanctity (al-wilīya),

24 of authority of deployment (al-taʿarruf) and of union (jamʿ). The contemplation of the creation does not veil the Truth from him, nor does the contemplation of the Truth veil the contemplation of the creation. Rather, he sees unity manifest in multiplicity and multiplicity rolled up in the Unseen Unity.

The station of the spirit is the culmination of self-negation and Self-affirmation. In it, the mystic recognises that the juxtaposition of unity and multiplicity is not paradoxical. Rather, it coincides such that there is unity in multiplicity.

This is the culmination of the third journey that is the rank of sanctity (al-wiljya) and since he is everlasting after becoming annihilated, he has arrived at the station of complete contentment (al-tamkġn al-tjmm). 'His breast has been expanded' 25 insofar as he is not so immersed in the rules of the realm of [235] multiplicity to neglect the contemplation of pure unity. Rather, he sits between the two limits and is placed in the station of union between annihilation in the very essence of everlasting subsistence and everlasting subsistence in the very essence of annihilation. This is the fourth journey in creation through the Truth.

The key term raised in this section is sanctity (wiljya) a key Sufi concept that concerns both spiritual authority and intimacy with the One. Kġshjġnġ describes sanctity as the station of annihilation in the One, contentment and intimacy with Him. 26 It is also at this point that ʿaṡmulġ broaches the question current in the school of Ibn ʿArabġ concerning the seal of sanctity and the definition of the Pole of reality with specific individuals. 27 The seal is the Perfect Man (al-insjġn al-kjġmil), the true vicegerent of God on earth.

This is the rank of prophecy (al-nubuwwa) and legislation (al-tashrġʿ) and the leadership of the community with their plurality and differing affairs and their networks of interaction.

Prophecy establishes the criterion both of the Law and distinction between good and evil. As such, ʿaṡmulġ describes the culmination of the fourth journey as the station of the criterion and of the division. 28

If you know this, then know that as the book consists of four journeys in the sense of an intellectual journey (al-safar al-ʿilmġ) through theoretical discourse (al-baʿġth al-naʿʿarġ) that corresponds to the journey of the wayfarers that is the journey of states (l-safar al-ʿijlġ) and of actions (al-ʿamalġ) and so on, then one must investigate thoroughly the correspondence between the journeys of the wayfarers and the sections of the book.

The key point here is to stress the correspondence between the two modes of noetic inquiry, mysticism and philosophy and to affirm their complementarity. Indeed, it is often asserted that Mullj ʿadri successfully reconciled the method of the mystics and the philosophers and his magnum opus testifies to this achievement.

The first journey concerns metaphysica generalis (al-umʿr al-ʿjmma) and is a premiss upon which the first art relies, that is he proof of the Necessary in His beauty and His attributes. Through that, one moves onto the second journey which is onto-theology or metaphysica specialis (al-iljhiyyit bi l-maʿná l-akhaʿʿ). This corresponds to the first journey of the wayfarers from the created realms to the Truth. The sage (al-ʿakġm, that is, Mullj ʿadri) discusses His attributes the Most High, and from His existence he deduces His unicity and from His unicity His eternality. In fact, from His existence (he deduces) His

knowledge, His power, His life and His will. This corresponds to the second journey, which is the journey through the Truth in the Truth.

The first journey therefore concerns onto-theology or rather provides both a semantics and an adequate metaphysics for sound 'God-talk'. Thus appropriately both ontological and cosmological proofs for the existence of God are first expounded here.²⁹

The divine sage (Mullī ʿadri) makes the third journey in his book (a discussion) of substance and accident. But he discusses them not from the point of view of physics but of divinalia. This section of the book corresponds to the journey of the wayfarer from the Truth to creation since substances and accidents are contingent quiddities and determinations of the created realms.

After discussing substances and accidents, the author discusses the soul and its faculties and its inspirations and its progress and its descent and its felicities and its wretchedness. This is the fourth journey of the book on psychology ('ilm al-nafs). [236] This corresponds to the journey of prophecy and legislation, which is the fourth journey of the wayfarers. The prophet qua prophet, in his legislation of commands and his call (al-da'wa, kerygma) to God, calls to what gives the soul felicity and salvation and repulses from it (the soul) its wretchedness and its perdition. Thus the journey of the soul in the book resembles prophecy and legislation.

The mystics who have completed the four journeys are like prophets because they have seen the Truth and know the end of man, the return to the One. Thus they are best equipped to engage in moral exhortation and commanding the good. 30 Islamic philosophers have held that the perfection of philosophy is prophecy. 31 The enlightened philosopher is in that sense like a prophet because he knows reality but lives in this world. He thus has responsibilities with respect to his fellow man and should concern himself with the organisation of society and social relationships. The need for prophecy in this sense always remains and is a function carried out often by a saint. The legislative function as such of prophecy, however, remains sealed and completed with the Prophet of Islam. The culmination of the journeys of the mystic and the philosopher lies in this world, in the ethics and politics of this world and in striving to achieve spiritual success in this world by recognising the underlying unity in the cosmos that reflects and pays homage to the unity of God.

Notes:

Mullī ʿadri, *al-ʿikma al-mutaʿjliya fī l-Asfīr al-ʿaqliyya al-arbaʿa*, eds. R. Luṣfī et al, 3rd edn., Beirut: Dīr iḥyāʾ al-turīth al-ʿarabī 1981, vol. I, p. 13.

Mullī ʿadri, *al-Asfīr*, vol. I, pp. 13-18.

The only scholar, to my knowledge, who has considered these glosses is Seyyed Hossein Nasr, *ʿadr al-Dīn Shīrīzī* and his transcendent theosophy, Tehran: Imperial Iranian Academy of Philosophy 1977, pp. 57-61.

Sayyid Abī l-ʿasan Rafīʿī Qazvīnī, *Ghawṣī dar baḥr-i maʿrifat*, Tehran: Intishārāt-i Islām 1376 shamsī, pp. 232-36.

Cf. 'Alç al-Jurjinç, Kitib al-ta'rcfjt, ed. A. Sprenger, rpt. Beirut: Maktabat Lubnjin 1969, p. 124; J.W. Morris, "'He moves you through the land and sea...'" in *The Journey of the Heart*, ed. J. Mercer, Oxford: Muhyiddin Ibn 'Arabi Society 1996, pp. 41-69.

R.C. Zaehner, *Mysticism sacred and profane*, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1957, pp. 87, 150ff.

AflEŞçn 'ind al-'arab: ŪthlEjçyi, ed. 'A. Badawç, rpt, Qum: Intishirjt- Bçdir 1413 qamarç, p. 22; tr. G. Lewis in *Plotini Opera*, eds. P. Henry & H. Schwyzer, Brussels: Desclée de Brouwer 1951-73, vol. II, p. 225. For discussion, see Fritz Zimmermann, "The origins of the Theology of Aristotle," in *Pseudo-Aristotle in the Middle Ages*, ed. J. Krayer et al, London: The Warburg Institute 1986, pp. 138-39. On the doffing metaphor as the quest for the true self, see Lloyd Gerson, *Plotinus*, London: Routledge 1994, p. 271. Instances of the use of this metaphor and quotation include Ibn 'Arabç, *al-FutEjt al-Makkiyya*, ed. O. Yahia, Cairo: IFAO 1972, vol. II, p. 219.

Cf. Morris, "'He moves you...'" p. 59.

In another work consonant with his monism, he insists that there are only three journeys: from Him (min 'indihi), to Him (ilayhi) and in Him (fçhi). See Ibn 'Arabç, *Kitib al-isfir 'an nati'ij al-asfir in Rasi'il*, rpt., Beirut: Djr 'idir 1997, p. 457.

Qishjnç (sic!), *al-İŞili jt al-Efiyya*, ed. A. Sprenger, rpt. with tr. N. Safwat as *A glossary of Sufi technical terms*, London: The Octagon Press 1991, p. 87 (Arabic), p. 62 (English).

A reference to al-Qur'in al-Najm (The Star) 53: 7.

These two terms refer to al-Qur'in al-Najm (The Star) 53: 8.

Mullj 'adri, *al-Asfir*, vol. I, p. 18.

amulç, *Jimi' al-asfir*, eds. H. Corbin & O. Yahia, Tehran: Institut Franco-Iranien 1969, pp. 147, 339-40, 494, 402.

Referring to a manuscript in Tehran University Central Library 2401/2 mentioned by DjnishpazhEh, *Fihrist-i nushka-hj-yi khaŞŞç dar Kitibkhjna-yi markazç-yi Djnishgih-i Tehran*, Tehran: Tehran University Press 1339- shamsç, vol. IX, pp. 1012-13.

Mullj 'adri, *al-Asfir*, vol. I, p. 13.

Cf. W. Chittick, *The Sufi path of Knowledge: Ibn 'Arabç's metaphysics of imagination*, Albany: State University of New York Press 1989, pp. 5, 122, 185, 204.

Mullj 'adri, *al-Asfir*, vol. I, p. 18.

Al-Qushayrç, al-Risjla, ed. 'A. Ma|mEd, Cairo: Djr al-ma'rif n.d., vol. I, pp. 153-82.

Mullj 'adri, *al-Asfir*, vol. I, p. 18. On subtle substances, see Annemarie Schimmel, *Mystical dimensions of Islam*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press 1975, pp. 174, 389.

See the excellent discussion in Sachiko Murata, *The Tao of Islam*, Albany: State University of New York Press 1993.

Cf. Steven Wasserstrom, *Religion after religion*, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1999, pp. 66ff; M. Sells, *Mystical languages of Unsayings*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1994, p. 21.

Cf. Qumshehç in *Mullij ʿadrij, al-Asfir*, vol. I, p. 14.

ʿamulç, *Jjimiʿ al-asrjr*, p. 394 considers sanctity to begin at the culmination of the first journey since one has traversed the waystations and stages and become annihilated in the Truth.

Reference to *al-Qurʿjn al-Inshirj ʿ* (Expansion) 94: 1.

Kishjnç, Iʿšili ʿit, p. 23 (Arabic), 24 (English).

ʿamulç, *Jjimiʿ al-asrjr*, p. 402.

ʿamulç, *Jjimiʿ al-asrjr*, p. 546.

Mullij ʿadrij, al-Asfir, vol. I, pp. 92ff.

Cf. Qumshehç in *Mullij ʿadrij, al-Asfir*, vol. I, p. 16.

Cf. D. Black, "al-Fjrjbç," in *History of Islamic Philosophy*, eds. S.H. Nasr & O. Leaman, London: Routledge 1996, vol. I, pp. 190-92.

Eckhart, Luther, and the Buddha in the Marketplace: Heidegger's Great Synthesis of the Mystical and the Existential

Jonathan Weidenbaum, State University of New York at Buffalo, USA

Abstract

Heidegger's existentialist phenomenology is one of the key contributions to twentieth century philosophy. He uses the concept of an Augustinian 'inner man' to convey a situated and embodied account of human experience that is later described by phenomenologists and existentialists such as Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. The author shows how Heidegger borrows one understanding of human experience from the scholastic and mystical tradition (that of self-transcendence), another understanding from the existential and anti-mystical tradition of Luther and Kierkegaard (that of intense self-individuation), and synthesizes these into a single and coherent picture of existence; a vision far more inclusive and far-reaching than the purely existentialist philosophies of his supposed successors. He suggests that such a synthesis has been prefigured several times in the history of the West, though often incompletely, and that Heidegger has achieved an adequate and well-grounded presentation of this synthesis for the modern era

Introduction and Methodology

In the famous preface to his *Phenomenology of Perception*, Maurice Merleau-Ponty rejects the Augustinian 'inner man' for a fully situated and embodied account of human existence. 1 It seems that depth, for the existentialists, should no longer be equated with inward or 'deep' experience (except in metaphor and linguistic convention only). The concept of a disembodied internal world to be explored without reference to the external world of work and play is a derivative fiction, a Platonist abstraction fermented behind the monastery walls of scholastic piety and mysticism. It is well known that Merleau-Ponty's understanding of the fully contextualized nature of experience and cognition is built on Heidegger's notion of being-in-the-world from division I of *Being and Time*. Heidegger is thus seen as the originator of 'existentialist phenomenology', the discipline which aims to describe the structures of experience as they are lived concretely, particularly as embedded in a material, social, and historical environment.

In this essay I will argue that Heidegger actually preserves the Augustinian 'inner man' along with the situated and embedded account of experience relied upon by Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and others. I will show how Heidegger borrows one understanding of human experience from the scholastic and mystical tradition (that of self-transcendence), another understanding from the existential and anti-mystical tradition of Luther and Kierkegaard (that of intense self-individuation), and synthesizes these into a single and coherent picture of existence; a vision far more inclusive and far-reaching than the purely existentialist philosophies of his supposed successors. I will suggest that such a synthesis has been prefigured several times in the history of the West, though often incompletely, and that Heidegger has achieved an adequate and well-grounded presentation of this synthesis for the modern era.

The two frameworks of selfhood, which form the background of Heidegger's synthesis, are found largely in the theological and spiritual heritage of the Occident; though both, arguably, have their parallels in the East as well. No apology will be made for the major place that the history of religion occupies in this paper, for Heidegger states:

Without this theological background, I would never have come onto the path of thinking. 2

Heidegger distills from these traditions a specific ontological core, a certain structure for conceiving the nature of the self and its comportment to reality as a whole. His personal and intellectual relationship to theology, from his seminary training through his interest in early Christianity and so on, has already been examined as a subject in its own right. 3 It is not the purpose of this essay to explore a territory which has already been so well traversed, but to shed light on a specific contribution that Heidegger's philosophy offers to the ontology of selfhood, ontology in general, and, perhaps, the philosophy of religion. This synthesis of the mystical and the existential in Heidegger's thought has been previously overlooked, barely noticed, or outright denied. Indeed, Kiesel suggests that Heidegger never accomplishes it. 4 I argue that he does.

I. The Self and its Ground: Heidegger and Mysticism.

This is the place of the infinite spirit;
achieving it, one is freed from delusion;
abiding in it even at the time of death;
one finds the pure calm of infinity.

Bhagavad-Gita.5

A. History

The ego or self stands at the center of our experience, directing our body through its environment much as Arjuna tugs the reins of his chariot towards the field of battle. The chariot driver, as ego, may assert itself as master, thus facing a world of external objects and barriers to be manipulated and surmounted. Or he may hand the reins of his chariot over to the disinterested and serene Krishna, who watches the whole affair of ego and world unfold like two aspects of a single drama. When this happens the delusions of self and other, subject and object, lose their power to bewitch us, and that which transcends and contains all of these dualities is allowed to disclose itself for the first time. All things are then seen as what they really are: individual moments emerging from one underlying reality. In the symbolism and passages of the Bhagavad-Gita then are encapsulated both kernels of world mysticism: the call for self-transcendence, and a vision of the totality of existing things, including ourselves, as nothing but emanations from a deeper truth.

It comes as no surprise that the image of the chariot with its corresponding symbolism is found in the writings of Plato, for a similar worldview stands at the heart of the Near East as it does the East. The soul may either identify with its worldly needs and thus disperse itself over the flux of sense experience, or it may immerse itself within the eternal and unchanging principle behind appearances. This metaphysical ethics soon spread to the West and remained vividly present throughout the entirety of medieval intellectual history. From Augustine and Anselm through the mystics of the fourteenth century, philosophical reason was still far from degenerating into a mere tool for calculative thinking as it would during the course of modern philosophy. Heidegger is therefore correct in stressing the commonalities between scholasticism and mysticism, for the mystic just actualizes in life what the philosopher discovers in thought: that the true goal of reason is a 'transcendent primal relationship of the soul to God', wherein the self is finally released from its infatuation with particular beings to stand in the presence of Being itself. 6

Heidegger originally looked to scholastic philosophy and mysticism for a fresh perspective upon the nature of intentionality, particularly with the intent of weaning from the medieval tradition a reconciliation of subject and object, where the intentional act, or directedness of consciousness somehow bridges the gap between the perceiving mind and perceived object without reducing the latter to the former. From an early work on Duns Scotus to his course on the Philosophical Foundations of Medieval Mysticism, Heidegger hoped such research would lead to the establishment of a deeper metaphysics free from the objectifying tendencies of traditional metaphysics and epistemology. 7 To help accomplish this task, the living side of the medieval world-view would have to be placed over the dogmatic side, and a mysticism of living experience preferred over the more academic and scholarly work of the philosophers. 8 While Heidegger planned to use the work of the German mystic Meister Eckhart for this early project, his intellectual preoccupation with medieval thought was soon replaced with a passion for the tenets of early Christianity and Luther. However, the Neoplatonic mysticism of Eckhart would never leave Heidegger's interest completely. Perpetually lurking beneath the surface of his philosophy throughout each stage, Eckhart's mysticism would re-emerge most visibly in the essays of his later work. Caputo claims Heidegger actually makes reference to Eckhart in *What is Metaphysics?* and *What is Called Thinking?*. 9

B. Renunciation

'The man of eternal renunciation...' Krishna instructs Arjuna in the Bhagavad-Gita, '...is one who neither hates or desires; beyond dualities, he is easily freed from bondage.' 10 In bondage to its worldly wants

and desires, the self faces an environment of objects and entities to be coveted, ignored or feared. Let the self assert complete dominion over the world leaving nothing for it to fear, it remains a victim to its own need for control like a petty tyrant in a small country. Thus tightening its own boundaries, the self alienates itself from the ground of its own being in which no such borders exist and all dualities like that of ego and other have yet to arise. This primal condition, the 'still desert' of the soul, is available only to the self who has renounced the need for asserting itself over the world. The experience of selflessness then brings with it an understanding of reality in which the world is no longer a mere collection of things to be used or conquered.

Great mystics from different cultures and languages have often invented their own unique terms for this principle of renunciation. Eckhart's own notion of *Gelassenheit*, or detachment, has made such a powerful mark on the German language that a philosopher living six hundred years later would feel compelled to employ the very same term, a philosopher well-known for coining his own words to express his thoughts. Then again, part of Heidegger's originality with language consisted not so much of coining new words but of tracing key terms back to their original meaning. The one addition that Heidegger would contribute to the concept of *Gelassenheit* after all was the idea that to free oneself from attachment to the 'public superficialities of existence' is to allow one to tap into historical possibilities of existing, possibilities long since forgotten. ¹¹ The historical possibility in this instance is the Contemplative belief that truth enters the soul of one who has renounced the self to 'become a nothingness'. ¹²

The activity of intellectual discrimination is suspended along with the will to master in the practice of *Gelassenheit*. Our tendency to neutralize the richness of existence by categorizing it into small conceptual boxes has proven just as vexing as the need to conquer it; hence the Contemplatives of the Middle Ages emphasized the activity of 'unknowing' at least as much as ascetic self-renunciation. ¹³ Heidegger likewise warned of the forgetting of Being for the acknowledgment of only particular beings. The danger, here, is not merely the dicing of the world into units for our material utilization, but the sectioning off of reality for the numerous intellectual sub-disciplines which typically make up the sciences and humanities. And it is not science and technology themselves which have ever been guilty (Heidegger is not asking us to live in caves), but the taking of these regions of inquiry as the most basic understanding of existence. As a corrective to this, and in the manner of mystical traditions spanning from monastic Contemplation to Taoism, Heidegger prescribes the placing of one's mind and volition in abeyance in order to allow uncategorized Being itself to enter our view. Like the Contemplative view that the unblemished truth is received only by those divested of self, Heidegger continually insists that it is the contingent and groundless nature of human existence, which allows Being to show itself in the first place. Human existence, as a project continually pitted over its possibilities, is not so much a thing at all, but an event; a stretch of open space or 'clearing' by which the totality of Being is made visible.

C. Being

And what is this Being? Krishna, the embodiment of the infinite Brahma, explains His true nature to Arjuna:

The whole universe is pervaded by my unmanifest form; all creatures exist in me, but I do not exist in them. ¹⁴

All things exist within the Absolute, yet the Absolute itself is no particular thing. In a seeming contradiction, Krishna earlier proclaims:

He who sees me everywhere and sees everything in me will not be lost to me, and I will not be lost to him. 15

While the Absolute is not exhausted or identified with any particular thing, everything manifests the Absolute to the one who perceives the world in the right way. For the absolute, as no particular thing, is everything, '...being, nonbeing, and beyond'.16

Such a panentheistic conception of deity is so removed from the transcendent God of traditional theism, that medieval mystics like Eckhart have typically felt the need to distinguish between 'God' on the one hand and the true God or Godhead on the other. The former is the prime mover or first cause of the theologians and scholars, the God who hangs over and above creation like a silver ball and sends out rewards and punishments to the earth below. God's most naked being, however, the Godhead of the mystics, is less of a personal God than an impartial ground of all being, the field and primordial unity from which all things derive their source and existence. In the true spirit of the Contemplative tradition, Eckhart asks us to unknow the transcendent God in order to prepare ourselves for the 'eternal abyss of divine being', the God beyond words. 17 Like Brahma, the Godhead is no particular thing, not even the greatest of all things or 'that-which-nothing-greater-than-can-be-conceived'.18

Because the Godhead, as Being itself, is no particular being, Eckhart often describes God as a kind of pure nothingness (as he does with the soul in the practice of Gelassenheit). The depiction of the Absolute as a primordial nothing is a common device in mystical literature, and is seen in classic texts as diverse as the Tao-Te-Ching and the Zohar. Heidegger employs this same metaphysical use of Nothingness in his conception of Being, for nothingness

does not remain the indeterminate opposite of beings but reveals itself as belonging to the Being of beings. 19

Being is therefore no particular being but

nearer to man than every being, be it a rock, a beast, a work of art, a machine, be it an angel or God. 20

It is because we are so thoroughly immersed in Being through and through that it repeatedly resists conversion into a mere item of knowledge or object of thought. This is why Heidegger places such a stress upon pre-intellectual styles of knowing like anxiety and boredom, for these are more tacit modes of awareness which rely on the whole of our existence to disclose the nature of Being. It is in fact our very rootedness in Being which makes the question of Being possible to begin with; so much so that the study of Being is undertaken by Heidegger in the language of forgetfulness and remembrance rather than ignorance and knowledge. This last feature is prevalent in the history of religion and mysticism as well. From Neoplatonism to Sufism, the encounter with truth is rarely described as a novel discovery, but instead depicted as either a restoration of an original unity from which we have fallen, or the uncovering of a child-like state of spontaneity and clarity of vision which has somehow become clouded and soiled over time.

Heidegger alerts us to the prejudice of treating Being as simply the 'most universal concept' superimposed upon the data of experience in an intellectual fashion; for it is because Being is the very medium in which we actually live that it first appears to us as so conceptual and arcane. 21 It is therefore instructive to see how Heidegger's unique rediscovery of Being finds expression among the

more literary existentialists, philosophers who emphasize the concrete through particularized characters and realistic settings. Sartre here speaks through the mouth of his protagonist in *Nausea*:

Never, until these last few days, had I understood the meaning of 'existence'. I was like the others, like the ones walking along the seashore, all dressed in their spring finery. I said, like them, "The ocean is green; that white speck up there is a seagull," but I didn't feel that it existed or that the seagull was an 'existing seagull'; usually existence hides itself. It is there, around us, in us, it is us, you can't say two words without mentioning it, but you can never touch it.

...If anyone had asked me what existence was, I would have answered, in good faith, that it was nothing, simply an empty form which was added to external things without changing anything in their nature. And then all of a sudden, there it was, clear as day: existence had suddenly unveiled itself. It had lost the harmless look of an abstract category: it was the very paste of things, this root was kneaded into existence. Or rather the root, the park gates, the bench, the sparse grass, all that had vanished: the diversity of things, their individuality, were only an appearance, a veneer. 22

Where the hero of Sartre's novel reacts to the empty nature of the self and the inescapable presence of Being with confusion and disgust, Heidegger sees in these things the source of all value and meaning. Heidegger presents in his own peculiar way the same principles heralded by the world's mystical traditions. First, that one of the pinnacle moments of human existence is to serve as an empty container or open window through which an appropriation with a reality greater than ourselves is made possible. Second, that the reality to be encountered is no existing thing at all, but the ground and plenum of all existence and non-existence; that out of which all things, including ourselves, are nothing but transient parts. To debate whether Heidegger's thought can be likened to mysticism in actual content or structure only is beside the point; that the secular writings of a contemporary thinker can allude to the very same things described by the mystics serves as a wonderful testimony to the truths spoken about by both. 23 In fact, it is Heidegger's fresh and non-traditional style of philosophizing, which enables him to capture both principles in one elegant expression: 'Man is the shepherd of Being'. 24

II. The Self as Unmediated Project: Heidegger and Existentialism

There seems to be the same difference between hell, purgatory, and heaven as between despair, uncertainty, and assurance. 25

Luther, Thesis Sixteen

A. History

The self, while placed in the midst of a larger nexus of meaning, finds it all too easy to shirk the painful responsibility its own existence requires. Anything from the highly ritualized worldview of a primitive community to the equally ritualized over-structure of a modern society may provide the self with enough external distraction and mediation that it fails to experience the birthpangs of genuine self-awareness and autonomy. Religion has often served to engender this unfortunate process; the most prominent instance of this being the mystic who, as described in the last section, calls for the annihilation of the self into a greater ground of reality.

Enter Luther. Though his well-known *Ninety-Five Theses* is little more than a protest against a specific church practice (the sale of indulgences), thesis number sixteen embodies the very shift of focus Luther

would bring to the development of religion and culture in the West, namely the move from cosmology to phenomenology, from abstract speculation concerning the nature of reality to a psychology of the spiritual life. In contrast to the systematic and integrated metaphysics of a Thomas Aquinas or a Meister Eckhart, Luther's 'anthropocentric theology' 26 remains centered upon the self as it actually exists: as a kind of desperate tightrope walk over the possibility of infinite condemnation on the one hand and that of infinite salvation on the other. Luther's challenge to the philosophical and mystical legacies of the Middle Ages then contains both principles of the existential turn in world culture: the stress on stark individuation in opposition to the immersion of the self under a larger envelope of significance, and the self's continued acceptance and even will-full affirmation of its perpetually incompleting and ungrounded nature.

Luther's theological revolution did not occur in a vacuum; Bainton, in fact, labels Luther's thought as 'the theology of Paul heightened, intensified, and clarified'. 27 It is this reinvigorated Pauline theology which set the stage for the 'inner-mind' of Luther and greatest of the existentialists, Soren Kierkegaard, as well as the foundation for the Neo-orthodox theology of the twentieth century (Barth, Brunner, Niebuhr...etc.). It is in this last movement in which some of the themes of the previous thinkers find their most explicit formulation: that the individual must shipwreck his/her own efforts to establish the meaning of their life, and that the individual must enter alone into a spiritual crisis through which he becomes a new person. This is an experiential philosophy quite different than that of the mystics; for the pantheistic and Neoplatonic conception of reality oversteps the great divide between the transcendence of God and the finitude of man so necessary for the violence and rigor of true faith. There is a 'Basic opposition', explains Emil Brunner, 'between the Biblical and the idealist, pantheist, and mystical thought concerning God'.28

It is this finite, creaturely understanding of man found in the Bible which Heidegger found so useful for a phenomenology of lived experience. His interest in religion thus moved from Eckhart and medieval philosophy to Paul and early Christianity (with the influence of the historicist philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey). Heidegger's obsession with Paul is evident in his Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion course, and his subsequent interest in Luther is found in his Augustine and Neoplatonism course in which Luther's theology is employed as a corrective to Augustine's Neoplatonic influence. 29 Heidegger's reading of Kierkegaard would play an unparalleled role in Being and Time, and his infatuation with this brand of theology was most evident throughout his extensive work with Rudolf Bultmann and Paul Tillich at Marburg.

B. Individuation

We have seen that the ecstatic self is the one who has escaped the narrow boundaries of the ego, the one who has left behind the need to maintain an identity and preserve it through a world, which stands opposite to it. We have also seen that this state of selflessness is accompanied by an understanding of things as parts of an undifferentiated whole, an Ultimate beyond dualities. Such a vision of reality is the goal of intellectual mysticism as well as religious mysticism, the practice of philosophical idealism and Contemplative piety alike. 'The systematic Idea,' says Kierkegaard, 'is the identity of subject and object, the unity of thought and being'. 30 Both pantheism and philosophical schematization attempt to swallow the individual into a closed system, an arrangement with nothing left out, 'not even such a little minikin as the existing Herr Professor who writes the system'. 31 But concrete existence, for Kierkegaard, means the facing of our future possibilities. Human life is essentially an open-ended affair, never to be understood in a closed system unless in a joke only. The person who would attempt to incorporate the existing person in the system, be it the dialectical system of Hegel or the acosmistic

system of the Vedas, is seen by Kierkegaard as similar to the man who would build a great palace and yet live in a doghouse next door. 32 Mysticism is therefore to be counted alongside Idealism as another way we ignore our existence, a way we dodge the passion and personal involvement which are the true hallmarks of the religious life, what in fact, for Kierkegaard, constitutes the very definition of spiritlessness.

To distance ourselves from our first person perspective on reality is to make no sense of the passion and commitment required for authentic living. A genuine relationship, whether to God, a work of art, or another human being, requires a flesh and blood I to respond to a Thou, since a disembodied and indiscriminating love for everyone is really a love for no-one at all. This is why a social existentialist like Buber warns us against a mysticism which would dissolve the I into the Thou, for it was with his whole being with which Job, the great fore-father of existentialism, brought himself before God in hope and anguish. 33 A true ethics, certainly an existentialist ethics, is simply impossible without the total person.

Heidegger never formulated an explicit ethics; his philosophical task from the beginning to the end of his career was devoted to the knowledge of Being. Nevertheless, Being for Heidegger is only known through the entity in whom the question is made possible; it is an existing, concerned creature whose own life is at issue for itself and whose existence is found inseparable from a culture and environment (without being reducible to either). Here we have come as far from the armchair metaphysics of traditional philosophy as possible, for the true nature of objects, world, time, and history, are known in the third person in their derivative form only. This early and most influential of Heidegger's attempts to uncover the nature of Being begins with the context in which Being is first made intelligible, namely through a finite being who projects itself into the future while inheriting a past, who either succumbs or transcends the status-quo of the herd, and who either flees or bravely anticipates its own death. The methodology of Being and Time thus consists of bottom-up approach in which the experiential structures of the individual are of primary concern, for this gritty phenomenology of human existence constitutes the window through which Being can appear. Even before the writing of Being and Time, it was on these grounds that Heidegger criticized Rudolf Otto's Idea of the Holy, a popular study of the mystical experience. Heidegger claims that Otto's singling out of the numinous, or the non-rational character of the holy over and above its moral elements, is a metaphysical distinction unrooted from the personal and historical phenomenology of the individual. 34

C. Ungroundedness

There is a speech given at the end of Bergman's *Winter Light* to the distraught priest who serves as the film's protagonist. In this second of the supposed 'silence of God' film trilogy, a minor character recounts the passion and suffering of Christ to help place the priest's crisis of faith into perspective. 35 Christ's physical pain during the crucifixion, explains the character, was short. The real pain was the moment of extreme alienation and loneliness experienced by Christ on the cross, the feeling of being deserted by both his disciples and God, and the prospect that all of his life's work and martyrdom had been in vain. This was Christ's darkest moment, where the Gospels record his famous utterance: 'My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?' 36 The gravity of this dialogue is accentuated visually with a carving of the tormented Christ hanging over the altar, a symbolic portrait of the priest's own state of desperation.

Central to genuine spiritual existence for Luther is an inner trial called *Anfechtung*; the utter despair of the self in its alienation from God, the mood of living precariously without the certainty of redemption. 37 Far from the mystic who rests absorbed and completed within the Absolute like a child in its womb, it

is in our identification with the suffering Christ where we are finally vindicated before God. An adherent of Luther's 'theology of the cross' may then state with Kierkegaard that the greater the anxiety 'the greater is the man'. Anxiety is the yoke of authentic living, the terrible freedom faced by the self who accepts itself as it really is: a project pitted over its future possibilities, the highest of which is the leap of faith in which its own efforts to justify its existence are crushed. 38 This dying and rebirth of the ego, inner movements of the self which parallel the passion and resurrection of Christ, is a process to be renewed without end. Indeed, Kierkegaard compares this highest possibility of human existence to the repetitive strokes of a swimmer or the strides of a dancer. 39 The stirring last words of Winter Light are spoken as our troubled priest turns to face his congregation: 'Holy, holy holy Lord of Hosts...' One gets the sense that this is an affirmation he will need to relive throughout the course of his life.

The writings of Kierkegaard are replete with rich depictions of personality-types who run from this uncomfortable condition of genuine selfhood. Instead of taking will-full responsibility over the contingent and open-ended nature of experience, the majority of the human race attempts to escape themselves for some kind of universal existence, perhaps an objectified social role, or the basking in some pantheistic conception of deity or Hegelian Absolute Spirit. 40 This was perhaps the thinking of Paul whose admonition for the early Christian community to await the Parousia or Day of Judgment was designed to shake the early Christians away from just this sense of security and complacency. The second coming, Paul believes, will inevitably catch us by surprise, for '...the day of the Lord will come like a thief in the night'. 41 Paul thus adds a strong temporal element to the role of anxiety in the spiritual life, a futural, anticipatory one in particular. This kairological 42 character of lived time plays an unparalleled role in Being and Time.

It is predominately in Being and Time in which Heidegger would synthesize most all of the themes mentioned above, though purifying them from any explicitly theological content. Human existence, when fully actualized, is an anxious and future-oriented affair, a resolute acceptance of mortality and the fleeting nature of one's life, along with a connection and responsibility to a history and a generation. When approached in an intimate sense as a possibility, which can occur at any time, death is a frightening and unsettling thing. The masses of people try to sidestep the uncomfortable awareness of their own contingency by throwing themselves into a shallow and public existence. Here, the gossip and distraction of everyday life is used to achieve a safe state of selfless anonymity in which the personal implications of death, guilt, and commitment are never experienced. In an interesting but rare display of his religious influences, Heidegger labels this latter possibility of human existence fallenness, and the switch to the former more resolute and kairological possibility, Augenblick or 'the moment of vision', an open reference to Kierkegaard. 43

Whatever style we choose for our existence requires constant renewal, since human existence, for Heidegger, is fundamentally different from something like a rock or a tree, things that are already identical with themselves and exist as fixed objects. We, however, are not objects but activities, and possess possibilities through which we are free, within certain bounds, to define our very being. Our true nature is then an unstable one, an incompleteness to be either dodged or affirmed in irresolute and resolute existence respectively. Mystical union with an Absolute of any kind is the ultimate form of fulfillment and completion, and is thus commonly seen as the biggest antithesis to this view of the human person. Even scholars who write on the subject of Heidegger and mysticism (most often on the points raised in section I of this paper) acknowledge the limits this presents to any comparison of mysticism with Heidegger's situated and project-like view of the self (called by Heidegger Dasein, or 'being-there'). Sikka writes:

Nowhere in any of Heidegger's works is there a description of a state quite like that of the completion of the soul in mystical union. In *Being and Time*, Dasein, as existing being-in-the-world, is always incomplete, always lacking and striving. If it were to gain the completion in which mystical union consists, it would no longer be Dasein, would no longer be there (see SZ, 236). In fact, in mystical union, 'human being' is no longer there and so such union is often described as a form of death, although this death is supposed to equal absolute fulfillment, not the end, in the sense of cutting off, of possibility. If such death dies into any kind of life, it then cannot be the life of this world, since absolute fulfillment cannot belong to being-in-the-world. 44

It is telling that a few of the existentialists who have built off of Heidegger's work were outright atheists. Sartre for instance held God to be a contradiction, the impossible goal of a consciousness, which yearns to discover a secure foundation for itself while simultaneously preserving its own freedom. But consciousness is doomed to be free, a perpetual state of becoming which can never be reconciled with a stable ground of any kind without its free and project-like character then congealing and collapsing into a static mass or finished set of meaning. For Sartre, there is the density and meaninglessness of Being on the one hand, the uprooted and meaning-seeking nature of consciousness on the other, and nothing in-between. Man is a 'useless passion', and to introduce any Absolute whatsoever into the picture would kill the ambiguous and open-ended nature of the human condition. 45

To those who feel that Sartre has just taken Heidegger's early philosophy to its logical conclusion, there is then an unbridgeable gap between the Heidegger of *Being and Time* and the teachings of world mysticism. Furthermore, since it is the late and supposedly more Being-centered philosophy of his, which is often compared with mysticism, a gap is then also placed between the early and later chapters of Heidegger's thought. Where the mystics prescribe self-transcendence and immersion into a greater ground of reality, the early Heidegger is commonly seen as stressing a more intensified self-individuation as well as affirmation of the unmediated and project-like nature of human selfhood.

III. The Self as Project Standing Out of its Ground: Heidegger's Mystical Existentialism.

Bare-chested and bare-footed, he comes out into the market-place;
Daubed with mud and ashes, how broadly he smile!
There is no need for the miraculous power of the gods,
For he touches, and lo! the dead trees are in bloom.

Kaku-an.46

We have seen the emphasis on self-transcendence in the mystical tradition, where the self dissolves its stubborn independence for an appropriation with a greater ground of being prior to the dualities of self and world, ego and other. A Zen master named Seikyo, who illustrated the search for spiritual attainment with the symbolism of a man seeking an ox, depicted this level of non-duality with the image of a pristine white circle completely emptied of content. Even the dualism of the non-enlightened spiritual seeker on the one hand (the man) and the goal of enlightenment on the other (the ox), ceases to exist in the Buddha-nature. The circle thus represents pure Being without differentiation.

Kaku-an, another Zen master from the same period, felt that Seikyo's illustrations misrepresented the final stage of enlightenment. The self in Zen Buddhism does not completely disappear into some milky void beyond distinctions and remain there for good. It instead carries on with its existence, working and living in the world as it did before. Standing out of its ground in the Buddha-nature, the self's motions

are engendered with an enriched sense of harmony and earnestness; its activities less self-centered, its relationship to others more compassionate. For this reason Kaku-an added additional stages to Seikyo's original work, the last of which depicts an enlightened Buddha walking into a marketplace and mixing with the general public. In his commentary to the picture, Kaku-an writes:

Carrying a gourd he goes out into the market, leaning against a staff he comes home. He is found in company with wine-bibbers and butchers, he and they are all converted into Buddhas. 47

It is arguable that this is the moment of return shared by the whole of world mysticism, and exemplified by the lives and writings of mystics East and West. Many of the Christian mystics, for instance, could be seen as anticipations of the reformation, the majority of whom spoke of an active form of contemplation in which communion with God occurs through the activity of everyday life. When in touch with the ground of the soul, formerly good deeds become 'living works', selfless instead of contrived, spontaneous instead of calculated. Meister Eckhart belonged to this perspective:

And whoever truly possesses God in the right way, possesses him in all places: on the street, in any company, as well as in a church or a remote place or in their cell. 48

This picture of the self as existing out of its ground is core to understanding Heidegger's comments on Sartre from the Letter on Humanism. 49 While Sartre insists on the priority of our freedom in forming the structure of our existence, Heidegger replies that it is exactly this freedom of ours, which discloses our source in Being. An experience cannot occur without a context anymore than a figure can exist without a ground; even something perpetually outstripping itself requires a base from which to shoot out from. It is in fact this launching movement of the self, which provides enough distance for the base to be seen in its entirety, much as a large hill in a thick forest permits a view of the whole span of woods.

This projection and lift of the self out of Being creates an expanse or stretch of non-being through which Being can surface. There is then a hole created in the distancing of the self from its base, a void or nothingness, which parallels the nothingness of Being itself (since Being is not any particular being). 50 Nothingness, for Heidegger, is then an essential part of both: the open and transcending nature of the self through which Being is made manifest, and the very transcendental and non-objectifiable reality of Being. We are a free and existing creation standing out of our ground in something greater than ourselves, a situation in which neither self nor ground precludes the existence of the other. Sartre is therefore wrong. The self in its search for an Absolute in no way seeks to mediate the risk and freedom of living, nor is there a contradiction between these things and our inherence in Being. In the words of Alan Watts, the inconceivable is 'not so much the abyss into which we are falling; it is rather that out of which we act and live, think and feel'. 51 Kierkegaard's complaints about pantheistic-style systems are no longer a worry, since the ground does not at all swallow up the self but instead presents it with a measure of buoyancy and support (something not entirely different from Kierkegaard's own notion of personal salvation). Buber's complaints about mysticism also have no bearing here, since there is a flesh and blood 'I' to relate to a 'Thou' after all.

Intimately related to the nothing, the experience of angst is another connection between the mystical and existential sides of Heidegger's synthesis. On the one hand, anxiety reveals the decisive and insecure nature of genuine living; the experience of the self who retrieves his or her possibilities from the complacency and safety of the herd, and who faces his or her mortality in a state of fortitude and responsibility. On the other hand, anxiety, as that which reveals the groundless nature of our being, is the mood from which we attempt to flee by running to the world for support. But just as anxiety is

connected to the center of our existence and not to anything in the world, such attempts are fruitless. Our hold on the things of the world then begins to 'slip away', 52 stranding us before the naked and inexpressible presence of Being which hangs, dreamlike, as no particular being at all. It is helpful here to recall Holden Caulfield's breakdown in the *Catcher in the Rye*, whose frustrations climax in his hallucination of falling through a sidewalk. When his tenacious attempts to cling on to reality finally collapse, he experiences not the chaos of insanity but sheer wonder at existence, awe at something as unimportant and nonsensical as the sight of his little sister revolving around a carousel. The impression of reverence and amazement that anything is at all and is not completely nothing; this is the experience from which, according to Heidegger, true metaphysics begins. 53

Heidegger's use of things like mood and emotion as types of knowledge has already been mentioned in section I. But now we finally know why. Being is not something that stands opposed to us like the conservative God of the neo-orthodox theologians, but is instead the foundation from which we arise like a spark from a fire. But Being is not something we then automatically 'have'. As the very medium of our existence, Being is closer to us than we are to ourselves, yet "the near remains farthest from man". 54 And it remains farthest from ourselves not only by way of our need to categorize and manipulate, but in our tendency to avoid our own life extremities. The alternative to this, also mentioned earlier, is the more genuine but dreadful form of living in which we freely take up our personal and cultural history while anticipating death. This individualized and unmediated acceptance of our freedom and finitude cleaves us away from the petty occupations of the present by pointing us toward the future and adjoining us with the past. Our existence thus has a stretched quality, and it is this fundamentally lived and futural form of temporality through which Being itself is brought to light. The point is that in genuine existence we become transparent to Being; that is, we have the ability to actualize the ground through our life in the way a glass of water allows itself to be permeated through and through by a colored dye. A shallow, distracted existence conceals our ground in Being. A genuine, resolute existence serves as its conduit.

The self as a finite project standing out of its ground in Being and as either transparent or opaque to this ground is the one picture running consistently throughout Heidegger's philosophical career. A large part of the *Kehre* or 'turn' between the early and later Heidegger consists of a change of perspective on this same picture. The Heidegger of *Being and Time* uses human existence as the vantage point for understanding Being, and the later Heidegger looks at Being more directly; seeing human existence as the window supplied by Being in order to make itself known. 55 Being is truly the most fundamental theme on both sides of the *Kehre*, and human existence is seen equally on both sides as the project whose activities and ways of life either help or hinder its unfolding into view. This is Heidegger's great synthesis of the mystical and the existential.

This synthesis, as a true synthesis, incorporates the essential and defining feature of both ontologies. It is notable that the existentialist wing of Heidegger's synthesis goes even further than the moment of return in traditional mysticism. While the Buddhist saint and Christian contemplative carry on with their existence even while reconciled with the Absolute or God-head, nowhere in the literature of either form of mysticism is there the same importance placed upon the contingent and creaturely qualities of that which stands on the hither side of the appropriation. And certainly is there nothing near the investigation Heidegger presents into the earthbound nature of our existence; for the Heideggerian self is essentially strewn across an environment of equipmental and social artifacts, and partially defined by this environment and its history. 56 This is an investigation conducted with such precision that it remains one of the most respected influences on practically every scientific and philosophical inquiry

into the situated and embodied nature of the human self; from the 'existentialist phenomenology' of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, to contemporary work in psychology and cognitive science. 57

One gets the sense that if Heidegger never left the seminary and remained a theologian in *Being and Time*, he still would have had to leave behind Neoplatonic mysticism as it is found in its pure form. If one's very being is defined by his or her mortality and inseparability from a milieu or set of circumstances, it makes no sense to ask one to transcend the body and identify with an ideal world lying beyond the dungeon of sense experience. An essential feature of Heidegger's reconciliation of the existential and the mystical is his placing of Being underneath us rather than over us, and its availability to us through things like mood and guilt rather than the disembodied vehicle of reason. Heidegger thus saves the deepest impulse of Neoplatonic thought by, quite literally, turning it on its head. It is in our desperation as finite and anxious selves that we are brought close to Being, and it is in the process of abstraction and objectification in we are pulled away. It is in this way that Heidegger rescues the Augustinian 'inner man' from both extremes: the hierarchical and intellectualized metaphysics of traditional Neoplatonism on the one hand, and the completely worldly and situated framework of the French existentialists on the other.

Concluding thoughts

The idea that important truths are made present through a mode or state of our own being, what I have called transparency, is the kernel of Heidegger's synthesis of the mystical and the existential. Whether transparency can be achieved by our own volition or not is beside the question. 58 What is more interesting is the similar use of the term by one of Heidegger's major influences. For Kierkegaard, genuine selfhood is the state in which '...in relating itself to itself and in willing to be itself, the self rests transparently in the power that established it'. 59 That is, the self must accept itself as the singular and concrete project that it is, while founding itself upon the rich mysteries of faith. A century before Sartre's analysis of theism as the belief in a hopeless contradiction, Kierkegaard effectively created all of the major tenets of existentialism while remaining a deep Christian theist. Yet the ground to which the self is made transparent is a narrow one, and too far above the world from which we live, work, and breathe. Kierkegaard, good existentialist that he was, exiles us from our root in Being by violently opposing the notion that existence can be a spiritual home for us in any way. Even while proving the consistency of existentialism and theism, Kierkegaard, as shown earlier, maintains a strict exclusiveness between existentialism and anything resembling mysticism.

While Kierkegaard forgoes the universal for the individual, Augustine forgoes the individual for the universal. Not even the depth of Augustine's emotion, passion, and despair can rescue the existential side from his ultimate goal of union with an abstract and atemporal God. It took Heidegger the fervently anti-Greek theology of Luther to temper Augustine's Neoplatonism enough to make any use out of it.

If there is any historical figure who most closely approximates the synthesis, it is Paul, the common ancestor from which both Augustine and Kierkegaard spread out into two opposite historical and ideological poles. It is in Paul's writing in which joyful mysticism ('...it is no longer I who live, but it is Christ who liveth in me.' 60) and anxious freedom find their first major synthesis in the West. Such a synthesis would not be as fully established again until the twentieth century with the writing of Heidegger. Heidegger thus resembles a secularized Paul for the modern world.

Works Cited

Bainton, Roland, *Here I Stand*, New York: Mentor Books 1950.

Ballard, Bruce, *Role of Mood in Heidegger's Ontology*, Maryland: University Press of America 1991.

Bergman, Ingmar (Director) and Ekelund, Allan (Producer), *Winter Light*, [Video Tape]. Svensk Filmindustri 1961.

Bhagavad Gita, tr. Barbara Miller, New York: Columbia University Press 1986.

Brunner, Emil, *Truth as Encounter*, trs. David Cairns and T.H.L. Parker, Philadelphia: Westminster Press 1943.

Buber, Martin, *Between Man and Man*, tr. Maurice Friedman, New York: Macmillan Publishing 1965.

Caputo, John, "Heidegger and Theology," in *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger*, ed. Charles Guignon, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1993.

, *The Mystical Element in Heidegger's Thought*, New York: Fordham University Press 1986.

Eckhart, Meister, *Selected Writings*, tr. Oliver Davies, New York: Penguin Books 1994.

Hacker, Paul, *The Ego in Faith*, Franciscan Herald Press 1970.

Heidegger, Martin, *Being and Time*, trs. John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson, New York: Harper & Row 1962.

, "Letter on Humanism," and "What is Metaphysics," in *Basic Writings*, trs. David Krell, Frank Capuzzi, & J. Glenn Gray, New York: Harper & Row 1977.

Kaku-an, "Ten Oxherding Pictures" in *Manual of Zen Buddhism*, ed./tr. D.T. Suzuki, New York: Grove Weidefeld 1960.

Kierkegaard, Soren, *The Concept of Anxiety*, tr. Reidar Thomte, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1980.

, *The Sickness Unto Death*, trs. Howard Hong & Edna Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1980.

, *A Kierkegaard Anthology*, ed. Robert Bretall, New York: The Modern Library 1946.

Kiesel, Theodore, *Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time*, Berkeley: University of California 1993.

Luther, Martin, *Ninety-Five Theses*, tr. Bertram Lee Wolf, in *Martin Luther: Selections from his Writings*, ed. John Dillenberger, New York: Doubleday 1962.

Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, *Phenomenology of Perception*, tr. Colin Smith, New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1962.

Sartre, Jean-Paul, *Being and Nothingness*, tr. Hazel Barnes, New York: Washington Square Press 1956.

, Nausea, tr. Lloyd Alexander, New Directions 1964.

Sikka, Sonya, Forms of Transcendence: Heidegger and Medieval Mystical Theology, New York: State University of New York Press 1997.

Tillich, Paul, Systematic theology volume I, Chicago: Chicago University Press 1951.

, The Courage to Be, New Haven: Yale University Press 1952.

Watts, Alan, The Way of Liberation, New York: Weatherhill 1983.

Notes:

Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. xi.

Kiesel, The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time, p. 70.

For instance, in the writing of Kiesel and Caputo. I make use of their work throughout this essay.

Kiesel, The genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time, p. 218. He labels the self's transparency and dependence upon God as the childlike sense of religion, and the more active and resolute self as the adult sense of religion:

Of course, these two, the childlike and adult senses of religion, are not incompatible, but Heidegger never quite gets around to resolving the Pauline paradox of trust and confidence on the one hand, and the despair of decision on the other...

The Bhagavad-Gita: Krishna's Council in Time of War, p. 39.

Heidegger quoted by Kiesel, The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time, p. 71.

Kiesel, The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time, pp. 71-75.

John Caputo, "Heidegger and Theology," pp. 271-72.

Caputo, The Mystical Element in Heidegger's Thought, pp. 28-29 and 154.

The Bhagavad-Gita: Krishna's Council in Time of War, p. 57. The yoga of renunciation has been labeled elsewhere as Karma Yoga. The self still works and acts in the world, but non-egotistically. It instead dedicates the fruits of its activities to God.

Heidegger, What is Metaphysics? p. 106.

Meister Eckhart, Selected Writings, p. 145.

One important work of medieval mysticism is titled The Cloud of Unknowing, written by an unknown monk of the fourteenth century.

Bhagavad-Gita, p. 83.

Bhagavad-Gita, p. 67.

Bhagavad-Gita, p. 105.

Meister Eckhart, Selected Writings, p. 205.

To Anselm's famous argument for God's existence in his *Proslogion*, Paul Tillich replies that the proof presupposes a derivative conception of deity, namely that it objectifies God by portraying Him as an object among other objects, a thing among other things. It is interesting that Tillich bases his objections on his view of God as 'being itself', and in strikingly similar fashion to Eckhart, the 'God beyond God'. These remarks are found in Tillich, *Systematic Theology* volume I, Chicago: Chicago University Press 1951, and *The Courage to Be*, New Haven: Yale University Press 1952. Tillich was, of course, highly influenced by Heidegger.

Heidegger, *What is Metaphysics?* p. 110.

Heidegger, *Letter on Humanism*, p. 210. Heidegger is referring here to the transcendent God of the scholars and philosophers, not, say, to Eckhart's concept of the Godhead.

Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 2.

Jean-Paul Sartre, *Nausea*, tr. L. Alexander, *New Directions* 1964, p. 127.

In *The Mystical Element in Heidegger's Thought*, Caputo claims that Heidegger's writing, in its non-theistic and non-denominational character, resembles mysticism in the structure of its ontology but not in its content. Sikka, *Forms of Transcendence*, pp. 266-67 disagrees.

Heidegger, *Letter on Humanism*, p. 210.

Martin Luther, *Ninety-Five Theses*, in *Martin Luther: Selections From His Writings*, p. 491.

I borrow this term from Paul Hacker's study of Luther's theology: *The Ego in Faith*.

Roland Bainton, *Here I Stand*, p. 51.

Emil Brunner, *Truth as Encounter*, p. 89.

See Kiesel's enlightening chapter on the 'The Religion Courses' in *The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time*.

Kierkegaard, *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, in *A Kierkegaard Anthology*, ed. R. Bretall, New York: The Modern Library 1946, p. 205.

Kierkegaard, *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, in *A Kierkegaard Anthology*, p. 204.

This is one of Kierkegaard's most famous analogies. See *The Sickness Unto Death*, pp. 43-44.

Many of Buber's remarks against otherworldly styles of mysticism are found in *Between Man and Man*, tr. M. Friedman, New York: Macmillan Publishing 1965. As an interpreter of Hasidic Judaism, Buber was always quick to stress the ethical and this-worldly nature of this mystical movement.

Kiesel, *The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time*, pp. 96-97.

In his second biography, *Images: my life in Film*, Bergman denies that this trilogy is really a trilogy at all. But this is irrelevant to this essay.

Matthew, 27:46.

Bainton, *Here I Stand*, p. 31.

The Concept of Dread, p. 155.

See *Fear and Trembling*.

Kierkegaard calls this form of existence despair, and sums them up nicely in *The Sickness Unto Death*.

Thessalonians, 5:2-11. See Kiesel's chapter on 'The Religion Courses' in *The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time*.

The Kairos is the Greek and New Testament term for time as it is taken up in this decisive and non-objective sense

Bruce Ballard claims that Heidegger simply takes the early Christian anticipation of the Day of Judgment and replaces it with death. See *The Role of Mood in Heidegger's Ontology*, p. 110.

Sonya Sikka, *Forms of Transcendence*, p. 221.

Sartre is, in the opinion of the present author, among the most despairing of the existentialists, as well as one of the most rewarding. The whole second half of *Being and Nothingness*, tr. H. Barnes, New York: Washington Square Press 1956, according to Sartre can be boiled down to man's fruitless attempt to become God.

From 'The Ten Ox-herding Pictures,' tr. D. T. Suzuki, *Manual of Zen Buddhism*, p. 134.

Ibid. In some interpretations of this passage, the gourd represents emptiness, or the self in a state of non-attachment. This is the interpretation of Suzuki among others. In other interpretations it is a wine gourd, an open defiance of the prohibition of alcohol in monastic Buddhism. This is a typical feature of Mahayana Buddhism, a tradition that attempts to vanquish the line between monastic and lay Buddhist practice.

Eckhart, *Selected Writings*, p. 9. Caputo, *The Mystical Element in Heidegger's Thought*, p. 138 contains an interesting discussion of Eckhart's use of a passage from the New Testament to illustrate exactly this theme.

Heidegger, Letter on humanism, in Basic Writings, pp. 208-9.

Heidegger, What is Metaphysics? in Basic Writings, p. 105, states:

Holding itself out into the nothing, Dasein is in each case already beyond beings as a whole.

This state of being 'beyond beings' reveals Being.

Watts, The Way of Liberation, p. 18.

Heidegger, What is Metaphysics? in Basic Writings, p. 103.

Heidegger, What is Metaphysics? in Basic Writings, p. 112, expresses this more formally as: "Why are there beings at all, and why not rather nothing?"

Heidegger, Letter on Humanism, in Basic Writings, p. 210.

Sikka, Forms of Transcendence, p. 154, comes very close to making the same observation:

...whereas the early Heidegger tends to think of the being of beings in terms of a project of Dasein, the later Heidegger, after the so-called Kehre, is more inclined to think of Dasein as a project of being and to think the being of beings accordingly...

Though her stating of Heidegger's earlier notion of Being as "a project of Dasein" seems to relativize Being to man, instead of seeing the project of Dasein as what it really is in Being and Time: the context of intelligibility through which Being appears.

One of Heidegger's terms for human existence is "Being-in-the-world."

For instance, the work of Andy Clark, Hubert Dreyfus, George Lakoff, and others.

There is no substantial difference between either side of the kehre even on this issue. In Being and Time, an involuntary call to conscience serves as a necessary condition for a genuine, resolute existence.

Kierkegaard, Sickness Unto Death, p. 131.

Galations, 2:19-20.

Tolerance Versus Neutrality: a critical analysis of liberal neutrality

Hamid Hadji Haidar, Institute of Islamic Studies, UK

Abstract

This paper will discuss the possibility of the state being a neutral entity inside of a plural society. One of the pillars of liberal ideology is the belief that the liberal state will be neutral and fair towards all competing ideologies, even non-liberal ones. The liberal state, it is argued, has no other role than to guarantee that its citizens are able to freely express themselves, and have an equal role inside of

political discourse. Such a belief is fraught with problems, in so far as the idea of a neutral state would be akin to a non-ideological state. But precisely because it is a liberal state, it is an ideological state that makes the same sorts of claims to morality and socio-political ethics as any other ideology. In this sense, then, it is impossible for the liberal state to be neutral in any meaningful sense.

The justifications used for neutrality are problematic as well. The benefits of having a neutral state are usually framed within concepts of utilitarianism, individualism, and majoritarianism that are themselves filled with contradictions. These justifications will also be discussed and criticized.

From this discussion, we will conclude that the liberal state is better described as a system of tolerance, rather than neutrality. The liberal state accepts the presence of competing ideologies, while still giving liberal ideology and ethics the primary role in shaping society.

Introduction

Can the state be neutral between different ways of life in a plural society? To answer this question, we shall try to examine the accuracy of the liberals' assertion that they are not biased against non-liberal groups. The notion liberals use to describe this characteristic is neutrality. To keep this promise, there have been two main streams of liberalism, one of which offers a "comprehensive philosophy" for human life, whereas the other puts forward a "political order" for a just society without intending to organise all aspects of human life.

We will first look at the origins of this discussion. We will then explore some favourable consequences of neutrality for the whole of society. We will then analyse three arguments used to justify liberal neutrality, in order to determine the accuracy of this assertion. This article does not intend to analyse liberalism and its goals on the whole; instead, we will confine ourselves to assess one key component of this philosophy: the neutrality of the state.

1- Pluralistic Society and the Problem of Agreement

Modern societies are characterised by variation of norms, values, beliefs and moralities. Unlike traditional communities, urban societies contain interests and loyalties, which are not only diverse, but also conflicting and contradictory. 1 The main sources of this diversity of cultures and values in modern societies include those related to 1) original nations seeking to uphold their traditional way of life, 2) communities that are territorially concentrated and seek to maintain their own languages and cultures, 3) immigrants, 4) indigenous ethnic minorities, 5) religious communities, 6) sub-cultures such as gays and lesbians, 2 and 7) the individual's various tastes and preferences. 3 Consequently, on the one hand, we confront divergence between groups and communities with each other in what they value. On the other, there are clashes, too, between different groups and institutions, which are expected to meet the requirements of social groups. So far as the political systems are concerned, we confront the question of whether or not it is possible that the state respond successfully to the conflicting interests, concerns, demands and orientations of social groups. The main concern here is whether there any shared bases, upon which reasonable people with contradictory ideas about the good life can live together justly and peacefully. 4 To put it in a more relevant form, can the state be neutral with respect to the conception of the good life so that people who possess contradictory convictions about the good life would accept its legitimacy?

2- Plausibility of Neutrality

Liberals are often proud that they offer the only feasible and plausible solution to this problem. 5

Liberals often characterise themselves as tolerant people, who pave the way for ideas and actions they do not approve of. This is due to their prioritisation of freedom of choice over all other human values. They assert that there must be no imposition of a certain conception of the good life on citizens in a liberal society. 6 Liberalism suggests that the main purpose of government is to protect individual rights and to increase freedom of choice, 7 but not to define the contents of the good life.

Their assertion has two sides. On the one hand, different persons and groups have to respect each other's attitudes and orientations. On the other, so far as the state is concerned, it must be neutral with respect to diversity of beliefs and actions of different persons and groups entrusting the selection of the good life to equal and free persons. Neutrality is not an intrinsic value appreciable per se. It is favourable because it can be used as a means to guarantee some intrinsic liberal values; i.e., neutrality is an 'instrumental principle' and a 'second-order value'.⁸ Therefore, we have to justify neutrality by one reason or another. Here are some reasons to support neutrality of the state.

Relativism

One justification in favouring neutrality of the state is posed by relativists. They assume that we can never make sure that what we understand and realise as truth is the very truth. As Peirce put it, 'our knowledge is never absolute but always swims'. The consequence of fallibilism for liberalism is significant. 9 Since one cannot justifiably assert in any case to possess the absolute truth, the reason for advocating freedom of choice is strong. 10 Consequently, the state would lack any justification for imposing its specific conception of the good life on citizens; that is, the state should be neutral.

Maximising utility

In another attempt, presupposing that the freedom is the way to happiness, pleasure, satisfaction, goodness and so forth, liberals maintain that the rationale entails that we maximise utility and general welfare by neutrality of the state. 11 In this argument, neutrality of the state is supposed to guarantee non-interference of the state into the private sphere. This is called 'negative freedom'. 12 In this sense, freedom is an 'instrumental value' for the main goal of liberalism; i.e., utility.

To put it in another way, what liberals give dominance to is not the content of a citizen's view about the good life. Instead, the most significant liberal value is that citizens be free to pursue what they choose as their goals and ideals. 13 Liberals individualise man and isolate him from all relationship with other people and the nature. Since they view the man as chooser they hold that he owns his life and the products of his work. Consequently, he should be free to manage his life and actions as he wishes. 14 The source of value, for liberals, is man's choice. Every way of life is valuable if, and only if, we understand them as valuable and choose them. The political consequence of this belief is that the state must not advance any particular conception of the good life at the expense of others. All citizens should be treated equally and independent. 15 Therefore, to provide the greatest number of citizens with utility the state must not support one conception of the good life that deprives non-loyal to that conception of his utility.

Autonomy

Freedom should not be only thought of in a negative sense. Rather, 'positive freedom,' meaning autonomy and self-determination, is another liberal value. One might even consider this sort of freedom

as the more favourable goal for liberals. Since without autonomy human beings are not distinguishable from other creatures, which lack the ability to develop themselves, autonomy may be characterised as an intrinsic value that is worth considering per se. 16

To put it in another way, in the absence of autonomy, citizens would be treated as children and their position as qualified persons able to conduct their own affairs would be denied, as Dahl maintains. 17 In other words, if the state force a citizen against his will it would treat that person as a mere means and would deprive him of being an end.18

By contrast, a neutral state, which does not advocate any specific conception of the good life, would pave the way for all to make decisions and take responsibility for their actions, through which they would develop themselves as human beings.

Equality

From the liberal point of view, the plausibility of freedom and autonomy prevent us from depriving anyone of reaching this basic right, which is related to the nature of human beings. Therefore, it is taken for granted by liberals that all adults are equal, in the sense that 'the good or interests of each person must be given equal consideration'. This is called 'Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests'. 19 To reach this goal, it is maintained that the most effective, or the only feasible, way is neutrality of the state with respect to various conceptions of the good life. Otherwise, if the state adopts one conception of the good life, according to which to conduct the public affairs, it would discriminate against those whose preferences of the good life is not advocated.20

Here, neutrality of the state is used as the means for providing equal freedom for all citizens, which is a complementary value for liberty and autonomy.

3- Various Interpretations of Neutrality

Literally, neutrality means that the state does not support or help either side in a dispute, contest, war, and the like.21 In political philosophy, neutrality is considered as an indispensable part of the spirit of liberalism. Here we shall examine some significant attempts at explaining and justifying the neutrality of the state.

Absolute neutrality with respect to morality

One may suppose that liberalism is 'neutral with respect to morality'; that is to say, "liberalism is a non-moral idea". However, this conception is not compatible with the liberal stance. Liberals are committed to justifying their preferred way of life with appeal to moral values. 22 Therefore, neutrality as an epistemological principle, rather than a moral value is irrelevant; 23 that is, "impartiality of state policy" is impossible.24

As Parekh explains it, every government has a certain political system: it may be organised in accord with the principle of separation of powers or it may concentrate all authorities in one body; the electoral system might be direct or indirect; the party system might be one party, two parties or multi-parties. Each of these features is based on a specific conception of the good. With respect to policies, no government can be neutral about matters such as 'slavery, polygamy, public hanging, suicide, capital punishment, abortion, violent sports, divorce, lesbian and homosexual marriages and so on'. The act of

prohibiting or permitting any of these issues is based on a specific conception of the good. Parekh concludes that 'a morally neutral state is logically incoherent'. 25

Neutral conception of the good life

The term may be used to indicate a "neutral conception of the good life", which is agreed upon by all disagreeing citizens of a society. The greatest utility for the largest number of people is suggested as a neutral conception, 26 which is the lowest common denominator. This view is J. S. Mill's approach in *On Liberty*. 27

Utilitarianism consists of the following premises. First, we human beings all agree that happiness is valuable, regardless of any specific idea about the nature of man or any conviction about the world. In addition, reason entails that we try to maximise utility in the society. 28 Finally, to avoid partiality we have to equally consider the utility of every person in the society. One proposal for establishing a neutral state is put forward by utilitarians. Rather than goodness, pleasure, happiness or the like, they define utility as want-satisfaction. This conception is a 'second-order' conception that accommodates all contradictory notions of the good life. 29 Therefore, it is a universally acceptable cornerstone for establishing the state. This concept does not exclude any conceivable conviction about the good life. In fact, the conception of utility as want-satisfaction reduces all substantive conceptions of the good life to a common ground acceptable to all. It is worth noticing that although this conception is a specific conception of the good, it is neutral and impartial that is compatible with all contradictory conceptions of the good. 30 This view seems to be consistent with the liberal intent to be neutral and tolerant, since aggregating citizens' wants does not involve any judgment about their values. When citizens go to the ballot box, the state's role is just to count their votes through majority rule, rather than evaluating their opinions. 31 In this way, since the unanimity is impossible and we should choose, at least, between two options if more voters choose (a) to (b) then by adopting (a) we can obtain more utility than when (b) would be adopted.32

This view, however, leads itself to some critical remarks, when one digs a little below the surface. Not only does it suffer from some defects that are decisive for a liberal's purposes and convictions, but also it cannot guarantee neutrality of the state.

1) So far as maximising utility is concerned, this view suffers from some considerable defects. Firstly, this view presupposes that the sum of the benefit each member in the majority will obtain is equal to the sum of the benefit each member in the minority will lose. 33 Not only is this presupposition unjustifiable, but also it is conceivable that even sometimes the whole benefit majority obtains is far less than the whole deprivation the minority suffers from. 34 Moreover, it includes the assumption that the majority's want is consistent with the majority's interest. 35 In this respect, Elster noticed the difference between real interest and 'standing passion' by asserting that no one can convincingly guarantee that whatever a majority decides upon is really to its benefit. Hence, if the majority decides under the influence of manipulation or standing passion even the least utility is lost. 36

2) Another criticism is posed by Kant with respect to the morality of utilitarianism. To maximise the whole happiness in the society, utilitarianism treats some persons as means to maximise happiness for the whole. This view, therefore, fails to respect all citizens as ends. In other words, this view assumes the society to be one unit with one interest, where any loss of a particular person's interests is counterbalanced by a net gain'. 37 This approach, you may say, ignores individualism in the sense of

atomism that is crucial to liberals. 38 Consequently, it cannot be invoked as a moral law, neither as a comprehensive moral philosophy nor as a political morality.

3) Another defect is recognised by communitarians with regard to individualism this view involves. They criticise individualists' assumptions that 1) man is nothing more than a "free chooser" and 2) the worth of any idea or action is due to our choice. Firstly, they emphasise that the choice is not the only source of value, since some things are worthwhile because they constitute traditions and customs that we belong to, not because we choose them. Moreover, it is difficult to deny universal validity of some norms even if we do not view them as valuable, such as keeping one's promises and avoiding doing harm to others. 39 These norms seem not only to be worthwhile per se, but also they are the bases of other moral values whatever they are. In this way, the bases of utilitarianism fall down.

4) As for neutrality, one may pose that majority principle can certainly result in creating a distinguishable 'permanent minority' that live under the domination of a permanent majority.⁴⁰ In such a situation, the assumption that the majority and the minority agree upon a common denominator, that is, the greatest want-satisfaction for the largest number of the population is misleading. For, the substantive utility of the majority always contradicts the substantive utility of the minority. Therefore, the minority does not surely agree on the policies made in accord with the majority's preferences. In other words, utilitarianism as want-satisfaction is always biased against that conception of the good life, which advocated by the permanent minority. For example, an established liberal society and government based on secular principles, which has settled in ignorance about, or with denial of, the existence of God and the Divine Will ⁴¹ cannot be neutral towards religious values. Rather, the liberal mode of life is entrenched in all the major institutions so as to have culminated in bias against religious values advocated by religious minorities.⁴²

Neutral procedure for collective decision-making

We may build liberalism on a "neutral procedure" for collective decision-making, ⁴³ as Charles Larmore in *The Morals of Modernity* suggests. ⁴⁴

Acknowledging the deficiency of 'substantive liberalism', ⁴⁵ Larmore suggests a version of political liberalism to establish a neutral state in accord with liberal principles. His suggestion is to construct the liberal state on the basis of "neutral principles" for collective decision-making, which can justifiably prevail over reasonable disagreeing citizens about the substantive conception of the good life. ⁴⁶ What he offers as political liberalism includes two principles: 1) 'the norm of rational dialogue' and 2) 'the norm of equal respect'. ⁴⁷

Although what Larmore suggests resembles principles that Rawls describes as a "procedure based on neutral values", (such as impartiality, equal opportunity and generality of principles to all similar cases), ⁴⁸ Larmore avoids calling his offered principles as being neutral values. Rather, he explicitly maintains that they are moral values, albeit minimal, which need justification. ⁴⁹ Therefore, political liberalism is not, as he describes, absolutely neutral; rather, it is neutral in relation to contentious views of the good. ⁵⁰ Moreover, it is not neutral in relation to the conceptions of the good whatever they are; instead, his preferred liberal principles are neutral as far as to accommodate individualist liberals and communitarians. ⁵¹ It is confined to the people, who 1) accept the worth of the principles of rational dialogue and equal respect for establishing the political organisation and 2) give dominance to them over their other commitments, when they conflict with each other.⁵²

Larmore, thus, explicitly announces that 'liberal thought can [not] keep its promise of offering a political conception acceptable to people having very different views about the human good'.⁵³

These principles resemble what deliberative democrats suggest as the procedure of collective decision-making. In a deliberative democracy, each member of the community can propose and reason in favour of his/her idea, with the aim to choose the best alternative to serve the public good. ⁵⁴ Cohen calls his proposal of deliberation as an 'ideal deliberative procedure', by which he aims to offer a procedure for decision-making that can best justify collective decision-making and legitimise the outcome of public choice, no matter what the outcome would be.⁵⁵

On the other hand, however, Larmore's suggestion diverges from deliberative democracy in that he aims at establishing the political order on a common ground through rational dialogue and equal respect; rather than conducting public affairs in everyday life. ⁵⁶ To fulfil such a duty, he maintains that liberals take pride in seeking relationally neutral principles.

His proposal might be criticised as follows.

1) One may assert that due to the inequality of people with regard to the ability of discussing and reasoning, 'weaker people may sheepishly acquiesce to the stronger'. ⁵⁷ Consequently, rational dialogue and equal respect can better serve those privileged people and their interest; ⁵⁸ that is, it would be biased against weaker people in practice, albeit neutral in theory.

2) Moreover, we should consider that the process of rational dialogue can normally be implemented at the level of representative assemblies, rather than the whole population of a society that are too numerous to assemble for public decision-making. ⁵⁹ Consequently, the feasibility of his project is doubtful.

The primary goods

Rawls in Political Liberalism laid out two meanings of neutrality based on substantive conception of the good, which are consistent with the principles of justice as fairness that he suggests. One acceptable meaning of neutrality is that the state should guarantee "equal opportunity" for all citizens to freely promote any permissible conception of the good. By permissible, he means those conceptions that are compatible with the principles of justice as fairness. Another possibility, Rawls argues, is that the state should not favour intentionally any comprehensive view about the good life; i.e., "legality of all comprehensive doctrine".⁶⁰

We can explain his project through the following steps:

1) Priority of right to good; Kantian liberals, including Rawls, distinguish between right and good, between a structure of fundamental rights and freedoms, and the conceptions of the good, which citizens might adopt to follow within that structure. They maintain that the right takes precedent to the good. ⁶¹

2) Original position; Rawls proposes an imaginary situation in which participants in a collective decision-making with the following characteristics are to organise their society and determine the structure of their government. 1) They are all equal and free to make decisions. 2) They are all capable of reasoning. 3) They are located in a position of ignorance of their mental and physical abilities. 4) No one knows

what his/her future position in the society would be. 5) Finally, all ignore their own specific conception of the good. 62 He imagines these conditions to provide the ground for resorting to a pure reasoning about the good and prevent the influence of selfishness.

3) Primary goods; Rawls, then, maintains that people in original position, in which they can make decisions in accord with the principles of justice would agree on a certain collection of the primary goods to determine the framework of political order. Those principles, Rawls argues, are neutral with respect to their divergent conceptions of the good life. Those primary goods include a) basic rights and equal liberties for all; b) minimum wealth and income for all; c) equal opportunity for everyone to reach political and economic positions, through fair competition; d) the social bases of self-respect. 63

Why do they choose such principles? Basic liberties are obviously necessary to safeguard each one's following of his/her own conception of the good life. Moreover, no one can pursue his/her own specific conception of the good life, if he/she does not possess sufficient wealth and health care. Furthermore, a sense of self-respect gives meaning to the conception of the good life. 64 In addition, the assumption of freedom and equality of people entails that they enjoy equal opportunity to wield unequal economic, social and political positions through fair competition. 65 In this aspect, they would adopt such a condition, according to which the advantage of the worst-off people could be guaranteed. 66

Rawls himself acknowledges that neither philosophical nor political liberalism succeed in keeping their promise not to favour any conception of the good. 67 So far as his project is concerned, it presupposes, as he admittedly mentions, substantive and moral values with respect to the nature of man, social conditions and the principles of justice. 68 Distinguishing procedural neutrality from neutrality of aim, what he asserts his proposal would provide in relation to neutrality is that

Justice as fairness hopes to satisfy neutrality of aim in the sense that basic institutions and public policy are not to be designed to favour any particular comprehensive doctrine. It is important to emphasise that it may still affirm the superiority of certain forms of moral character and encourage certain moral virtues. The crucial point is that this does not lead to the perfectionist state of a comprehensive doctrine. 69

However, Rawls's project gives rise to some other critical remarks.

1) As far as priority of right to good is concerned, far from being a neutral principle it is a controversial issue, since we cannot find a collection of rights accepted by all liberals. Whereas egalitarian liberals favour some economic and social rights, such as education, health care and welfare, Libertarian liberals support a strict system of private property rights and civil freedoms. 70 Therefore, this theory should choose one of these two strands, which leads to bias against the other. Furthermore, it is biased against non-liberal conceptions of the good, which might offer a very different collection of rights. When we consider the possibility that some reasonable persons in the original position might believe that the right to salvation in the eternal world, for example, is a principal right, the scope of disagreement, and thus the bias, appears to be more significant.

What is more, one might even cast doubt on the distinction between right and good. It may be said that, the suggestion of the conception of right derives from the difficulties we confront when having to assess the goodness of something, because of being value judgmental. One way to escape from controversy about normative assessment is to believe that something is a right. In this way, one may pretend that he/she be not exercising a value judgment when offering something as a right. However, we can find no

difference in the essence of right and good as far as value judgment is concerned. There is no difference, for instance, between believing that every citizen has the right to freedom of speech and believing that it is not good that anyone prevent him/her from a certain speech. Nor can we find any difference between believing that someone has the right to a minimum wealth and believing that it is an essential good, or say a task, for government to provide him/her with a minimum wealth. In both examples, we make a value judgment, no matter however we would organise the subject involved. Nevertheless, we may admit that in the case of right the value judgement is indirect whilst in case of good it is direct.

2) In addition, this theory presupposes the equality of members of the community in original position, which is itself a specific substantive attitude about the social condition that needs a justification. ⁷¹ It is based on equality of all people in reasoning, which might be strongly denied. Again, there appears an issue for disagreement that prevents neutrality.

3) As far as the minimum of wealth is concerned, it depends upon an assumption about human nature. It supposes that when the future is uncertain, each one prefers to guarantee the minimum income for himself/herself, ⁷² whereas one may assert that some people in original position would be keen to take a risk and prefer a society with more inequality in the hope that to become amongst the most advantaged groups. ⁷³ In other words, we might not equate reasonableness with prudence to conclude that reasonable people would avoid risk-taking.

4- Toleration versus Neutrality

Considering all justifications discussed above, none of which can avoid some defects, one would prefer to distinguish between two notions: toleration versus neutrality. It would seem that neutrality is not a proper way to describe the liberal attitude towards different conceptions of the good. Instead, one might suggest the word toleration, which has the potential of being ranked in hierarchical degrees. For, the less the scope of public sphere is determined, the more the private sphere will be. The more the private sphere is, the more toleration will be exercised towards different conceptions of the good. By contrast, neutrality is a conception that cannot be ranked in different degrees. It is a conception that either exists or dies, because we cannot imagine a condition of being neutral, whilst favouring, at least, a common good as the cornerstone of conducting public affairs.

By this distinction, one can suggest that what political liberals call neutrality should be called the higher degree of tolerance. In other words, since every state should necessarily exercise a minimum set of rules and principles, based on which to conduct the public affairs, the neutrality seems to have no meaning in relation to the state.

Conclusion

We have examined three distinguished attempts to justify toleration and neutrality in liberalism. We discussed here that the establishment of a neutral epistemological procedure is as impossible as finding a common substantive conception of the good life. The principles of rational dialogue and equal respect seem unfeasible at the national level. The principles of justice as fairness presuppose controversial issues, which prevent it from being neutral. Consequently, it seems that neutrality is not a proper expression to describe liberals' attitude towards different conceptions of the good. We established here that the word neutrality, which is a conception that cannot be ranked in different degrees, should be replaced by the word toleration, which can be ranked in hierarchical degrees. Therefore, what political liberals call neutrality may be called the higher degree of tolerance. For, the less the scope of public

sphere is determined, the more the private sphere will be. The more the private sphere is, the more toleration will be exercised. To put it in another way, since every state should necessarily exercise a minimum set of rules and principles to conduct public affairs in accordance with neutrality seems to have no meaning in relation to the state. Nevertheless, when we compare a liberal state with a non-liberal one, we apparently find that in the former, various doctrines about the good can better present themselves and survive than in the latter. However, this situation might not be called neutrality towards divergent conceptions of the good. Rather, it is more relevant to name it tolerance.

Notes:

Bhikhu Parekh, "Cultural Diversity and Liberal Democracy", in David Beetham (ed.), *Defining and Measuring Democracy*, (London: SAGE Publications, 1994), p. 199.

Ibid., pp. 199, 200.

Bhikhu Parekh, "The Cultural Particularity of Liberal Democracy", in D. Held (ed.), *Prospects for Democracy*, (UK: Polity Press, 1993), pp. 158, 159.

Thomas Nagel, *Equality and Partiality*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 154.

Michael J. Sandel, "Morality and the liberal Ideal", in *The New Republic*, No. 7, (May 1984), p. 15.

Ibid.

Iain McLean (ed.), *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 286.

David Thunder, "A Refutation of Anti-Perfectionist or Neutralist Liberalism", <http://homepage.tinet.ie/~philosophy/Articles/Article1.html>, 03/04/01, p. 1.

Michael Saward, "Democratic Theory and Indices of Democratisation", in David Beetham (ed.), *Op. Cit.*, p. 9.

Michael J. Sandel, *Op. Cit.*

Ibid.

Charles Larmore, *The Morals of Modernity*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 123.

David Thunder, *Op. Cit.*, p. 2.

Bhikhu Parekh, "The Cultural Particularity of Liberal Democracy", *Op. Cit.*, pp. 157- 159.

Charles Larmore, *Op. Cit.*, p. 128.

Robert A. Dahl, *Democracy and its Critics*, (USA: Yale University Press, 1989), p. 91.

Ibid., pp. 104,105.

Thomas Nagel, Op. Cit., p. 159.

Robert A. Dahl, Op. Cit., pp. 85, 86

David Thunder, Loc. Cit.

Jonathan Crowther (ed.), Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English, (fifth edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 780.

Charles Larmore, Op. Cit., p. 125.

Ibid., p. 127.

John Rawls, Political Liberalism, (USA: Colombia University Press, 1993), p. 193.

Bhikhu Parekh, "Cultural Diversity and Liberal Democracy", Op. Cit., pp. 206, 207.

Charles Larmore, Op. Cit., pp. 125, 126.

Michael J. Sandel, Op. Cit.

Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 9, 10.

Brian Barry, Justice as Impartiality, (USA: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 139.

Ibid., pp. 160, 161.

Michael J. Sandel, Op. Cit.

Jon Elster, On Majoritarianism and Rights, <http://www.sintercom.org/poli#nfo/polessays/elster##_on_majoritarianism.html, 24/11/2000>, p. 2.

Robert A. Dahl, Op. Cit., pp. 142, 143.

Ibid. , p. Can the state be neutral between different ways of life in a plural society?. 151.

Ibid., pp. 142, 143.

Jon Elster, Loc. Cit.

Michael J. Sandel, Op. Cit., p. 16.

Charles Taylor, Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers, vol. II, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 187.

Charles Larmore, Op. Cit., pp. 127, 128.

Jack Lively, *Democracy*, (UK: Basil Blackwell, 1975), p. 25.

Will Kymlicka, *Op. Cit.*, p. 200.

Bhikhu Parekh, "Cultural Diversity and Liberal Democracy", *Op. Cit.*, p. 206.

Charles Larmore, *Op. Cit.*, p. 126.

Ibid., pp. 125, 126.

John Patrick Rudisill, *The Neutrality of the State and its Justification in Rawls and Mill*, <<http://www.ukans.edu/~phil/F2000Abstracts.htm#ml#Rawls/19/04/2001>>, p. 1.

Charles Larmore, *Loc. Cit.*

Charles Larmore, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 134- 137.

John Rawls, *Op. Cit.*, p. 191.

Charles Larmore, *Op. Cit.*, p. 126.

Ibid., p. 125.

Ibid., p. 133.

Ibid., pp. 141, 142

Ibid., p. 133.

Thomas Christiano, "The Significance of Public Deliberation", in James Bohman and William Rehg (ed.), *Deliberative Democracy, Essays on Reason and Politics*, (USA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1999), p. 243.

Joshua Cohen, "Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy", in James Bohman and William Rehg (ed.), *Ibid.*, pp. 72, 73.

Charles Larmore, *Op. Cit.*, p. 136.

Diego Gambetta, "Claro!: An Essay on Discursive Machismo", in Jon Elster, (ed.), *Deliberative Democracy* (UK: The Press Syndicate of The University of Cambridge, 1998), p. 21.

Iris Marion Young, "Communication and the other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy", in Seyla Benhabib (ed.), *Democracy and Differences*, (U.S.: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 123, 124.

James D. Fearon, "Deliberation as Discussion" in Jon Elster (ed.), *Deliberative Democracy*, p. 54.

John Rawls, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 192, 193.

Michael J. Sandel, Loc. Cit.

Raymond Plant, *Modern Political Thought*, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1991), p. 99.

John Rawls, Op. Cit., p. 181.

Raymond Plant, Loc. Cit.

John Rawls, Op. Cit., pp. 180, 181.

Raymond Plant, Op. Cit., p. 100.

John Rawls, Op. Cit., p. 190.

Ibid., p. 192.

Ibid., pp. 193, 194.

Michael J. Sandel, Loc. Cit.

Raymond Plant, Op. Cit., p. 106.

Ibid., p. 101.

Ibid., p. 103.

Book Reviews

On Religion, Thinking in Action Series

John D. Caputo, London: Routledge 2001, pp. 147, paper, £7.99.

Caputo seems to begin this leisurely but stimulating meditation rather inauspiciously: "Any book entitled *On Religion* must begin by breaking the bad news to the reader that the subject-matter does not exist". The reader immediately feels the dread of an imminent maelstrom of post-modernist wordplay and obfuscation. But not so. The aim of the new *Thinking in Action* series from Routledge edited by Simon Critchley and Richard Kearney is to 'take philosophy to the public' through short accessible works that address issues and concepts that affect us all. So a post-modernist Derridean nightmare does not follow. The line-up includes some of the most prominent living philosophers applying their minds to major issues with a view to sharpening the debate and offering informed argument. Some of the other titles include Michael Dummett on immigration, Jacques Derrida on cosmopolitanism, John Cottingham on the meaning of life and Simon Critchley on humour. The thirst for philosophy in the public, indicated by the sales and popularity of magazines such as *The Philosophers' Magazine* and *Philosophy Now*, and popular philosophy written by Alain de Botton and Nigel Warburton (the latter being far more sophisticated than the former), justifies such a series. Philosophers need to recognise the need to write for those outside the ivory tower and to be engaged intellectuals. The authors' list for this series throws up the names of some of the most prominent politically and socially engaged philosophers around.

Caputo's book is refreshing. As one of the most prominent Derridean Catholic philosophers in the United States, one expects a certain discourse from him, a neo-Nietzschean espousal of relativism and a deconstruction of those terms and concepts most familiar to us, which we, perhaps, are too complacent in decoding. He in fact states quite explicitly how his analysis of 'religion' is in debt to Derrida. ¹ However, the opening of the book merely indicates the iterations and the multivocality indicative of the term 'religion'. There are so many phenomena that answer to that name. The heterodoxy of Caputo's approach is actually informative and fosters greater understanding. He actually advocates an enjoyable, engaged and engaging attempt at understanding 'religion'. His is a radical hermeneutic ² of the phenomena of religion, views from the margins of philosophical discourse that proffer a different perspective. For him, religion is a series of open questions, of beginnings. Caputo affirms that religion is about the 'love of God', definition that requires deconstructionist analysis because on the face of it, the term may be disputed by non-theistic traditions. Then the series of questions revolves around the existential question(s): what/who/how do I love when I love God? Caputo does not accept the credal 'closures' of 'orthodoxy' and revels in his own 'heterodoxy'. Rather, his is a hermeneutics of beginnings. Yet the stress on the question of the love of God clearly places him at the heart of the catholic tradition, especially the mystical tradition associated with the likes of Meister Eckhart (d. ca. 1327), a figure whom he studied and contrasted with Heidegger for one of his earlier works. ³ Eckhart like many other mystical across the religious traditions were concerned precisely with this question of 'how do I love God' and what that means and what 'love', 'God' and 'religion' mean, placing themselves at odds with conventional notions of what these terms mean.

The book comprises five chapters. The first chapter introduces the theme of the love of God. Religion is initiated by the question of love, by the Augustinian inquiry, 'what do I love when I love my God?' Love is unconditional giving, a search for the impossible, which following Derrida, he understands as something whose possibility we do not conceive. It is the beyond. Caputo's approach seems oddly both Catholic and quite loose. His radical hermeneutic of the impossible locates him at the religious edge of experience. But lest he be understood as eschewing adherence to a tradition or a historical construction of a religion, he dismisses 'sitting on the fence'. But he does attack absolutism. Appealing to the mystical tradition, he allies himself with the *docta ignorantia*, 'a learned or wise ignorance, that knows that we do not know and knows that this non-knowing is the inescapable horizon in which we must act, with all due decisiveness, with all the urgency life demands' (page 19). Being religious is being humble with the truth and not trafficking in 'interpretations'. But once again he stresses that he is not opposed to confessional traditions. Hermeneutics is unavoidable as long as we live in this world as social and historical beings. But a radical hermeneutics must avoid the definite.

The second chapter analyses the phenomenon of a post-secular world and introduces the second theme of 'religion without religion', a concept that Caputo borrows from Derrida. The certainties of a sacral age such as the medieval era in which the divine presence was assumed and arguments for the existence of God made from an analysis of existence and from the principle of causality are no longer. But nor is the rational compartmentalisation of a Kantian secular world what we face. The Prophetic voices of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche proclaimed the death of God and uncertainty of certainty. But the 'flower of religion' has once again bloomed and the proposition that 'God is dead' is itself 'dead'. There is little in this examination which most observers of religious phenomena would dispute.

The third chapter tackles the vacuity of new ageism and bogus spirituality, while looking for 'religious themes' in popular culture. Virtuality in cyberspace distorts one's concept of what is real and leads to new ageism, sighting of UFOs and 'angels'. The unbridled materialism of much of this material such as

the 'work' of Deepak Chopra reveals the vacuity of such 'religion'. By contrast, this chapter contains a masterful analysis of Star Wars, an apposite analogy given that there cannot be many unfamiliar with this popular franchise. He stresses the religious theme (that is non-Manichean) of a cosmic struggle between good and evil, between the Jedi way in harmony with the force and the evil machinations of the sith lords and the 'dark side' of the Force. Star Wars is a classic example of a world of 'religion without religion', in which there is little explicit religious or religious symbols but the language and imagery of the Force and the conflicts between the two sides is profoundly religious.

Chapter four castigates fundamentalism for its 'lack of love'. Caputo continues his unmasking of what is 'unreal'. Self-righteousness and action on behalf of God are the critical faults within fundamentalism and once again Caputo appeals to a prayer of Eckhart, "I pray God to rid me of God" (page 94). Caputo wants to hold on to the non-knowing inherent in the answer to 'what do I love when I love my God'. He cannot accept the fixed answer of fundamentalism.

The final chapter returns to the two main themes: what does it mean to love God and how can we have 'religion without religion' in a post-modern, post-secular world. Religion without religion needs to forgo the idea of 'the true religion' but must hold onto the concept of religious truth. But although the apophatic tradition he espouses is a venerable and respectable one, one still feels unease when he says: "the faithful need to concede that they do not cognitively know what they believe by faith in any epistemologically rigorous way" (page 111). Religious truth is no propositional but a truth of action, or virtue and a return to the medieval sense of vera religio as 'true virtue'. One might say that Caputo's manifesto is that "God is more important than religion as love is more important than faith" (page 117).

Caputo's discourse is existentially engaged and relevant and the questions he raises and some of the 'truths' he uncovers critical to our lives. But at the same time, it is too loose. What is the result of what he says? It still seems to hold out the reductionist view of religion as 'godly action' and virtue devoid of any tradition. But there is much to commend in this thought-provoking work.

Sajjad Rizvi

Pembroke College, UK

Defenders of Reason in Islam

Richard C. Martin, Mark R. Woodward, Mu`tazilism from Medieval School to Modern Symbol, with DWI S. Atmaja: Oneworld Publication, 1997.

Where as there are those who argue that Islamic philosophy had ended with Ibn Rushd in the 7th A.H. there are others who maintain that Islamic philosophy is a living tradition particularly in Iran and the eastern part of the Islamic world. Defenders of Reason in Islam sheds light on the origins, historical development and the modern proponents of rationalism and argues that rationalism is well and alive in the Islamic intellectual tradition. This work is significant not only because it is a scholarly presentation of the Mu`tazilitie doctrine, often referred to as Muslim rationalists, but also because it is a comparison between the last great Mu`tazilites, Qadi Abd al-Jabbar of 10th CE and Harun Nasution, a modern Indonesian Muslim thinker.

Following an introduction in which the author explains the intricate relationship between Orientalism, fundamentalism, modernism and the latter's' relationship to rationalism, authors state their thesis as

"Fundamentalism belongs to a larger discourse of which theological modernism, including neo-Mu'tazilism, is an important part." (p. 7). The book begins by a discussion concerning "The Rise and Fall of the Mu'tazilites in premodern Islam." The authors allude to such major figures as Hasan al-Basri, Wasil ibn 'Ata, Dirar, Balkhi, al-Jubba'i and al Ibn Rawandi and through them, early theological debates are put in their proper context. Following a brief treatment of Asha'ari Madhhab and the extent to which their teachings curtailed Mu'tazilites, one of the central figure around whom the present work revolves, Qadi Abd al-Jabbar is alluded to. The treatment of the Ash'arite here is somewhat brief and general and could be developed further.

Authors present a thorough discussion of Qadi Abd al-Jabbar's life, his pupils and the spread of Mu'tazilite's thought in certain areas through such sects as Zaydiyyah. In chapter 3, the life and works of Qadi Abd al-Jabbar is thoroughly discussed and even though this chapter contains materials alluded to already in the previous chapter (p.33-36), it nevertheless provides the reader with valuable information, particularly regarding Qadi Abd al-Jabbar's works and his magnum opus, Kitab al-usul al-Khamsa. In the following chapter, this text is put in its intellectual context of the 10th and 11th C.E. by offering a section by section explanation of the translation of Kitab al-usul al-Khamsa. On the positive side, the authors have clarified "a text that resists to be read" and some of the finer theological points are laid down in a more clear and coherent fashion. In this regard, this chapter should be viewed as supplementary reading. On the negative side however, the explanations are somewhat redundant in lieu of the translation itself and readers of this book are expected to be able to follow Qadi's translation.

The chapter is useful but somewhat expository and lacks extensive analysis and interpretation of the issues raised in The Kitab al-usul al-Khamsa. One wonders why the materials are presented here in an outline fashion since they are discussed in more detail in the next chapter. The scholarship however is impressive and shows the mastery of the authors of figures and themes who have provided the intellectual background of the book. The materials presented here are brief but thorough and the discussion of the translation of Qadi 'Abd al-Jabbar's book contains an outline of five themes discussed in the translation: knowledge of God, Divine Unity, Theodicy, Eschatology, the Intermediate Position, Commanding the Good and Prohibiting Evil. The central issues discussed in the above themes are explained in a clear and concise manner which provides the reader with an overview of Qadi's major work.

The translation of the Kitab al-usul al-Khamsa that follows in Chapter 5 is lucid and clear. The text begins by a discussion concerning the possibility of knowing God through speculative reasoning, the fundamentals of religion, the question of Divine Unity and attributes. The text is written in a question-answer format and it is more expository than analytical. In the third section, the thorny subject of theodicy is discussed and such issues as divine punishment and the possibility of being recompensed for diseases and sickness caused by God are alluded to. Finally eschatology and the possibility of intercession, the intermediate position between being a sinner and a believer which is a salient feature of Mu'tazilite doctrine and the principle of commanding the good and prohibiting evil are discussed.

The authors then turn to a discussion on the conflict between traditionalism, modernism and some of the central figures of these two powerful movements as a prelude to the thoughts of Harun Nasution. The authors' use of certain concepts such as traditionalism, modernism and rationalism are not always clear. At times, traditionalists are synonymous with anti-rationalists and other times they are different. One case in point is (p.120) where it is said "both modernists and traditionalist's theology is that both madhhabs challenge the claim of the 'ulama..." Generally speaking, 'ulama are regarded to be the torchbearers of traditionalism and it is not clear in what way and how traditionalists are different than

the 'ulama. The author's treatment of the life and thought of several key figures here such as Ibn Taymiyah, 'Abd al-Wahhab, Muhammad 'Abduh despite its brevity, is quite useful. Islamic traditionalism and rationalism in South Asia and "the significance of Mu'tazilites in Indonesia," which is the subject of discussion in the following chapter is one of the most interesting parts of this book since so little is known about it. The introduction of Islam in Indonesia through Sufism, the impact of such modernists as Jamal al-Din Afghani, Muhammad 'Abduh and Rashid Rida and the development of Muhammadiyah as the bastion of rationalism and traditionalism are among issues discussed here. It appears that rationalism has found its place in Indonesia not among speculative sciences but in the "theology of development." This is somewhat comparable to the renaissance insofar as the practical application of rationalism was emphasized more than its philosophical intricacies and in this context the contributions of such figures as N. Madjid is acknowledged by the authors.

The ideas of the central figure of Indonesian rationalism, Harun Nasution is discussed next. The relationship between F. Rahman and H. Nasution and their similar and yet divergent positions on rationalism is an important issue here. Nasution's position that the Quran is not a "complete and perfect text" is a radical departure from most Islamic rationalists. It is not however clear what is meant by "complete and perfect." If he means it in its literal sense, then he is not alone and many would agree with him that the text of the Quran lends itself to be read into in order to address the challenges of the modern world.

Nasution's major work, *Kaum Mu'tazilah dan Pandangan Rasionalnya* whose outline is brought forth followed by the actual text is a rather comprehensive review of the major issues with which Mu'tazilites are concerned with. The language is free of jargon and accessible. Nasution seems to be closer to the Mu'tazilites and more of a rationalist than F. Rahman and less of a rationalist than Ibn Rawandi since he allows a place for revelation. The authors in a chapter titled "Modern and Postmodern Glosses on Mu'tazilism" have alluded to the ideas of a number of modern thinkers such as M. Arkuon, F. Mernissi, H. Hanafi and different ways in which rationalism has been defined and applied by them.

The final chapter is devoted to a discussion on "The Implications of Modernity." The authors discuss the place of rationalism in the present day Islam and examine various theories which propose that Islam is inherently resistant to change. The debate between the rationalists and traditionalists in the Islamic world is not only an intellectual one but as the authors have alluded to involves power and authority.

The book is the first of its kind to provide a comprehensive view of rationalism both medieval and modern. Discussions especially those concerning particular thinkers are often sketchy and brief though useful. Perhaps the major shortcoming of the book resides in the fact that the authors have completely neglected to discuss rationalism in the most philosophically active region of the Islamic world namely Iran. Few issues have been discussed more extensively in post-revolution era of Iran among the intellectuals than the place of rationalism and its relationship to politics and religion. Something should have been said about such figures as Ali Shariati, Abd al-Karim Soroush and a whole number of other figures and movements who have made rationalism the focal point of their intellectual crusade to bring about socio-political change. The other major shortcoming of the book is the leap from Mu'tazilites to the modern era without mentioning the Peripatetics who are the real successors of the Mu'tazilites. Mu'tazilites did not die a silent death but that they evolved into a more mature and sophisticated philosophical movement known as Peripatetics (*mashsha'is*). Such figures as al-Kindi, Farabi, Ibn Sina and in particular Ibn Rushd represent rationalism in Islam at its best. Certainly, such figures as Zakariyah Razi who rejected revelation, Shahristani and Omar Khayyam were well within the Mu'tazilites Project. The

Peripatetics certainly are well and alive in the Islamic intellectual tradition especially in Iran where Islamic Philosophy remains a living tradition even though their influence is substantially curtailed.

Finally, I remain opposed to the use of the term "Islamic rationalism" and advocate the use of "rationalism in Islam." Rationalism is a methodology and its use in different religious traditions does not produce Christian rationalism or Hindu rationalism for there is nothing Christian, Islamic or Hindu about rationalism.

The book in a sense is a sad commentary about how the Islamic civilization turned its back to reason and rationalism, the engine that drove it forward and produced arts and science unparalleled in the medieval era. It is a petty to see that the use of reason by Mu`tazilites and Peripatetics historically has come to be somewhat of a taboo in the Islamic civilization. Such figures as Ibn Rawandi, Zakariyah Razi and `Omar Khayyam who propagated their ideas freely in the medieval era could not have survived in their own native land of Iran today. Even the modern advocates of reason that authors have alluded to in the book seem to be somewhat apologetic about their reliance on reason and use rationalism in a qualified sense of the word.

The book under review is well researched and the scholarship is impressive. The work goes a long way to stimulate discussion on rationalism among Muslim intellectuals and ought to be read particularly by the young Muslims interested in the revival of the Islamic civilization.

Mehdi Aminrazavi

Mary Washington University, USA

Correspondance Ivanow-Corbin

lettres échangées entre Henry Corbin et Vladimir Ivanow de 1947 à 1966, ed. Sabine. Schmidtke, Travaux et mémoires de l'Institut d'études Iraniennes, Peeters, Louvain 1999, 235pp, paper, no price given.

A correspondence is often a valuable biographical insight into the lives, often mundane and even petty, of great figures. More personal than an academic monograph and offprint, they can still yield academic insights and help us to enter the world of preconceptions that formed the minds of the past. This correspondence, apart from being a great read, sheds light upon the development of the academic study of Ismī'īlīsm in Western scholarship. It contains 74 letters in the possession of Madame Stella Corbin, the widow of the late great 'Iranologist' (and let's use this French neologism since the series that the book stands in does too) mostly written in English by Vladimir Ivanow, the philologist founder of modern Ismī'īlī studies based at the Ismaili society in Bombay and then in Karachi to Henry Corbin, a philosopher and hermeneut, whose contributions to scholarship on Ismī'īlī thought are immense. The correspondence spans two critical decades in the development of 'Iranology', from the trickling initiation of the work of the Ismī'īlī society and the French Institute in Tehran to the volume and quality of their respective publications and activities in the mid-sixties. It is in those letters where one finds a major disagreement over interpretation on Nīẓār-i Khusraw that we find the protagonists at their best

and we see what is at stake, the toil and struggle to find texts in obscure libraries, overcoming the obstacles of ignorance and bureaucracy, and contrasting arguments of merit. Was Niẓir a significant thinker or not? This discussion is of critical interest to those working on Ismī'īlī thought given the centrality of this Central Asian figure in the literature of the past few decades, thanks partly to Corbin's insistence on his importance. 4

The contrast between the two protagonists of the correspondence could not be more striking, and it is what makes this work so interesting. On the one hand, we have the Russian emigré philologist based first in Bombay and then Karachi working on Ismī'īlī history and thought with, it is clear, little sympathy, (indeed he is full of venom for modern adherents of that faith) for his subject writing in petulant English. He attacks the 'silly talk' of mysticism (letter 3) and expresses the hope that qualified psychiatrists might more fruitfully investigate it! Yet none of this detracts from the immense significance of Ivanow for Ismī'īlī studies. On the other, we have the Iranophile phenomenologist lost in the 'essences' of his subject, full of French politeness and good humour. Ivanow consistently condemns himself in his own writing showing up his racism, judgmental, petty and pedantic attacks on his contemporaries who seem not worthy even to be in his presence. In fact, the consistent friendly and even deferential tone he displays towards Corbin seems to unhinge the reader and raise the possibility of further insincerity on his part. Corbin, however, in his elegant French remains ever the sphynx; although he does remind Ivanow (letter 4) that he and his institute in Tehran do not only study mysticism!

One gets the impression, perhaps unfairly given the small sample of him that is here, that Ivanow was rather a mean-spirited individual, and never afraid to speak his mind. Ivanow was a man of the world with an eye for detail and a desire for economy whether material or of praise. He complains (letters 6 & 7) of the costs of clothing and laundry in London and Paris in comparison to India (should the differential surprise Corbin or us?). The Orientalists' Congress of 1948 is regarded as a waste of time (by the end of reading the book one realises that this assessment as with others displays his poor judgement and ought to be taken with a barrel of salt). Louis Massignon is mocked and abused for his piety and sympathy to Sufism; in one letter Ivanow seems to go so far as to wish him death! Marshall Hodgson, a pioneer in the study of Islamic history, is dismissed as a 'Chicago gangster'. The quality of Aref Tamer's work might be dubious but he certainly did not deserve the abuse that Ivanow heaps upon him. Samuel Stern, Frederick Babinger and Bernard Lewis are sneered at for being Jews in a series of most distasteful caricatures. He is also quite scathing in his attack upon his patrons the Nizārī Ismī'īlīs and indeed their Imam as well. One finds a strong anti-American sentiment. He makes fun of the English 'talking themselves out of an empire, remaining hungry laquais (sic!) of Wallstreet (sic!)'. A constant strain of his racism is in his attitudes to 'Orientals'. Just to take one example, we find him writing the following (letter 85): 'in the East...they are inspired liars, tell lies whether it is necessary or not, in and out of season, but are hopelessly helpless technically in this art.' One cannot make apologies for his racism, and apart from Corbin, he does not speak of anyone with any respect.

In many ways the differing styles of the two represent different camps in academia and in methodology, one that is philological, historical and insistent upon linguistic accuracy, that is arrogant in its self-belief and quick to criticise and condemn the efforts of others. The other that is tolerant even indulgent of the work of contemporaries seeking to understand the essence of their subject through the use of an explicit hermeneutic immanent in the text.

The text is enhanced by the presence of a masterful critical apparatus. The biographical index is slightly marred by the absence of entries on figures mentioned repeatedly in the text, namely Bernard Lewis,

Marshall Hodgson, Jamaludin Akhavi, and Yahya Khashshab. Also Asaf Ali Fyzee was an Indian Bohra and not Egyptian. It is also a pity (though by no means a criticism of the editor) that the replies of Corbin were not on the whole available. One would like to have read what Corbin made of Ivanow's personal attacks upon academic colleagues.

The French are very good at producing series and works such as these and on the whole the lack of similar scholarly attempts in English reveals a certain gulf in academic cultures. French 'Iranology' remains very much a model that we ought to emulate in Anglo-Saxon academe. A welcome contribution to Ismī'ī and Corbin studies.

Sajjad Rizvi

Pembroke College, UK

Robert Grosseteste

James McEvoy, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2000. Pp.vii + 219 (paper: ISBN 0-19-511450-7).

This study of Robert Grosseteste by Professor James McEvoy is published in the Great Medieval Thinkers Series which will also publish studies on Duns Scotus by Richard Cross, Bernard of Clairvaux by G.R. Evans and John Scotus Eriugena by Deirdre Carabine. The reason for mentioning this is that, having read the book on Grosseteste, it is difficult to see why he should be considered as one of the great medieval thinkers. He comes across as a somewhat obscure figure about whom not a great deal is known and who, apart from his works of translation from Greek and his pastoral writings, wrote no substantial philosophical text whatsoever. This book's limited appeal, in this reviewer's opinion, will be mainly for those who are Grosseteste scholars or those who are historically interested in the ecclesiastical events and personages who inhabited Grosseteste's world. The first six chapters are worthy of note only from a historical perspective and it is not until the latter part of Chapter 6 entitled "Contribution to Philosophy" that this reviewer's interest began to stir. Having mentioned Grosseteste's astronomical studies, the author deals with his subject's interest in the metaphysics of light and the theological application of this to an understanding of God.

The concept of God as light is an interesting one which carries Platonic resonances and it would have been worthwhile for McEvoy to have written a lot more on the subject rather than merely briefly reporting the debate in which Grosseteste was involved. True, the point is made that Grosseteste's philosophy of light was never set down in a comprehensive way but must be reconstructed from various sources. But surely the theme is a sufficiently exciting one to merit more than a few pages in Chapter 6? After all, it can be argued that the metaphysics of light as found in the Platonic and Aristotelian writings and subsequently in Neoplatonism and Christian and Islamic thought is a worthy subject for discussion and specifically here would have contextualised the importance of Grosseteste as a contributor to this fascinating theme.

Another interesting point arose in Chapter 9 with regards to whether or not the Incarnation of Christ was necessary or voluntary and whether or not it would have occurred anyway even in the absence of original sin. This is also a fascinating subject for the theologically minded Christian and one would have liked to have seen McEvoy explore and tease out his own views on the subject. As it is, the reader is left with a report of Grosseteste's views without really knowing what the author himself thinks. A third interesting point relates to Grosseteste's claim that Jesus voluntarily chose to die during the crucifixion,

the implication being that as divine, he might have chosen not to die during this event. McEvoy rightly dismisses the latter possibility because of the reality of the human suffering, including that of the asphyxiation experienced by Jesus on the cross.

Overall, this reviewer must confess to a sense of disappointment that such areas as the metaphysics of light and the issues mentioned around the Incarnation and crucifixion of Jesus were not more critically and extensively explored. That being said, this is a beautifully published book and will undoubtedly recommend itself to the Grosseteste scholar and will contribute further to the existing literature on this subject.

Patrick Quinn

All Hallows College, Ireland

A most unlikely God: a philosophical enquiry into the nature of God

Barry Miller, Notre Dame/London: University of Notre Dame Press 1996, pp. 175, cloth, £21.50.

Barry Miller is a subtle and provocative Catholic philosopher. This work follows his earlier *From existence to God* (University of Notre Dame Press 1992) that argued for the existence of a creator, and furthers the argument, responding to criticisms made. *A most unlikely God* addresses the problem of traditional ontological arguments for the existence of God and tackles the thorny issue of the divine nature, putting him at odds with some Catholic philosophers like Alvin Plantinga, who argue for the existence of God but deny that He has any nature. He also finds himself disagreeing with 'perfect-being theology' because it misunderstands God not by attributing too much to Him but rather too little and because it compromises the radicality of the divine nature in comparison to creation. Miller, if anything, is a radical proponent of God as a hyperousion, but one that defines and bounds existence. God radically differs, in his account, from even the most exalted of His creatures.

Miller's primary concern is the possibility of 'God-talk'. That is to say, can one construct propositions that are meaningful with God as a component within their structure, and consequently can one predicate anything of the subject 'God'? Following from this observation and focus, he addresses himself to three central issues that complement and develop his earlier work. First, the nature of God is to be the creator of the universe. Second, God is identical to His existence (*ipsum esse subsistens*). Third, God is simple existence. Throughout the enterprise, he strikes what seems almost to be a characteristically Thomist balance (or some might say 'fudge') between taking positive and negative positions on talking about the divine nature. He develops a precarious balance between kataphatic and apophatic philosophical theology. Thus he rejects two extremes (page 158). One extreme taking a pessimistic view holds that nothing positive can be asserted about God's nature. The other extreme holds that just about anything can be predicated of God and the nature of predication of attributes of God and creatures does not differ. Thus the latter view is committed to univocity of theological language. Both positions, he maintains are 'misguided'.

The work comprises nine chapters. The first chapter considers various 'discordant' views on the nature of God. Perfect-being theology errs in regarding God as a super-being and predicating being equally of God and creatures. Miller does not wish to deny that God is a perfect being but he insists on emphasising His transcendence, which requires one to reject the account of predication given by Anselmians amongst others. Negative theology, which for him lapses into agnosticism, is represented by

Maimonides' account of God as the One, which Miller finds equally unsatisfactory. Miller regards God to be a 'limit case' of being. To explain his position in comparison to some Neoplatonic accounts of God as the ultimate degree in the scale of being, he distinguishes between a 'limit simpliciter' and a 'limit case'. Accounts that concern the scale of being regard God to be within the scale of being. With respect to F, a limit simpliciter of F is an F. However, God is a 'limit case'. Thus, a 'limit case of F is decidedly not an F' (page 7). God is not the limit for members of a series. Rather, He is beyond the series as a limit case.

Chapters two to five consider the nature of existence and its concomitant properties. The core discussion in this section concerns Aquinas' concept of 'subsistent existence'. In his exposition, Miller takes issue with most mainstream philosophers' accounts of existence. The Kantian observation that 'existence is not a real predicate' is seldom defended nowadays. But the diluted position that existence is not a first-level predicate is, or even that granted it is predicable, it is not a real property. Miller defends three positions in response. Not only is existence a first-level predicable, it is a real property (not a Cambridge property) and a rich, not an impoverished, property at that. In the proposition, 'Socrates exists', his existence is a rich concept that adds something to our notion of Socrates. But neither element is sufficient in itself. Existence is not self-explanatory as Socrates' individuation requires the element 'Socrates', while the actuality of Socrates is insufficient in itself since it requires existence. Graham Oppy's significant and comprehensive study of the question of existence and proofs for the existence of God (Cambridge University Press 1995) came out around the same time. His objections to ontological proofs are no doubt important ones for Miller to consider in any future work and for readers to juxtapose to these core chapters on existence. However, the explanation that Miller provides for subsistent existence is quite different to those accounts on the whole susceptible to Oppy's objections. For Miller, subsistent existence entails that an instance of existence and its bound are identical. Hence, the limit case bound of existence is identical to the limit case instance of existence. Both refer to God. Within a series of instances of existence, each individual is a bounded variable. However, the limit case instance of existence is zero-bounded and bounds the series. This exposition evokes two proofs of God in Avicenna's philosophy. The first is the proof of the Necessary Existent and the chain of contingents that is bound by it in the fourth section of *al-Ishārāt wa l-tanbīhāt* (Pointers and reminders). The second is the discussion of the perfection of God in chapter four of the *divinalia* (*al-ilāhiyyāt*) of *al-Shifā'* (The Cure).

Chapters six to nine provide Miller's 'limit case' argument for divine simplicity. Not only is God simple and rich but His existence also has properties. Simplicity does not (pace Kenny) entail a denial of possessing properties. Just as God is the limit case of existence, so His properties are limit cases of properties such as knowledge and power and so on. Chapter seven considers the relationship between divine simplicity, foreknowledge and human freedom. The question of evil is raised and considered. God knows acts but does not directly cause them. Rather, he causes that Socrates commits an act, not what precise act he commits since that would impel Socrates to act precisely. The final problem considered is how one can talk about a simple God? Surely a simple and transcendent God is ineffable? Miller's solution is to allow propositions that include empty logical parts. Such sentences are normal instances of everyday language and grammar. God-talk can thus allow for logically complex propositions. He concludes with a discussion of God as pure actuality. All the discussion up to this point had not dealt with the issue of God qua creator. Through an analysis of pure actuality, Miller tackles the issue.

What is most radical about Miller's account is his defence of Neoplatonic proofs for the existence of God including his proofs for divine simplicity. The most interesting aspects of his argument concern the nature of subsistent existence and his limit case account of God. One still feels somewhat dissatisfied

with his theodicy and his account of the process of creation relating to existence. But overall, Miller's work is thought provoking and has some astute insights into onto-theology.

Sajjad Rizvi

Pembroke College, UK

The Tibetan Assimilation of Buddhism: Conversion, Contestation, and Memory

Matthew T. Kapstein, New York: Oxford, 2000.

This is an unusual, stimulating piece of scholarship. It is exhaustively researched, linked deeply and broadly to the larger discussions circulating through Tibetan studies and the histories of religions. It is fair-minded in relation to its sources, critical of traditional historiography without being belligerent. Not only will scholars of Tibetan Buddhism benefit from this work, but also historians of Tibet generally, practitioners of tantric Buddhism, philosophers and mythologists should have this book on their shelves.

This book is unusual because it is a book in three separate but equal parts, as set out by the subtitle: "Conversion, Contestation, Memory." It concerns the adaptation of Buddhism to Tibetan soil, and the transformation of Tibet by Buddhist doctrine and practices, by its systematic expositions and narrative constructions. As such, it is not much concerned with a material history of the assimilation, but with the gradual and sudden modifications of a mental culture under the influence of an alien world view. This world view, as we learn, however, is not simple, but diverse, and Kapstein follows numerous threads of development of Buddhist thought and culture. In fact, it does not, generally by design, constitute a single history at all, and so the title is misleading. It is not a tale of the Tibetan assimilation of a monolithic Buddhism, but rather a series of tales concerning many efforts to assimilate particular (not all) aspects of diverse lines of Buddhism. As Kapstein says, the "view [that Tibetan Buddhism is] an almost invariant preservation of a perennial [Indian] tradition [is] far too simple" (69).

Because of this, the book presents a special challenge to the reviewer. It is far from easy to summarize the theme of the book. It's rather like trying to summarize a newspaper. It also brings to mind *The Thousand and One Nights* in being a story about stories, sometimes about stories within stories, with Kapstein in the role of a scholarly Scheherazade, telling the tales of "reason, truth, and history," (3) but also commenting on them, urging other scholars to correct their own readings (which are nevertheless treated respectfully), nudging legend and history towards a co-operative telling of the truth of the facts, or the truth of the tale-teller himself or the community itself. The book functions best this way. Read it cover to cover. Read the notes (rich with contemporary debates). Study it, but know that it will be difficult to give Kapstein's point of view on assimilation in simple terms. Kapstein is generous, charitable, interested in his field, personally acquainted with Tibet and many of the actors in its contemporary story, and prefers to move along the open flow of religious transformation than to fix it with a steely gaze to a single status. He has consequently offered us the textures of the assimilation.

As I read, however, I kept wondering where the theme of assimilation went. What was the character of it? Upon finishing the book, I was initially struck by the lack of a unifying conclusion. But this lack of unity itself is likely by design. Kapstein only planned to offer sketches, and while each chapter has a story to tell, none are linked all that deeply to other chapters, certainly not to those in another section, and sometimes only loosely to those in its section. No single argument is being made from beginning to end. This may be due to two factors: First, several of the chapters of the second half of the book appeared as

articles in various journals over a 12-year period. Second, Kapstein is sensitive to and wants the reader to experience the bewildering variety of ways that Buddhism became the religion and philosophy of Tibet. It is a form of pretence, he might think, to suggest that assimilation could be captured as a single thing.

I do not believe this to be a defect. Indeed, rather than bemoaning the lack of a unifying conclusion (though the tale-teller in us all might wish justifiably for such a thing), let me do what Kapstein himself does with legendary history—determine just what the lack means for Kapstein, the author. As an example, in the first section the author works back and forth between the Testament of Ba and several Dunhuang manuscripts. The former is a probably post-10th century text, purported to be earliest in origin by scholastic (11th-14th c.) Tibetan historiographers, and taken by them as historically factual. The latter are earlier in reality, probably 8th to 9th century but unknown to later scholastics. Both of the texts deal with the imperial period (7th to 9th centuries). The Testament of Ba has a sort of canonical status for Tibetan historians. It is largely fictional, however. The Dunhuang documents are much more accurate, closer in time to the events they narrate, and constitute the best factual history available for the Imperial period. Both of them, in Kapstein's opinion, have something unique to tell us of the founding of Buddhism as a Tibetan form of religion. Traditional historiography worked from the Testament of Ba. Contemporary Tibetanists, following the discovery in 1900 at Dunhuang of the Old Tibetan Annals, the Old Tibetan Chronicle, and the Old Tibetan Genealogy, work now from earlier documents. Instead of rejecting the Testament of Ba as merely legendary, Kapstein admits that legend and history cannot be clearly distinguished anyway (this attitude also grounds his treatment of myth in the third section). Consequently, he takes the Testament to provide "a vision of a world ordered by the agency of the Buddhas and bodhisattvas, a vision that was projected back upon the earlier monarchy itself." In other words, the legends of the Testament of Ba, the foundation for so much of later Tibetan historiography, tell us the truth of the authorial intention more than the facts of the imperial conversion to Buddhism. It is here that Kapstein's generosity and insight shine so brilliantly. One must assume, as Kapstein says, that there are some kernels of truths in the legends (especially since they are so early). He is ready to find what the "historical fiction" (25) of the Testament of Ba has of truth about it, whether biographical, political, or religious.

In general outline, assimilation took place in Tibet in three major modalities. The first section relates of the conversion of people and culture, their becoming Buddhist. This conversion is analysed in both legend and history. Assimilation also took place in contestation, and the second section is the most demanding read, with its considerations of epistemological debates among the scholars of Buddhism during Tibet's own scholastic period. This is the refining, correcting, and affirming of the tradition's doctrinal and philosophical positions. The third section, "Myth, Memory, Revelation," is the section that makes us wish most for a conclusion. The theme of assimilation is perhaps least evident here, but we are provided some insight into the ways in which the Nyingmapa tradition transformed the "Indian Buddhist inheritance" (178) concerning memory into "all that is present as such in the mind" (195). Assimilation is both conservation and transformation. Also, it is in this section that Kapstein's love of tales comes out so clearly. Given his defence of the unique truth of myth, and his humanistic love of story ("we cannot desist from being tellers of tales" 177), we might stamp our feet and demand that the teller of this tale bring his tale appropriately to a close. Weren't we promised the story of The Assimilation of Buddhism in Tibet? Yes, and we have been given part of it. But Kapstein is the wily Scheherezade—he ends by not ending, and we allow him to live another day to bring out further tales of Tibetan Buddhism (currently in the works).

Should you be more harsh in your demands for textual conclusiveness, then I recommend this text as a sort of narrative encyclopaedia of a several strands in Tibetan history. It is rich with substantial apparatuses, and these supplement the text nicely. It is more than adequately sub-divided, so one can scan the headings and find something of interest. All in all, this is a highly useful text, and it will set one on a quest for more information, the roads to which Kapstein has indicated throughout.

Eric M. Buck

University of Kentucky, USA

Philosophy in Classical India

Jonardon Ganeri, London: Routledge 2001, pp. 207, paper, £11.99.

The study of Indian philosophy has matured and reached a high degree of sophistication in the last couple of decades. Precisely what is Indian philosophy has been a contested issue. 5 Early on, the Orientalist fascination with matters and 'ideas' eastern and mystical led to the focus on Vedānta and other more mystically inclined schools of philosophy. But through the effort of the 'analytical reconstructionists' such as the late Bimal Matilal and his students, the more 'logical' schools such as Navya-Nyāya have come to the fore. 6 Ganeri is one of Matilal's best students, a philosopher trained in the analytical tradition and comfortable with Sanskrit texts. He has followed up his previous work on semantics 7 with a magisterial introduction to themes in classical Indian philosophy and this work deserves to be widely used in introductory philosophy courses.

A major methodological approach that Ganeri prefers is to discard the old notion of 'six orthodox darśhanas or schools' of Indian philosophy alongside the 'heterodox' schools such as Buddhists and Jains. The study of non-western and pre-modern philosophy suffers precisely from this over-emphasis on strict classification and demarcation of doctrinal boundaries, which were often not recognised by contemporaries. The tendency of scholars to use labels and categories familiar to the Western study of philosophy can lead to distorting effects. 8 Rather, he approaches the study of Indian philosophy as 'philosophy' and focuses on themes and areas of philosophical investigation. A central theme of the work is the importance of 'rationality' in the Indian tradition that draws upon the analytical approach of twentieth century philosophy to examine the literature of ancient and classical India. What was the nature of the philosophical enterprise and what were the strategies of Indian philosophers? Thus the work furthers the radical reassessment of Indian philosophy that is underway, especially among the students of Matilal.

In his introduction, Ganeri addresses the objection that an emphasis on rationalism in the Indian tradition represents a 'reconfigured Orientalism'. His response is to distinguish between 'philosophical problems and explanations' and to argue that the pursuit of philosophy lies in the use of reason, however incomplete and inadequate, and in decontextualisation and not historical reductionism. To bolster the usefulness of the text for classroom usage, he adds suggestions for further reading including Sanskrit texts appended to each chapter. Historians of ideas might not like his approach. Analytical philosophers will love it.

Six chapters constitute Ganeri's excursion into reason in classical Indian thought. Chapter one considers the nature of rationality, its scope and limits and the debate on its adequacy and use. What emerges is a sense of a 'goal-oriented and instrumental' concept of reason in the early Vedic texts and

commentaries. The analysis of 'rational inquiry' also considers the nature of debate and forms of argumentation and the rules of debate and disputational engagement. Issues of perception, scepticism and metaphysical notions of the mind and epistemological discussions of the possibility of knowledge are thus raised within this framework.

Chapter two on rationality, emptiness (śūnyatā) and the objective view analyses the sceptic Buddhist use of rationality to demonstrate the limits of proof theory and reason. Nāgārjuna's non-committed approach to causation is presented. Appearances and perception are misleading. Causation is an empty notion as necessitation is incoherent. Metaphysics or at least one's access to an ontology that unfolds the reality of an 'objective world' is not available to us. The deconstruction of reason further involves the use of paradox and self-refutation.

Chapter three on the rational basis of metaphysics examines aspects of Vaiśeṣika ontology. Category theory, taxonomies and the logical foundations of metaphysics are discussed in this school, which is of critical interest to 'analytical reconstructionists'. Of particular interest is the notion of absence as an 'entity' in contradistinction to the notion of non-existence. Simple absences are disaggregated into difference, classical negation and opposition. Further issues that would interest the philosopher and student of other traditions is his presentation of number theory, universals and natural kinds. Ganeri has a keen eye on contemporary debates and he pitches his analyses to the contemporary philosopher without neglecting the Indologist.

Chapter four entitled reduction, exclusion and rational reconstruction tackles the central issue of a theory of meaning. How does one make sense of ontology? What are properties and how do concepts and sentences bear meanings? How do properties describe and refer to features of entities? Ganeri continues his use of Buddhist strategies for a minimal and 'impoverished' ontology. Conceptualisation is thus apophatic and he presents interesting theories of meaning that signify by 'exclusion' as 'words speak of things by excluding others', and by rational extrapolation.

Chapter five addresses perspectival theories of perception and ontology based on the Jaina doctrine of 'many-sided nature' (anekāntavāda) of things. The laws of contradiction do not apply and a central paradox of the theory seems to reconcile a substance metaphysical theory of the persistence of entities in their states with a process metaphysical stress on change and flux within entities as they exist. This chapter will be of especial interest to debates on relativism, epistemological theories of truth and validity and justification. Ganeri constantly makes the issues as presented in the texts seem alive and vibrant and the success of his book and the success of any presentation of philosophy lies precisely in the ability to make issues seem immediate and of relevance.

The final chapter entitled reason in equilibrium considers the limits of reason and the threshold of doubt and returns once again to Buddhist scepticism, a running theme in the book. Indeed, a refreshing feature of Ganeri's work is to demonstrate the central location of so-called 'heterodox' doctrines in elucidating the central issues of Indian philosophy. The later logicians of the 'orthodox' schools and their rationality are also inconceivable without the Buddhist onslaught on objectivism. Proof and supposition are incomplete and argumentation is balanced by doubt without lapsing into doxastic adherence to school positions. Elucidating endnotes, bibliography, suggestions for further reading and a useful index further enhance the text.

Ganeri's text points the way forward for producing text-books for philosophy courses on non-western traditions and is based upon his teaching at Nottingham University and King's College London. As a

template, it deserves to be widely copied. As an introduction to central problems of rationality in philosophy, it is as useful as many texts in so-called 'mainstream European philosophy' and has the added virtue of clarity. Scholars in the field of Islamic philosophy have much to learn from it.

Sajjad Rizvi

Pembroke College, UK

Notes:

He refers to two of his own works: *The prayer and tears of Jacques Derrida: religion without religion*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1997, and *Deconstruction in a nutshell: a conversation with Jacques Derrida*, New York: Fordham University Press 1997.

See his *Radical Hermeneutics*, Bloomington: Indian University Press 1987 and the follow-up volume published in 1998.

The mystical element in Heidegger's thought, Pennsylvania: Oberlin Printing Co. 1978.

The controversy began with Corbin's edition and study of *Niẓār-i Khusraw*, *Kitāb jami' al-'ikmātain*, Tehran: L'Institut Franco-Iranien 1953, which presented the naturalisation of Neoplatonism in Ismī'īlī philosophy. See also the recent book of Alice Hunsberger, *Nasir-i Khusraw: The Ruby of Badakhshan*, *Ismaili Heritage Series*, London: I.B. Tauris 2000 (Reviewed in this journal, vol 2, no 2, p 92).

See the excellent consideration of this question in Wilhelm Halbfass, "Darśana, ānvāyikā, Philosophy," in *India and Europe: an essay in understanding*, Albany: State University of New York Press 1988, pp. 275-310.

See Matilal's classic work *Perception: An essay on classical Indian theories of knowledge*, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1986, which is dedicated to two pre-eminent figures of Oxford philosophy, Sir Peter Strawson and Michael Dummett.

Semantic Powers: Meaning and means of knowing in classical Indian philosophy, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1999.

See Ganeri's deconstruction of the concept of the 'Hindu syllogism' in "The Hindu syllogism: Nineteenth century perceptions of Indian logical thought," *Philosophy East and West* 46 (1996) pp. 1-16.

Books published in Iran

Works on philosophy

In this issue, we consider some of the works published on philosophy in the past year including editions and translation of classical texts.

Bihnjm 'Arabç-Zanjnç, Sharç'atç va SurÊsh: Barrasç-yi muqbilç-yi jrj va na'ariyyit (Sharç'atç and SurÊsh: a comparative study of their opinions and theories), Tehran: Aryabjn va akhavjn 2000, pp. 144.

This work provides a theoretical comparison of the views of the late 'Alç Sharç'atç with the contemporary thinker 'Abdol Karçm SurÊsh, drawing out points of convergence and also indicating major methodological divergences. The comparison is an important one since they are both critical figures among the religious intellectuals of post-war Iran and represent the paradigm of the 'engaged and committed intellectual'. In a comprehensive introduction, the author explains his choice of subjects and after introducing the intellectual and social histories of the two individuals, expounds his process of selection. He addresses certain key themes and issues such as religion, the state, society, intellectualism and freedom, ideology, the religious establishment, academia, jurisprudence and the theory of the sovereignty of the jurist (wiljyat al-faqçh).

Ghuljm-°usain Ibrjhçmç Dçnjnç, Mijara-yi fikr-i falsafç dar jahjn-i Isljm (The course of philosophical thought in the Islamic world), 3 vols., Tehran: ±arç-i naw 2000, 3rd volume, pp. 478.

Dçnjnç is not only an important member of the Department of Philosophy at Tehran University but a well-known public figure, lecturer and writer recognised as an expert on the history of Islamic thought. These three volumes collect over seventy of his articles published in various journals and collections, some brief surveys, others opinion pieces and other still critiques of major thinkers. They are a testimony to his life's work and represent a major aspect of contemporary Islamic thought. Each volume is well supported with indices and appendices on personages, works and texts cited as well as concepts discussed.

Muçsin Kadçvar & Muçammad NÊrç, Mjkhudh-shinjç-yi 'ulÊm-i 'aqlç: manjbi'-yi çjç-yi 'ulÊm-i 'aqlç az ibtidj' tj 1375 shamsç (A bibliography of the intellectual sciences: sources printed up to 1996), 3 vols., Tehran: RÊznjma-yi iÊÛilj'it 2000, pp. 3418.

Scholars of the intellectual disciplines in Islam will be grateful to the authors for their painstaking work in preparing this bibliography. It collates information on works produced since the advent of publishing in Iran until 1996. As such it is an invaluable research tool, presents a survey of the work of scholars and their interest over the ages and it provides valuable insights into the work of non-Muslim philosophers in Iran and the rest of the world. The authors set these reasons out for undertaking this project in their introduction. The volumes include works either produced in Arabic or Persian as well as works translated into these two languages. The indices are highly useful, providing information by author and work systematically presented. Complete bibliographical details are provided. Volumes one and two are the alphabetical listing of sources and volume three is the index for the work. A welcome contribution to research.

Bahrjm Munta'irç, Andçsha-yi siyjsç-yi Fjrjbç: andçsha-hj-yi siyjsç dar tjrçkh-i Isljm (The political thought of Fjrjbç: political thought in Islamic history), Tehran: Hamrjh 2000, pp. 202.

The Platonising political philosophy of the classical philosopher Fīrībī (d. 950) is a critical entry into the study of political thought in Islamic philosophy. The author uses him as a standard against which he compares later thinkers on their political thought such as Avicenna (d. 1037), Averroes (d. 1198), Mīr Dīmīd (d. 1631) and Mullī ʿadri (d. 1641). The author examines Fīrībī's political ethics, his views on society and the cosmos, on family, on prophecy, on the pursuit of happiness, and on the virtuous city/society. In the final part of the work, he then subjects this Platonist account to a comparison with the political philosophy of Imāmī Shi'ism which should be of special interest to Fīrībī scholars given the debates around his confessional standing.

Fīrībī, *Andāsh-hj-yi ahl-i madīna-yi fāila* (On the principles of the views of the inhabitants of the virtuous city), translated and annotated by Sayyid Ja'far Sajjīdī, Tehran: Sizmīn-i chīp va intishārit-i vizīrat-i Irshād 2000, pp. 311.

This work is a Persian annotated translation on the Farabian classic that established Platonic political thought in Islam modelled upon Plato's Republic. The work discusses the metaphysical and cosmological foundations of a political ethics and then establishes a utopian model city-state. Comprising an introduction and thirty-seven chapters, the text begins with the author's discussion of Fīrībī's work and thought upon political arrangements in human society. The text proper then goes onto discussing the ontological and cosmological hierarchy in existence, beginning with Prime Being and His attributes and states, and moving onto the effusion of being from Him that establishes this hierarchy through the Neoplatonic (in particular Proclean) theory of emanation. Fīrībī then discusses the nature and value of ethics and moves onto his description of human society, comparing different states. He presents a holistic and organic theory of society likening it to a body. The cosmos and the human body correspond as two aspects of the same model as macrocosm and microcosm. He ends with practical ethics, virtue and the means for establishing a utopia.

Muḥammad Bihishtī, *Shinākhht az dādgīh-i fiṣrat* (Cognition considered from a point of view of human nature), Tehran: Bugha 2000, pp. 184.

The author, a university lecturer at the university student branch of the Islamic Republican Party, presents a series of pieces on the nature of epistemology. The articles are quite elementary and avoid overly sophisticated or complex philosophical arguments. Epistemological considerations are critical because they lie at the heart of man's ability to make sense of his environment. Each chapter is appended with questions and answers, which again indicate the origins of these pieces as classroom discussions.

Some of the issues tackled include the nature of knowledge and man's relationship to his environment, observation, mysticism, objectivity and subjectivity, mental states and actual states, the nature of thought, cognitive dissonance, types of perception and knowledge, contradiction and dialectic, the limits of empiricism and the Qur'ān and observation. The key argument concerns how to discern a correct method for arriving at knowledge of objective reality.

Mullî ʿadrij, *Al-tanqıç fî l-manşiq* (Expurgation on logic), ed. Ghulîm-Rixî Yisçpêr, Tehran: ʿadrij Islamic Philosophy Institute 2000, pp. 60.

This is the third time in around twenty years that ʿadrij's short epitome on logic has been edited. It was previously edited by ʿAbd al-Muḥsin Mishkîṭ al-dċnç along with a Persian translation, and more recently in 1996 by ʿġmid İḡfahjñç in his collection of the shorter treatises of ʿadrij. Farmarız Qırjmalikç introduces the work, discussing logical genres in Islamic scholarship, the structure of the work and ʿadrij's logical method and the method in which the edition was conducted. He also considers the question of the work's ascription to ʿadrij and its validity.

The editor has used four manuscripts from the Majlis-i Shēra and the Faculty of Theology at Tehran University, and has utilised the previous editions. The text itself is based around the nine-part Aristotelian organon and each chapter is named after one of those books (namely *Isagoge*, *Categories*, *De Interpretatione*, *Prior Analytics*, *Posterior Analytics*, *Topics*, *Sophistical Refutations*), although the chapters are called 'illuminations' a term from Illuminationist (*ishrîqç*) philosophy.

Suhrawardç, *Hayikil al-nêr* (Temples of light), ed. M. Karçmç Zanjinç, Tehran: Nuqşa 2000, pp. 208.

The editor has collated the Arabic text of the original with a Persian translation made in the Muzaffarid period. The work itself is a short classic of the Illuminationist school, which was the subject of many commentaries in both Iran and India in the early modern period. A brief text, it comprises an introduction and seven chapters. It discusses the immediacy of man and the relationship of his body and his soul, of its origin and its return to the One. It is a critical Illuminationist examination of the theory of the soul.

Muḥammad Nêrç, Iran

Sajjad Rizvi, Pembroke College, UK

Books received

The titles mentioned here are either reviewed in the current issue or will be reviewed in future issues of the journal.

Abdel Haleem, M., *Understanding the Qur'an: Themes and Style*, London: I B Tauris 1999.

Acikgenc, A., *Scientific Thought and its Burden*, Istanbul: Fatih University Publications 2000.

Bahrîm Muntaʿirç, *Andçsha-yi siyısç-yi Fırjibç: andçsha-hj-yi siyısç dar tjrçkh-i Islîm* (The political thought of Fırjibç: political thought in Islamic history), Tehran: Hamrîh 2000, pp. 202.

Barry Miller, *A most unlikely God: a philosophical enquiry into the nature of God*, Notre Dame/London: University of Notre Dame Press 1996, pp. 175, cloth, £21.50.

Benmakhlouf, A., *Le vocabulaire de Frege*, Paris: Ellipses 2001.

Bergson, H., *Time and Free Will*, New York: Dover 2001.

Bihñim 'Arabç-Zanjınç, Sharç'atç va SurÊsh: Barrasç-yi muqbilç-yi irj va na"ariyyit (Sharç'atç and SurÊsh: a comparative study of their opinions and theories), Tehran: Aryabın va akhavın 2000, pp. 144.

Corcoran, K. (ed), *Soul, Body, and Survival: Essays on the Metaphysics of Human Persons*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press 2001.

Correspondance Ivanow-Corbin: lettres échangées entre Henry Corbin et Vladimir Ivanow de 1947 à 1966, ed. Sabine Schmidtke, *Travaux et mémoires de l'Institut d'études Iraniennes*, Peeters, Louvain 1999, 235pp, paper, no price given.

Cort, J., *Jains in the World: Religious Values and Ideology in India*, New York: Oxford University Press 2001.

Crone, P. & Zimmermann, F., *The Epistle of Salim ibn Dhakwan*, New York: Oxford University Press 2001.

David Ray Griffin, *Reenchantment without Supernaturalism, A Process Philosophy of Religion*, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2001, PP 426.

Engel, P. (ed), *Precis de philosophie analytique*, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 2000.

Esposito, J. & Voll, J., *Makers of Contemporary Islam*, New York: Oxford University Press 2001.

Fırjbç, Andçsh-hj-yi ahl-i madçna-yi fıřıla (On the principles of the views of the inhabitants of the virtuous city), translated and annotated by Sayyid Ja'far Sajjidç, Tehran: Sizmın-i çıp va intishırıt-i vizırat-i Irşid 2000, pp. 311.

Flanagan, O., *Dreaming Souls: Sleep, dreams, and the evolution of the conscious mind*, New York: Oxford University Press 2000.

Ghulım-°usayn Ibrıhçmç Dçnınç, *Mıjara-yi fikr-i falsafç dar jahın-i Islım* (The course of philosophical thought in the Islamic world), 3 vols., Tehran: ±arç-i naw 2000, 3rd volume, pp. 478.

Haeri, M., *The Chistis: A Living Light*, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001.

James McEvoy, *Robert Grosseteste*, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2000. Pp.vii + 219 (paper: ISBN 0-19-511450-7).

John D. Caputo, *On Religion, Thinking in Action Series*, London: Routledge 2001, pp. 147, paper, £7.99.

John Walbridge, *The leaven of the ancients: Suhrawardç and the heritage of the Greeks*, SUNY Series in Islam, Albany: State University of New York Press 2000, pp. xviii + 305, paper, £18.50.

Jonardon Ganeri, *Philosophy in Classical India*, London: Routledge 2001, pp. 207, paper, £11.99.

Mann, G., *The Making of Sikh Scripture*, New York: Oxford University Press 2001.

Matthew T. Kapstein, *The Tibetan Assimilation of Buddhism: Conversion, Contestation, and Memory*, New York: Oxford, 2000.

McDermott, R., *Mother of My Heart, Daughter of My Dreams: Kali and Uma in the Devotional Poetry of Bengal*, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001.

McKim, R., *Religious Ambiguity and Religious Diversity*, New York: Oxford University Press 2001.

Muhammad Bihisht, *Shinkht az d'gdgh-i fi\$rat (Cognition considered from a point of view of human nature)*, Tehran: Bugha 2000, pp. 184.

Muhammad Kadavar & Muhammad N'ar, *Mikhudh-shinj\$-yi 'ul'm-i 'aql: manjbi'-yi chip\$-yi 'ul'm-i 'aql az ibtidj' tj 1375 shams\$ (A bibliography of the intellectual sciences: sources printed up to 1996)*, 3 vols., Tehran: R'znjma-yi i\$ili't 2000, pp. 3418.

Mullj 'adrij, *Al-tanq' f' l-man\$iq (Expurgation on logic)*, ed. Ghulj'm-Rixj Yis'p'Er, Tehran: 'adrij Islamic Philosophy Institute 2000, pp. 60.

Oliver Leaman, *A Brief Introduction to Islamic Philosophy*, Cambridge: Polity Press 1999, pp. 199, paper, £12.95.

Ozcoidi, I. M., *La Concepcion de la Filosofia en Averroes: Analisis critico del Tahafut al-tahafut*, Madrid: Editorial Trotta 2001.

Pascoe, D., *Airspace*, London: Reaktion Books 2001.

Richard C. Martin, Mark R. Woodward, *Defenders of Reason in Islam: Mu'tazilism from Medieval School to Modern Symbol*, with DWI S. Atmaja: Oneworld Publication, 1997.

Suhraward, Haykil al-n'Er (*Temples of light*), ed. M. Kar'cm' Zanjin', Tehran: Nuq\$ha 2000, pp. 208.

Thakur, L., *Buddhism in the Western Himalaya: A Study of the Tabo Monastery*, New York: Oxford University Press 2001.

Recent Articles

The titles mentioned here are articles on Islamic Philosophy and Mysticism published in other journals. *Al-Qantara* (Madrid)

E. Tornero, "Sobre la génesis y la intención de 'El Filosofo autodidacto'," vol. 19 (1998) pp. 205-10.

G. Saliba, "Critiques of Ptolemaic astronomy in Islamic Spain," vol. 20 (1999) pp. 3-26.

E. Tornero, "Falsafa versus 'Arabiyya: al-Riz'," vol. 21 (2000) pp. 3-16.

C. Baffioni, "Different conceptions of religious practice, piety and God-man relations in the epistles of the Ikhwin al-'afi'," vol. 21 (2000) pp. 381-6.
Al-Shajarah (ISTAC, Malaysia)

- A. Açıkgenç, "The framework for a history of Islamic philosophy," vol. 1 (1996) pp. 1-19.
- B. Kuspınar, "İsmi'cl Ankarıvç and the significance of his commentary in the Mevlevç tradition," vol. I (1996) pp. 51-75.
- M.M. Abou-Sway, "Al-Ghazılç's 'spiritual crisis'," vol. I (1996) pp. 77-94.
- M. Zaidi bin İsmail, "Logic in al-Ghazılç's theory of certitude," vol. I (1996) pp. 95-125.
- Wan Mohd Nor Wan Daud, "Islamization of contemporary knowledge: A brief comparison between al-Attas and Fazlur Rahman," vol. 2 (1997) pp. 1-19.
- K.O. Kamaruzaman, "Towards forming an Islamic methodology of Religionswissenschaft: The case of al-BçrEnç," vol. 3 (1998) pp. 19-44.
- A.N. Diyjb, "A preliminary approach to İbn 'Arabç's theophanic anthropology," vol. 3 (1998) pp. 45-111.
- M. Moris, "Mullı ıadri's doctrine of the primary of existence (aıılat al-wujİd)," vol. 3 (1998) pp. 113-34.
- P. Lettinck, "İbn Sçni on atomism. Translation of İbn Sçni's Kitıb al-Shifı' al-ıabç'ıyyıt 1: al-samı' al-ıabç'ç Third Treatise, Chapters 3-5," vol. 4 (1999) pp. 1-51.
- A.N. Diyjb, "Intellect and imagination in İbn 'Arabç's anthropological epistemology," vol. 4 (1999) pp. 53-74.
- A.N. Diyjb, "The hierarchy of the Perfect Man according to İbn 'Arabç," vol. 4 (1999) pp. 175-98.

Arabic Sciences and Philosophy (Cambridge)

- A. Abou-Aly, "A few notes on unayn's translation and İbn al-Nafçs' commentary on the First Book of the Aphorisms," vol. 10 (2000) pp. 139-50.
- D. Gutas, "Avicenna's Eastern ('Oriental') philosophy. Nature, contents, transmissions," vol. 10 (2000) pp. 159-80.
- R. Wisnovsky, "Notes on Avicenna's concept of thingness (ıay'ıyya)," vol. 10 (2000) pp. 181-222.
- M. Rashed, "Théodicée et approximation: Avicenne," vol. 10 (2000) pp. 223-58.
- T-A. Druart, "The human soul's individuation and its survival after the body's death: Avicenna on the causal relation between body and soul," vol. 10 (2000) pp. 259-74.
- J. Jolivet, "Al-ıahrastınc's critique d'Avicenne dans la Lutte contre les Philosophes (quelques aspects)," vol. 10 (2000) pp. 275-92.

Arabica (Paris)

A. Al-Masri, "Imagination and the Qur'ān in the theology of 'oneness of being'," vol. 47 (2000) pp. 523-35.

Asian Philosophy (Nottingham)

S.H. Rizvi, "An Islamic subversion of the existence-essence distinction? Suhrawardī's visionary hierarchy of lights," vol. 9 (1999) pp. 219-27.

Bulletin of SOAS

L. Lewisohn, "An introduction to the history of modern Persian Sufism part I: The Ni'matullahī order: persecution, revival and schism," vol. 61 (1998) pp. 437-64.

L. Lewisohn, "An introduction to the history of modern Persian Sufism part II: A socio-cultural profile from the Dhahabī revival to the present day," vol. 62 (1999) pp. 36-59.

M.A. Amir-Moezzi, "Une absence remplie de presences: Herméneutique de l'occultation chez les Shaykhiyya," vol. 64 (2001) pp. 1-18.

History and Philosophy of Logic

T. Street, "Avicenna and al-ʿIṣṣā on the contradiction and conversion of the absolute," vol. 21 (2000) pp. 45-56.

International Journal of Middle East Studies (MESA)

S.A. Jackson, "The alchemy of domination? Some Ash'arite responses to Mu'tazilite ethics," vol. 31 (1999) pp. 185-201.

V.J. Hoffman, "Annihilation in the messenger of God: The development of a Sufi practice," vol. 31 (1999) pp. 351-69.

International Philosophical Quarterly (CUA)

D. Burrell, "Freedom and creation in the Abrahamic traditions," v. 40 (1999) pp. 161-71.

Iran (Journal of BIPS)

Y. Noorani, "Islamic modernity and the desiring self: Muhammad Iqbal and the poetics of narcissism," vol. 38 (2000) pp. 123-36.

Iranian Studies (SIS)

A. Matin-Asgari, "Abdolkarim Soroush and the secularization of Islamic thought in Iran," vol. 30 (1997) pp. 85-115.

Journal of the American Oriental Society

G. Saliba, "Writing the history of Arabic astronomy: problems and differing perspectives," vol. 116 (1996) pp. 709-18.

Tony Street, "On studying Arabic logic," vol. 117 (1997) pp. 536-41.

H. Landolt, "Henry Corbin, 1903-78: Between philosophy and orientalism," vol. 119 (1999) pp. 484-90.

Journal of the History of Philosophy

T. Kukkonen, "Possible worlds in the Tahīfut al-Tahīfut. Averroes on plenitude and possibility," vol. 38 (1999) pp. 329-47.

T. Kukkonen, "Possible worlds in the Tahīfut al-falṣifa: Al-Ghazālī on creation and contingency," vol. 38 (1999) pp. 479-502.

Journal of the History of Ideas

T. Kukkonen, "Plenitude, possibility and the limits of reason: A medieval Arabic debate on the metaphysics of nature," vol. 61 (2000) pp. 539-60.

Journal of Islamic Studies (Oxford)

Y. Michot, "Ibn Taymiyya on astrology," vol. 11 (2000) pp. 147-208.

T. Street, "Toward a history of syllogistic after Avicenna: Notes on Rescher's Studies on Arabic modal logic," vol. 11 (2000) pp. 209-28.

J. Janssens, "Al-Ghazālī's Tahīfut: Is it really a rejection of Ibn Sīnā's philosophy?" vol. 12 (2001) pp. 1-17.

T. Mayer, "Ibn Sīnā's 'Burhān al-īddiqān'," vol. 12 (2001) pp. 18-39.

Le Muséon (Louvain)

J. Michot, "La réponse d'Avicenne à Bahmanyâr et al-Kirmînç," vol. 110 (1997) pp. 143-222.

I. Alon, "Bargaining with God," vol. 110 (1997) pp. 223-43.

F. Klein-Franke, "The relation between knowledge and being in Islam. Annotations to Rashîd ad-Dîr's 'Book of Questions and Answers,'" vol. 113 (2000) pp. 205-220.

Muslim World (Hartford Seminary)

A. Buehler, "Currents of Sufism in nineteenth and twentieth century Indo-Pakistan: an overview," vol. 87 (1997) pp. 299-314.

M. Hermansen, "Religious literature and the inscription of identity: the Sufi tazkira tradition in Muslim South Asia," vol. 87 (1997) pp. 315-29.

V. Martin, "Khumaini, knowledge and the political process," vol. 87 (1997) pp. 1-16.

C. Ernst, "Vertical pilgrimage and interior landscape in the visionary diary of RÊzbihân Baqlîç (d. 1209)," vol. 88 (1998) pp. 129-40.

Y.B. Mermer, "The hermeneutical dimension of science: a critical analysis based on Said Nursî's Risale-i nur," vol. 89 (1999) pp. 270-96.

F. Rogers, "The Islamic ethics of abortion," vol. 89 (1999) pp. 122-29.

D. Brown, "Islamic ethics in comparative perspective," vol. 89 (1999) pp. 181-92.

M. Abaza, "A note on Henry Corbin and Seyyed Hossein Nasr: affinities and differences," vol. 90 (2000) pp. 91-106.

G.S. Reynolds, "A Sufi approach to food," vol. 90 (2000) pp. 198-207.

O. Safi, "Bargaining with baraka: Persian Sufism, 'mysticism', and pre-modern politics," vol. 90 (2000) pp. 259-88.

S. Bashir, "Enshrining divinity: the death and memorialization of Fażlallîh Astarîbjîdîç in °urÊfîç thought," vol. 90 (2000) pp. 289-308.

D. DeWeese, "Sacred places and 'public' narratives: the shrine of Aîmad Yasavîç in hagiographical traditions of the Yasavîç Êfîç order," vol. 90 (2000) pp. 353-76.

J.J. Elias, "A second 'Alîç: the making of Sayyid 'Alîç Hamadîjîç in popular imagination," vol. 90 (2000) pp. 395-420.

Philosophy East and West (Hawai'i)

A. Smirnov, "Nicholas of Cusa and Ibn 'Arabi: Two philosophies of mysticism," vol. 43 (1993) pp. 65-86.

A. Smirnov, "Understanding justice in an Islamic context: some points of contrast with Western theories," vol. 46 (1996) pp. 337-50.

Studia Iranica (Paris)

H. Landolt, "Le paradoxe de 'face de Dieu'," vol. 25 (1996) pp. 163-92.

S. Rizvi, "Roots of an aporia in later Islamic philosophy: the existence-essence distinction in the metaphysics of Avicenna and Suhrawardi," vol. 29 (2000) pp. 61-108.

Studia Islamica (Paris)

C. Genequand, "Idolatrie, astrolatrie et sabéisme," vol. 89 (1999) pp. 109-28.

J. Mojaddedi, "Legitimizing Sufism in al-Qushayrī's Risāla," vol. 90 (2000) pp. 37-50.

N.S. Amri, "Walī et awliyī' dans l'Ifriqiya médiévale. De l'activité originelle d'une motion aux modalités historique de son activation," vol. 90 (2000) pp. 23-36.

C. Addas, "L'oeuvre poétique d'Ibn 'Arabī et sa réception," vol. 91 (2001) pp. 23-39.

H. Landolt, "ʿaydar-i ʿmulī et les deux mi'rājs," vol. 91 (2001) pp. 91-106.